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The theory of the firm is solidly grounded in the works of Augustin 
Cournot and Alfred Marshall. It is from these individuals that price 
theory obtained some of the mathematical and geometric models of profit 
maximizing behavior. Marshall had a well developed theory of monopoly, 
but chose to devote his energies to a study o~ firms operating in markets 
characterized by" •.• freedom of industry and enterprise" (93, p. 345). 
Cournot was the first to develop a mathematical model of monopoly. Since 
Cournot and Marshall, most works in price theory have been refinements 
of the marginalist ideas they advocated. Predictions regarding managerial 
behavior were based upon the assumptions of profit maximization and the 
particular structure of the market in which the firm operated. Thus 
the works of Arthur C. Pigou, Joan Robinson, Edward Chamberlin, and 
Heinrich von Stackelberg presented alternative models of prof it maximizing 
behavior under the assumption of different market structures. Later, 
economists recognized that not only does market structure affect market 
conduct which, in turn affects market performance, but they also 
recognized the importance of feedback effects of conduct and performance 
on market structure. 
While these developments in economic theory have been indispensible 
in analyzing managerial behavior, price theory has not gone unchallenged. 
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Economists began to challenge the profit maximization model. Some 
suggested that the maximand was naive. Output and revenue maximization 
models were formulated as alternative theories of the firm, but these 
models appeared to have less predictive content than the profit max:i.-
mization model. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, economists began 
to infer from the works of Becker (12), Alchian and Kessel (4), and 
2 
Coase (20) that there may be a· more general model of decision-making 
behavior than that described by the theory of the firm. These pioneering 
works cumulatively implied that managerial behavior is a utility-
maximization process whereby managers maximize utility subject to a set 
of costs and rewards. Under certain assumptions, the utility maximi-
zation theory of managerial behavior reduces to the standard prof it-
maximization model. Consequently, the traditional theory of the firm 
can be conceived of as a subset of a more general utility-maximization 
theory of managerial behavior. 
The essence of the economic theory of property rights is that 
decision-makers maximize utility.by consuming both pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary income subject to an opportunity set function. This 
constraint on managerial behavior is conceived to be some function of 
the market environment in which the firm operates, the technological 
characteristics of the firm, general laws and mores regarding behavior, 
and profit requirements of the owners of the firm. An analysis of any 
industry will generate a set of characteristics unique to that industry. 
These characteristics shape the opportunity set constraining managerial 
behavior. 
In order to avoid interpersonal comparisons of utility functions, 
managers are assumed to have the same tastes and preferences for things 
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that provide satisfaction. Organizational theorists have provided 
property rights theorists with a long list of things considered to be 
likely sources of managerial satisfaction. Once certain sources of 
utility are related to certain managerial activities, testable implica-
tions of the property rights theory of managerial behavior can be 
generated for a host of managerial activities by altering cost-reward 
(property rights) structures. In defending this approach, Alchian and 
Kessel (4) note that meaningful implications of property rights theory 
can be generated by postulating what variables affect managerial utility. 
"This leads to meaningful implications refutable, in principle, by 
observable events" (p. 158). 
Many of the empirical investigations of the property rights theory 
of managerial behavior have been tests of firm efficiency and have been 
extended to a number of industries: savings and loan associations (81), 
airlines (27), hospitals (19), insurance companies (39), electric power 
companies (74), and water utilities (69, 79, 23, 48). For reasons noted 
in Chapter II and again in Chapter IV, tests of the efficiency predic-
tions of the theory of property rights are incomplete. Further, very 
little property rights analysis has been done for other aspects of 
managerial. behavior such as pricing and product policies, particularly 
product quality. Many studies have not distinguished between ownership 
rights and other factors that affect the manager's opportunity set. 
There has been virtually no attempt to isolate ownership from other 
noneconomic influences on opportunity sets. Nor have there been 
attempts, with the exception of Mann (66), to try to isolate political 
effects on managerial behavior. 
The theoretical models employed by property rights theorists range 
from heuristic models to geometric and constrained optimization models. 
Each of these models differ somewhat depending on the aspect of property 
rights theory being analyzed. There appears to have been no attempt to 
formulate a general model of managerial behavior that can incorporate 
the relaxation of a number of ownership rights as well as other factors 
unique to the industry under investigation. 
Objectives 
It is the intent of this dissertation to formulate a geometric 
model of a manager's utility maximizing behavior. In particular, the 
model will allow for the relaxation of the set of ownership rights that 
describe the "classical" firm. The model will also be useful in 
describing the expected effects on managerial behavior when considering 
other industry characteristics that shape the constraints faced by 
managers. The model is then used to generate testable implications 
regarding managerial behavior for the water utility industry. 
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The water utility industry was selected for several reasons. First, 
there are both investor- and publicly-owned firms which allow for the 
test of implications under conditions of alternative ownership rights. 
Second, there are other characteristics of the water industry that are 
expected to affect the manager's opportunity set and as a result 
managerial behavior. One such characteristic is the industry's 
regulatory structure. Ideally, these other industry characteristics 
should be controlled for when trying to isolate the effect of ownership 
on managerial behavior. Third, until recent years there has been little 
economic analysis of the water utility industry. Fourth, there are 
testable implications of the theory of property rights that have been 
developed here and elsewhere that either have not been applied to the 
water industry or have been applied but involve methodological problems 
that make the results of such tests less than conclusive. Finally, 
results of hypotheses regarding firm efficiency.and product quality may 
have important policy implications regarding water conservation and 
water quality. 
The hypotheses to be tested for the water utility industry entail 
hypotheses relating to (1) firm efficiency, (2) product quality, and 
(3) rate-making policies. Specifically, it will be hypothesized in 
Chapter IV that public water agency managers reJative to private water 
managers will e:;:ploy more labor and ca pi ta1, incur higher costs, combine 
inputs less efr;_ci.ently, incur more :i..nput waste, charge lower prices 
for all custorr.< groups, price' discriminate less, give preferential 
treatment to U1e high-usage relative to low-usage customers and resi-
dents relative to non-residents, and produce a higher quality product. 
Additionally, tests relating to the local regulatory-political effects 
on managerial behavior will be conducted, in part, to determine if 
ownership is an important non-economic determinant of managerial 
behavior after controlling for these effects. 
Organization 
Following the introduction, Chapter II presents the property 
rights theory of managerial behavior by first discussing the set of 
assumptions which underly the "classical firm" and the seminal analyses 
that relaxed these assumptions. The largest part of Chapter II, 
however, consists of a derivation of a geometric model of managerial 
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behavior. Chapter III discusses the characteristics of the water 
utility industry, some of which constitute important constraints on a 
water manager's behavior. Chapter IV consists of an application of the 
property rights model to the water utility industry. In this chapter, 
testable implications are produced with respect to firm efficiency, 
rate-making practices, and product quality. 
Chapter V presents the sample, data, method, and empirical results 
of the firm efficiency and product quality hypotheses. Similarly, 
Chapter VI formulates statistical tests and presents results for the 
rate-making hypotheses. Chapter VII discusses the empirical tests and 
results of hypotheses relating to the effect that local regulatory-
political influence has on manage!"ial behavior. Finally, Chapter VIII 
presents conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Introduction 
The recent interest in the theory of property rights has resulted, 
in part, from dissatisfaction with the traditional explanations of 
market performance. The traditional approach to explaining market 
behavior has been to investigate the relationship between market 
structure, market conduct, and market performance. While this paradigm 
has been indispensible to the economist's understanding of the economic 
behavior of the firm, there is a growing realization that the theory 
of the firm is but a subset of a more general theory of decision-making 
behavior. The traditional theory of the firm is based upon certain 
restrictive assumptions to be discussed below that are unlikely to 
obtain in modern-day markets. A more general theory of the firm would 
allow for the relaxation of these assumptions. It is the relaxation 
of these assumptions which constitutes much of the work in property 
rights theory. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the economic 
theory of decision makers within firms. This will be accomplished by 
relaxing the set of assumptions that constitute the "classical" owner-
ship characteristics. 
Characteristics of the Classical Firm 
Alchian and Demsetz (3) pointed out that the "classical" firm has 
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certain important characteristics: 
1. the owner-manager is the claimant to the residual income of 
the firm; 
2. the owner-manager has the right to observe the behavior of 
inputs and, through being the central party to all contracting, 
can revise and terminate input employment contracts; and 
3. the owner-manager has the right to transfer or sell the rights 
in (1) and (2) above. 
If these ownership rights are fully assigned and transactions and 
policing costs are zero, property rights will guide incentives such that 
externalities are internalized. According to Demsetz (34), 
(1) . the value of all harmful and beneficial effects 
of alternative uses of property rights will be brought 
to bear on their owners; 
(2) (if) . • . owners of property rights are utility 
maximizers, property rights will be used efficiently; 
and, 
(3) the mix of output that is produced will be independent 
of the distribution of property rights among persons 
except insofar as changes in the distribution of wealth 
affect demand patterns (p. 62). 
Given the above set of ownership characteristics and assumptions 
regarding transactions costs, owners' policing costs, and the degree 
to which property rights are assigned, a utility-maximizing owner-
manager would behave in ways consistent with the theory of the firm. 
Relaxation of Assumptions 
The conclusion above depends upon a restrictive set of assumptions 
that are unlikely to be met is present-day markets. The assumption of 
zero transactions costs was first relaxed by Coase (20). He noted 
that the initial partitioning of property rights would not affect the 
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allocation of resources as long as transactions costs are zero. Property 
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rights are partially transferred or partitioned via the contract. Coase 
observed that, even if contracts are able to fully assign property 
rights, resources may be misallocated if transactions costs are positive. 
As a result, managerial activities may no longer be consistent with 
those predicted by the theory of the firm. 
Traditional economic theory has dealt, however, with the problem of 
externalities. If has been shown that the assumption of zero external-
ities is incorrect to the extent that private marginal benefits and 
costs diverge from social marginal benefits and costs. Property rights 
theorists such as Cheung (17, 18) have shown that the extent to which 
private and social marginal benefits and costs diverge can be explained 
by individuals not having the right to contract, or to contracts with 
incomplete stipulations. For example, the common pool problem in 
natural resource economics is an example of markets participants having 
a non-exclusive contract with high transactions costs. Both McKean (72) 
and Posner (91) have done work in the area of transactions costs, 
externalities, and contracts. McKean analyzed product liability 
contracts. He explains that different liability assignments result in 
different transactions costs and therefore cause different uses of 
resources. Posner's work is in the area of a property rights analysis 
of the law. In sum, positive transactions costs and contracts 
incomplete in the assignment of property rights often result in 
externalities. The market mechanism may not internalize these in the 
firm's decision-making resulting in a suboptimal allocation of 
resources. 
Most property rights studies, however, have been concerned with a 
relaxation of the ownership characteristics of the classical firm. The 
ownership characteristics of the classical firm mentioned above are not 
applicable to many of our present-day enterprises. That is, owners and 
management are separated in both the modern corporation and in the 
public firm. Owners in regulated industries have an attenuated right 
to the firm's residual income. Owners of public firms have no right to 
the residual income of the firm nor do they have a right to transfer 
ownership of the public firm. Because the characteristics of many 
present-day decision-making units diverge from the characteristics of 
the classical firm, an understanding of the institutional, market, and 
political environment in which these units operate is a necessary step 
in analyzing modern economic behavior. 
Managerial Objectives 
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Traditional economic theory assumes that the firm's objective is to 
maximize profits. Economic theory therefore predicts price-output 
policies of profit maximizing firms that operate at some point within a 
range of possible market structures. Observed firm behavior does not 
always conform to that predicted by economic theory. Furthermore, the 
behavioral implications of prof it-maximizing models are somewhat 
limited. As a result, it has been suggested that firms pursue goals 
other than profit-maximization such as output maximization, profit 
satisficing, and revenue maximization (64, 57). These objective 
functions, however, seem to be even more limited in terms of their 
predictive content than the standard profit maximizing model. 
An alternative explanation as to why firms seem to behave in ways 
inconsistent with prof it maximization theory is that the behavior of 
firms results from rational responses by utility-maximizing managers. 
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Becker (12) was one of the first to explain managerial behavior as a 
utility maximization process. He incorporated tastes for discrimination 
as a nonpecuniary source of income in the manager's utility function to 
explain, among other things, why some firms would forego profits in 
order to hire less efficient but socially-attractive employees. The 
first systematic description of the economics of property rights was 
by Alchian and Kessel (4). They argued that the firm's observed 
behavior was the result of managers maximizing utility subject to the 
various constraints that are imposed by the firm's owners and market 
environment. Managers maximize utility by pursuing those activities 
that increase their pecuniary and nonpecuniary income. In terms of 
analyzing market behavior, Alchian.and Kessel state, "What is important 
is not a matter of differences in tastes between monopolists and competi-
tive firms, but differences in terms of trade of pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary income" (p. 163). 
This suggests that in order to describe firm behavior, the analyst 
must determine what factors affect the relative actual or imputed prices 
of pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources of income. Once it can be shown 
that certain factors affect relative prices in consistent directions or 
alter th~ constraints imposed on the utility-maximization process, 
demand theory can be used to predict changes in the composition of these 
sources of managerial utility and therefore the effect on managerial 
behavior. 
Efficiency, Costs and Property Rights 
An approach that many economists have used in property rights 
studies has been first to identify those managerial activities that 
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increase pecuniary and nonpecuniary income. Next, the institutional and 
market environment in which the firm operates is analyzed and the 
important variables which have an impact on the exchange ratios of 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary income sources as well as the constraints 
that are imposed on managerial utility-maximizing behavior are identified. 
Predictions of managerial behavior with respect to the consumption of 
utility-generating activities are then empirically tested. 
The first rigorous empirical test of the property rights theory was 
by Williamson (111). In a model that extended Alchian and Kessel's 
model, Williamson suggested that the firm's (manager's) objective was to 
maximize utility subject to the constraint that reported profits be 
greater than or equal to the minimum profit requirements of the owners. 
Utility was a positive function of the size of the firm's staff, 
managerial emoluments, and discretionary profit. According to 
Williamson, a larger staff not only meant a possible increase in salary 
for the manager, but it was also a source of nonpecuniary income such as 
power, security, status, professional excellence, and prestige. 
Managerial emoluments were the " .•. fraction of managerial salaries 
and perquisites that are discretionary" (111, p. 1035). In other words, 
this was organizational slack absorbed as costs. Discretionary profits 
were the profits in excess of the minimum return to owners and were 
assumed to be used by managers for expenditures on staff and discre-
tionary investment. The minimum return to owners was considered a 
return that was sufficient to maintain the manager's effective control 
of the firm. It was a function of the owner's perception of the costs 
and benefits involved in policing managerial behavior .. 
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A geometric interpretation of Williamson's model can be represented 
by Figure 1. As can be seen in that figure, a firm owned and managed by 
the same individual would produce at the standard prof it maximization 
level of output, S , where 3TR/3Q = 8TC/3Q. With the separation of 
7T 
ownership and management in the modern corporation, there are positive 
policing and monitoring costs borne by the owners. Owners will engage 
in less policing of management. and will be content with a lower level of 
profit. This leaves discretionary profits available to management to 
increase staff and discretionary investment. Managerial consumption of 
organizational slack reduces reported profits below potential profits 
whereas the consumption of discretionary investment expenditures exhausts 
any remaining excess of reported profits over minimum profits. As a 
manager spends the discretionary profits, total costs increase from TC 
to TCl, but Williamson assumes that marginal costs are unaffected. 
Williamson assumes that increases in staff expenditures, however, will 
increase product demand and thus both marginal and total revenue as 
TR shifts upward to TRI. Staff expenditures are assumed to increase 
demand because staff expenditures are assumed to contain an advertising 
component. Williamson's first-order conditions require the firm to 
equate marginal revenues and marginal costs, but staff will be employed 
ineff iciently--where the marginal value product of staff is less than 
the marginal cost of staff. This clearly implies that the firm will 
operate at a higher level of output than would be the case for the 
traditional prof it maximizing firm. At S in Figure 1, discretionary 
Tr 
managerial behavior results in an increase in marginal revenue relative 
to marginal cost. Marginal revenue and marginal cost can only be 
equated at a higher level of output such as staff and size level, S . 
u 
TR,TC per time period 
0 s 
u 
Staff and Size 
per time period 
Profit per time period 
0 
Figure 1. Williamson's Utility Maximization Hodel 




Here the manager attains a higher level of utility as given by 
indifference curve, ul. 
The most obvious implication of Williamson's analysis is that the 
greater the cost to owners of monitoring managerial performance, the 
less effort that owners will put into policing management. Owners will 
be content, therefore, with smaller minimum profit thus leaving more 
funds for managers to use to maximize their utility. This activity is 
expected to result in higher firm costs at a given scale of output. 
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An alternative explanation of the effect of the owner's monitoring 
costs on the firm's costs has been offered by Alchian and Demsetz (3). 
They point out that for most firms, resources jointly produce the firm's 
output rather than output being a simple sum of each individual's pro-
ductive effort. Because of this nonseparability of output among factors, 
it is a difficult task for managers and owners to meter performance and 
marginal product, and thus pay a reward equivalent to the marginal 
product of the resource. Labor resources thus have a tendency to be 
free riders in the production process. As long as detection, policing, 
monitoring, and metering costs are positive, the price of leisure 
relative to the price of productive work is lower than if these costs 
are zero and the worker will purchase more leisure time relative to work 
time--labor will "shirk" on the job. This implies lower productivity 
and higher costs for firms faced with additional policing costs which 
exceed the expected additional benefits from greater monitoring effort. 
Whether higher firm costs are due to shirking by labor or discretionary 
behavior by managers or some combination of the two, property rights 
theory strongly suggests that to the extent that owners are faced with 
greater policing costs, the firm will incur higher costs at a given 
level of output. 
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There have been a number of studies which have tested this funda-
mental proposition. Most of these studies assert that public firms, for 
reasons to be discussed later, are less efficient than are comparable 
private firms. Nichols (81) investigated stock versus mutual saving and 
loan associations and found that the mutuals were less efficient. Davies 
(27) found that private Australian airlines were more efficient than 
their public counterparts. Clarkson (19) found that non-proprietary 
hospitals were less efficient that proprietary hospitals. Frech (39) 
extended the property rights theory to an analysis of the efficiency of 
private insurance companies versus nonprofit mutual and Blue Shield firms 
in the processing of Medicare claims. He found that the private companies 
were more efficient. The property rights efficiency hypothesis has also 
been extended to the electric power (74) and water utility industries (23, 
48, 69, 79). The only study to find results contrary to those predicted 
by the property rights theory of firm behavior was the Mann and Mikesell 
(69) study. Mann and Mikesell found that private water firms had higher 
per unit costs than public water utilities. Crain and Zardkoohi (23) 
attribute this to the failure of Mann and Mikesell to control for input 
price differentials. Price differentials are expected to affect input 
choices and thus costs. 
It should be noted, however, that the results of most of these 
studies should be considered tentative. All of the studies suffer from 
the absence of disaggregated cost data. In addition, Morgan's study (79) 
can be criticized because of the nonrandomness of the data sample, 
Nichols (81) and Davies (27) did not use statistical testing, and all 
of the above studies with the exception of the Crain and Cardkoohi (23) 
article failed to control for input price differentials. Nevertheless, 
the weight of the evidence to date is consistent with the efficiency 
predictions of the utility maximization model. 
A Property Rights Theory of Managerial Behavior 
Legal ownership is a sufficient but not a necessary condit~on for 
a decision-maker to have command over certain resources or assets. The 
right, legal or implicit, to use, sell, or to change the quantity or 
quality of a resource or asset determine one's property rights. 
Depending on the particular industry, form of government, laws and 
regulations, social mores, and transactions costs, a decision maker is 
confronted by different constraints on his ability to "use" resources. 
These different constraints attenuate prope_~ty rights to different 
degrees and thus are expected to have a systematic impact on managerial 
·.,I 
behavior. 
The manager's utility function has both pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
sources of income as arguments. Utility is derived from the services 
X that goods and services provide. Pecuniary income, e.g., salary and 
stock options, allows;the consumption of marketable goods and services. 
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Nonpecuniary income is the positive utility received from the consumption 
of goods and services that are not directly purchased with pecuniary 
,,. 
income. The work of organizational theorists has suggested that a 
·, 
manager may receive utility from activities that increase the manager's 
prestige, power, the attractiveness of the work environment, job 
security, the public's perception of his contribution to the community's 
welfare, and from the absence of conflict with customers, regulators, 
and politicians (13, 41, 64, 99). A number of managerial activities 
could increase these possible sources of nonpecuniary income. For 
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example, greater prestige might result from a higher quality product, an 
increase in sales or profits, or community service. The feeling of 
greater responsibility or power might result from increasing the size of 
the firm in terms of sales, capital, labor, or from administering a 
larger discretionary budget. 
More formally, the problem is to maximize the manager's utility 
function subject to an opportunity set function. That is, the manager 
maximizes U(P,N) subject to O(P,N) where U(P,N) is a strictly concave 
and differentiable utility function with pecuniary, P, and nonpecuniary, 
N, income as arguments. P and N are substitutes in consumption. O(P,N) 
defines the opportunity set faced by the manager. It is concave to the 
origin, reflecting increasing opportunity costs associated with the 
consumption of additional sources of utility. It represents the possible 
combinations of P and N available to the manager given the market and 
regulatory environment, production technology, laws, and the property 
rights structure. The marginal condition that results from the maxi-
mization of the manager's utility is dP/dN.= -Un/Up. In other words, 
the rate at which the manager is required to give up P to obtain N is 
just equal to the rate at.which he is willing to give up P to obtain N. 
For normal goods, consumer behavior theory predicts that demand curves 
are down.sloping. Therefore, as the price (actual or imputed) of N 
changes relative to the price of P, or if the opportunity set shifts 
as constraints are relaxed, managers will alter their consumption of 
P and N, 
Utility Maximization and the Classical Firm 
Three important characteristics constitute the basic structure of 
property rights for the classical firm. First, the owner-manager is a 
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single individual who has the right to be the central party to all 
contracting. Second, the owner-manager is the claimant to the residual 
income of the firm. Third, the owner-manager has the right to transfer 
ownership of the firm. Given the above rights, the owner-manager will 
maximize utility at point P (see Figure 2) where his indifference curve, 
m 
u1 , touches the opportunity set function at the maximum level of profits, 
TI • Because pecuniary income and profits, TI, are equal to one another 
m 
in the classical firm, the manager-owner can increase his consumption of 
nonpecuniaries only by reducing profit, ceteris paribus_. 
In the classical case, however, the manager-owner has no tastes or 
preferences for nonpecuniary income. The manager-owner has no incentive 
to take income in-kind when pecuniary profits can be used entirely at 
the owner's discretion. Thus, the owner-manager's indifference curve, 
u1 , is horizontal reflecting preferences only for profit. The classical 
owner-manager, therefore, maximizes both profit and utility simultaneously 
at P • · For the classical case, the constraint on the owner's ability to 
m 
maximize utility, TI D, is some function of the technological factors 
m 
associated with the firm and the market environment in which the firm 
operates. 
The set of classical property rights does not adequately describe 
many of today's productive enterprises. Property rights theory, however, 
provides an explanation of what kinds of changes in managerial behavior 
can be expected to take place when the above classical characteristics 
are altered. In the following section, the separation of ownership from 
management will· be analyzed. The effect of attenuated returns will be 
considered next. Finally, the effect of the absence of the right to 




TI = P per time period 
D N per time 
period 
Figure 2. The Owner~Manager's Maximization of Utility 
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The Separation of Ownership frc '-1:1.nagement: 
A Geometric Derivation of a Utility 
Maximization Model 
In corporate enterprises, ownership and management are separated. 
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The owners, stockholders, are no longer the central party to ali 
contracting. Day-to-day operations of the firm are handled by management. 
With the relaxation of the assumption that the owners and the manager are 
the same individual, the utility maximization process can no longer be 
described by Figure 2 for two reasons. Owners are now faced with posi-
tive policing costs of management. Secondly, the manager's pecuniary 
income no longer equals the owner's wealth. 
Management is constrained to pursue, in part, the goal of owner's 
wealth maximization. But because of positive policing costs, owners 
engage in "optimal" monitoring where the benefits from additional 
monitoring are just offset by the additional costs. Of course, if 
monitoring was costless, owners would constrain management to a course 
of full profit maximization. Owners require a minimally-acceptable 
return on their investment which is expected to be at least equal to 
what they could earn elsewhere. The minimal profit requirement is 
partially a function of policing costs. The greater the cost to owners 
of policing management, the less the minimally-acceptable return will 
be. Since monitoring is costly, owners engage in less monitoring thus 
allowing management greater freedom in decision-making. As a result, 
the implicit price of managerial goals falls relative to the implicit 
price of the owner's goal of wealth maximization. Consumer behavior 
theory predicts that the manager will consume more of the sources of 
utility that have declined relatively more in price. The implication 
is that managers can be expected to pursue more managerial goals at the 
expense of the owner's wealth. 
A second reason why the utility maximization model has to be 
altered for the case of incorporation is that the manager's pecuniary 
income no longer equals the owner's wealth. There is no longer a one-
to-one relationship between profit and managerial utility. Therefore, 
there is no reason to expect a utility maximizing manager to make 
decisions that are exactly consistent with prof it maximization. The 
model that will be derived in the next section is based upon the 
plausible assumption that the compensation of the top executive officer 
is more a function of measures of firm size than of profits. The 
empirical evidence supports this p~oposition (98, 94). Even if 
the manager's pecuniary income is some positive function of reported 
firm profits, the directional hypotheses generated in the next several 
sections remain unaltered. A discussion of this is offered in the next 
section. 
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It has been suggested by Alchian (2), deAlessi (28, 29), and others 
that for the case where ownership and management are separated, a 
utility maximization model should include a utility function which 
has both·pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources of income as arguments. 
The constraint on the manager's maximization of utility, the opportunity 
set function, is a function of the technological characteristics of the 
firm, the market, legal, and regulatory environment in which the firm 
operates, and the minimum return to equity required by owners. Other 
things constant, the corporate manager can increase P and N only at the 
expense of the owner's wealth. Whereas in the classical case (where 
P = ~), the tradeoff was just between P and N. 
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Derivation of the Manager's Opportunity Set. A three dimensional 
graph can be used to show the relation~hip among P, N, and potential 
profit (see Figure 3). The manager's pecuniary income per unit of time, 
P, is plotted on the vertical axis; his nonpecuniary income per unit of 
time, N, is on the horizontal axis; and potential profit per unit of 
time is on the diagonal axis. The relationship between potential profit 
and N is expected to be inverse as it was for the classical case. For a 
given level of P, the manager can increase N only by reducing profit 
assuming all other things constant. The opportunity cost of increasing N 
at the expense of potential profit is assumed to increase as more N is 
consumed. Similarly, for a given level of N, the manager can increase P 
only at the expense of owner's wealth. Thus, the relation between profit 
and P is also expected to be inverse and concave to the origin reflecting 
the increased opportunity costs associated with additional quantities 
of P consumed. Therefore, the opportunity sets in potential profit-N 
space and potential profit-P space are inverse and concave to the origin. 
In the classical case, the manager-owner maximized utility in the 
profit-N space. The corporate manager, however, maximizes utility in 
the P-N space. Based on the previous assumptions that potential profit 
and P, and potential profit and N are inversely related, i.e., managers 
can only increase P and Nat the expense of the owner's wealth, it can 
be shown that the expected relationship between P and N is also inverse 
d h . . 1 an concave to t e origin. For a given level of profit, a corporate 
manager will choose some combination of P and N. A manager must reduce P 
1rhe assumption of concavity, increasing opportunity costs, while 
realistic is not necessary for the directional hypotheses derived from 
the model to hold. The assumption of concavity will be useful, however, 
in explaining what happens to the ratio of the manager's consumption of 
.p to N as constraints are relaxed. 
P per time 
period 
F 
TI per time period 
N per time 
period 
Figure 3. Derivation of the Manager's Opportunity Set 
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in order to have more N and vice versa. Other things constant, the 
manager can have more of both P and N only at the expense of owner's 
wealth. Given the potential profit-P and potential profit-N constraints 
of Figure 3, the P-N constraint can be easily derived. Assume that the 
minimally-acceptable return to owners is TI0 . If the manager's tastes 
were such that only P were desired, and if he had complete discretion 
over the size of his salary, that manager could consume r 0 pecuniary 
income and still generate the level of profit necessary for his survival. 
At the other extreme, a manager desiring only nonpecuniary income could 
consume N0 with a given level of profit, n0 . Because the opportunity 
set surface in potential profit, N, and P space is assumed to be 
concave at the minimum level of profit, TI0 , the downward sloping concave 
function, r 0N0 , represents the constraint imposed on the manager's 
utility-maximizing activities. In this model, the constraints on the 
manager's maximization process involves the technological and market 
constraints on potential profits as well as the constraint imposed by 
owners in the form of a minimally-acceptable profit. 
Shifts in the Opportunity Set. This model assumes that potential 
profits, as determined by the firm's technology and market environment, 
are constant. If, for example, potential profitability were to increase 
as a result of an increase in product demand, then the manager's 
opportunity set would shift outward from the origin. An increase in 
potential profits, holding the minimal profit to owners unchanged, 
provides management with access to more funds with which P and N can 
be purchased. The point of intersection of the potential profit-P and 
potential profit-N constraints with the potential prof it axis represents 
the potential level of profits when both P and N are zero. If potential 
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profits increase, this point of intersection moves down the diagonal axis 
to point E from point D (see Figure 4). If the increase in potential 
profits is entirely absorved as an increase in P, then the intersection 
of the potential profit and P constraint with the P axis will increase 
from point F to some point G. Likewise, if the increase in potential 
profits is completely absorbed as an increase in N, then the potential 
profit-N constraint will intersect at a higher point on the N axis such 
as at point I. Given the minimum profit, rr0 , the manager can consume 
P1 (where N = 0) or N1 (where P O). The manager's new oppotunity set, 
therefore, becomes P1N1 . Thus, the potential profit-N, potential 
profit-P, and P-N constraints all shift outward from the origin. 
The P-N constraint also shifts outward from the origin when owners 
lower the minimal return acceptable to them. Suppose that owners, due 
to an increase in the monitoring costs of management, lower their 
minimally-acceptable return. Assuming potential profits unchanged, 
managers will have access to more resources which can be diverted to 
utility-generating activities. If for example the owner's minimum 
return were to fall from TIO to rr 1 , (see Figure 5), the pecuniary income 
intercept of the P-N constraint would increase from P0 to P1 (where 
N = 0) and the nonpecuniary income intercept would increase from N0 to 
N1 (where P = 0). Thus, the P-N constraint would shift outward to P1N1 • 
Utility Maximization Subject to the P-N Constraint. As was 
discussed earlier, the corporate manager maximizes his utility subject 
to an opportunity set function. In Figure 6, the opportunity set 
function is given by P0N0 under the assumption that owners require a 
minimum profit of TI0 . Consumer behavior theory predicts that utility 
maximizing managers will consume some combination of P and N where the 
P per time 
period 
TI per time period 
G 
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Figure 4. The Effect of an Increase in the Firm's Potential 
Profit 
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Figure 5. The Effect of a Reduction in the Owner's 
Minimally-Acceptable Return 
28 




Figure 6. The Manager's Maximization of Utility and the 
Effect of Increased Monitoring Costs 
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marginal rate of substitution of N for P, MRSNP' is equal to the marginal 
rate of transformation of N for P, MRTNP" Because the MRTNP equals the 
ratio of marginal costs of N to P, the slope of the opportunity set 
function can be interpreted as the ratio of the opportunity cost 
associated with the consumption of P to the opportunity cost associated 
with the consumption of N. Given an indifference map, the manager 
maximizes utility at point A where total utility is given by the indif-
ference curve, u1 • The manager consumes OP pecuniary income and ON 
nonpecuniary income subject to the constraint that owners receive a 
profit no less than n0 . 
The manager's constraint in Figure 6, P0N0 , is based upon the 
assumption that all discretionary profits are used for the consumption 
of P and N. The only association between profit and managerial utility 
is the P and N received from the manager's use of discretionary profits. 
Meeting the minimum profit requirements ensures the manager's survival 
and thus a continued flow of P and N. A manager, however, may receive 
an increase in utility specific to meeting the owner's minimum profit 
requirements. For example, it has been argued that managers desire 
tenure (30). If greater job security is expected to be associated with 
managers consistently meeting the owner's profit requirements, managers 
will have an incentive to make sure that the minimal return to owners is met. 
The manager may get an additional source of N from reporting 
profits in excess of that which is required by owners. The manager may 
feel more successful or have a heightened sense of worth as a result 
of reporting profits in excess of the owner's minimum profit require-
ments. But this is only one of several sources of N and the manager 
would not be expected to consume this particular source of N to the 
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exclusion of all others. Furthermore, even if in the manager's employment 
contract, managerial compensation was positively related to reported 
profits, it is unlikely that the association between reported prof its and 
executive compensation would be so close as to induce the manager to 
forego all N in excess of that required for the efficient operation of 
the firm. Indeed, the works reported earlier conclude that measures of 
firm size are more important f~ctors than profits in determining the 
level of executive compensation. 
The only effect on the model from introducing a positive relation-
ship between the excess of reported over minimum profits and managerial 
utility is that, in equilibrium, the manager will have less discretionary 
profits to purchase P and the N not specifically related to reported 
profits. As long as reported profits are less than potential profits, 
a proposition which seems highly likely, the manager will have positive 
discretionary resources to engage in the utility maximizing process 
described earlier. 
This utility maximization assumes that managerial tastes and 
preferences are identical, so that all of the managers will have similar 
tastes for reporting profits in excess of minimum prof its as well as for 
the other sources of P and N. As a result, the important factors for 
deriving directional hypotheses involve the changes in the relative 
prices of the sources of utility and the changes in the position of the 
P-N constraint. Whether it is assumed that the manager receives utility 
from reported profits in excess of minimum profits or not, the 
directional changes in the slope and position of the P-N constraint 
that are hypothesized in this chapter remain unchanged. Thus, the 
directional hypotheses regarding managerial behavior discussed in this 
chapter and Chapter IV will remain unchanged as well. 
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The Effect of Increased Monitoring Costs on Managerial Behavior. If 
the classical assumption of zero monitoring costs is relaxed, it can be 
shown that the higher the owner's monitoring cost of management, the 
greater will be the manager's consumption of P and N. With positive 
monitoring costs, the minimally-acceptable prof it falls to a lower level 
such as n 1 (see Figure 6). Given that all factors influencing potential 
profit remain unchanged, the manager finds that his opportunity set, 
P0N0 , shifts outward to P1N1. Assuming that just an income effect is 
present, the manager moves to a higher indifference curve, u2 . The new 
equilibrium occurs at point B where the manager is consuming OP 2 
pecuniary income and ON2 nonpecuniary income. The manager, therefore, 
consumes more P and N at the expense of owner's wealth as policing costs 
increase. 
The manager is likely, however, to consume more N relative to P 
from an increase in monitoring costs. This is because consuming N is 
much less visible than increasing salaries (109). The ability with 
which managers can exchange prof it for N is expected to be greater than 
their ability to exchange profit for P. The cost to managers of 
increasing P at the expense of profit is greater because this type of 
managerial behavior is visible to owners and if carried too far might 
result in managerial reprimands or firings. Increases in N however, 
can often be hidden in the form of administration costs or production 
costs. Thus, for a given reduction in the owner's minimum profit, 
managers can be expected to increase N more than P because the costs 
to managers (the probability of :reprimands or firings) are expected to 
be lower when the less visible utility-generating activities are under-
taken. Furthermore, the salaries of top management are generally 
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determined by a board of directors. Therefore, the transactions costs to 
top management associated with an increase in P is much greater than it 
is for an increase in N. This creates an upward bias in the ratio of 
opportunity costs associated with consuming P relative to N. 
The model can be altered to reflect these propositions by ensuring 
that the potential prof it-P constraint is more concave to the origin 
that the potential profit-N constraint. That is, the rate at which 
managers can exchange prof it for P is expected to be less than the rate 
at which profit can be traded for N. For a given reduction in the 
owner's minimum profits, managers will consume more N relative to P 
because of the lower implicit price or opportunity cost of doing so. 
As can be seen in Figure 7, as increased monitoring costs reduce the 
owner's minimally-acceptable return, the manager's opportunity set shifts 
outward and become flatter, Thus, there is an income and substitution 
effect that results from the separation of ownership and management. 
The substitution effect, in particular, causes the manager to consume 
more N relative to P. The clockwise rotation of ray OR indicates that 
managers consume more N relative to P as monitoring costs increase. 
While this assumption makes the model somewhat more realistic, it does 
not affect the directional hypotheses of the model. Its main effect is 
to show that the manager will alter the composition of P and N consumed 
in addition to consuming more P and N as constraints are relaxed. 
In sum, the separation of ownership from management entails 
positive policing costs of management which results in management 
consuming both N and P with N increasing relatively more than P. The 
model also implies that if the owner's minimal profit requirement remains 
unchanged, anything that causes the firm's potential profitability to 
P per time 
period 
TI per time period 
R 
N per time 
period 
Figure 7. The Effect of an Increase in Monitoring Costs 
Under the Assumption that Managers Can More 
Easily Increase N than P with Increases in 
Discretionary Profits 
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increase will result in an outward shift in the P-N constraint thus 
allowing management to increase their consumption of P and N. 
The Regulated Private Firm: 
Attenuated Returns 
35 
In the previous section, the effect of separating ownership from 
management was analyzed. This separation eliminated one of the major 
classical property rights--owners were no longer the central party to all 
constracting and decision making. In this section a second classical 
property.right will be altered and the effects of the change will be 
analyzed. In particular, the owners of some productive enterprises such 
as utilities have an attenuated right to the residual income of the firm. 
Utilities, by virtue of the necessity of the good produced and the 
scale-economy requirements necessary for efficient production, are 
natural monopolies. Governments recognize that competition can be 
ruinous to some of these industries. In order to ensure continued and 
adequate supplies of the goods and to promote the efficiencies associated 
with large-scale production, governments grant these utilities monopoly 
status. Utility rates are regulated, however, to prevent monopolistic 
pricing. The dominant form of rate regulation involves average-cost 
pricing where a "fair" rate-of-return to equity is included in the 
average-cost concept. 
If owners are limited in their right to keep the profits of the 
firm, the returns to owners from encouraging efficiency in the operation 
of the firm cannot be fully captured. As a result, owners will have 
less of an incentive to monitor managerial behavior. As discussed in 
the previous section, owners will lower their minimally-acceptable 
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return (in this case to the regulated level) and the P-N constraint will 
shift outward. This allows managers to consume more P and N at the 
expense of the owner's wealth (see Figure 8). If the effect of rate 
regulation is to reduce profit from n 1 to the regulated level of profit, 
n2 , the manager's opportunity set will shift outward to P5N5 . A utility 
maximizing manager would consume more P and N. 
The expectation that managers will consume more pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary income as a result of rate regulation suggests that the 
economies of large size associated with natural monopolies are not all 
passed on to utility customers in the form of lower rates nor are the 
economies captured entirely by the owners. After the regulated rate of 
return is met, much of the excess residual income which may potentially 
result from large-scale production is probably captured by management 
(31). In comparison to the private unregulated firm, the regulated 
private firm will be less effici~nt. Its managers will consume more P 
and N thus increasing the firm's per unit administration and operating 
costs. 
The Public Firm: The Absence of the Right 
to Transfer Ownership Claims and to Keep 
the Residual Income of the Firm 
The public firm differs in two important respects from the private 
firm. One, the owners are taxpayers and generally have no right to any 
of the residual income of the firm. Thus, they have little, if any, 
incentive to encourage efficiency within the firm. Second, ownership 
cannot be transferred, or can be transferred only with substantial 
transactions cost (transfer of public ownership can only be achieved by 
the taxpayer moving from the community). 
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The more readily that rights to ownership can be exchanged, the 
greater the owner's ability to capitalize the rewards from efficiency 
into the present value of ownership shares. Owners of private firms, 
therefore, have an incentive to monitor the behavior of managers to 
ensure that the owner's profit goals are being met. If it is difficult 
or impossible to exchange ownership rights, as is the case with the 
public firm, owners will have less of an incentive to police managerial 
behavior (2). 
The case of the public firm can be represented by Figure 9 where the 
level of ·profit received by the owner-taxpayers, 1T3 , is equal to zero. If 
the owner-taxpayers have no right to the firm's profit, potential profit 
can be absorbed entirely as pecuniary income (where N = O) or as non-
pecuniary income (where P O) at point F and H, respectively. The P-N 
constraint shifts outward to FH and managers consume more of both P and 
N. 
In many instances, however, statutory constraints are placed on the 
salaries of public managers (31). If the statutory salary, OP , is s 
assumed for simplicity to equal OP6 , the pecuniary income of the manager 
of the regulated-private firm, the effect of lowering the owner's 
required profit from n2 t6 n3 is to cause the manager to spend the entire 
increase in discretionary profits on N. The manager's consumption of N 
would increase to ON 7 (see Figure 9). Thus, the public firm is expected 
to be less efficient (to incur greater per unit costs) than its 
regulated private counterpart. Public managers are expected to consume 
more N than managers of comparable, but regulated-private firms. 
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Utility maximization theory was used to show that managerial 
behavior within the classical firm, the corporation, the regulated-
private firm, and the public firm will differ because of different 
property rights structures. For instance, the manager of a regulated 
private firm is expected to consume more P and N than the manager of a 
comparable unregulated private firm, but less P and N than the manager 
of a comparable public firm. The public firm, therefore, is expected 
to be less efficient (to have higher per unit costs) than a comparable 
private, but regulated firm. This is a testable implication of the 
theory of property rights that has been the focus of much of the 
empirical work to date. 
The theoretical approach used in Chapter IV involves identifying 
those major managerial activities that give rise to pecuniary and non-
pecuniary income, and then observing how the manager's consumption of 
these activities differs when different property rights structures are 
analyzed. In Chapter IV, the prop~rty rights theory of managerial 
behavior is extended to an analysis of the water utility industry. Two 
different sets of property rights are identified within this industry--
one set is associated with investor-owned utilities and the other set 
is associated with publicly-owned utilities. Testable implications of 
the theory are developed with respect to firm efficiency, pricing, and 
production policies. But first, an overview of the water utility 
industry and certain important aspects of that industry will be 
presented in Chapter III. 
40 
CHAPTER III 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WATER 
UTILITY INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe various aspects of the 
water utility industry. Some of the characteristics discussed in this 
chapter impose important constraints, in addition to ownership rights, 
on managerial behavior. Part of Chapter IV is_ devoted to outlining the 
effects that some of these characteristics have on the manager's 
opportunity set. 
The first section presents a brief history of the water utility 
industry in the United States followed by sections on water utility 
management, the production process and capital intensity, costs and 
economies of scale, utility financing and linkages to local government, 
and rate-making practices. The last two sections present a discussion 
of water quality and the regulatory structure of the industry. 
Characteristics of the Water 
Utility Industry 
Brief History of the Water Utility Industrv 
The water utility industry had its inception during Colonial times. 
The first water system was built in 1652 to serve Boston residents (5). 
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It was a very crude system consisting of wooden pipes which transported 
spring water to a wooden holding tank from which area residents filled 
their buckets. The first water supply system designed specifically to 
serve an entire community was built in 1746 in Shaefferstown, Pennsylvania 
(5). It took another century before there were as many as 16 water 
systems. By 1800, there were 16 water systems of which 15 were privately-
owned (48). Privately-owned water systems represented the majority of 
water systems until the latter 1890s (48). 
From 1890 to the present, the number of water systems has increased 
dramatically (see Table I). In 1890, some 1878 utilities served a 
population of 22,678,000 (5). By 1976, it was estimated that some 
34,631 water systems served a population of 192,200,000 (see Table II). 
Over 18,000 of these water suppliers served populations of less than 
500 people. The table reveals that roughly 8 percent of the water 
systems serve 80 percent of the population and 80 percent of the water 
systems serve only 8 percent of the population (108). Further, it was 
estimated that in 1976, 84 percent of the population was served by 
public water firms whereas private water firms served only 16 percent. 
'The composition of public and private firms in 1976 is comparable to 
what it was in 1896. Public water firms accounted for 56 percent of 
the total number of water firms in 1976 (108) and 53 percent in 1896 (48). 
Water Utility Management 
Water utility managers are subject to state regulations and the 
profits requirements of owners in the case of privately-owned utilities. 
Public water managers are responsible for carrying out. the directive of 


































17 ,808 133,126,310 
19,236 150,602,164 
34,631* 192,200,000 
*Utilities are defined as all community water systems (a) serving 
25 or more (15 or more connections) fixed resident populations, 
(b) which are privately-owned systems or publicly-owned local and 
state systems, and (c) which are located in the contiguous 48 states. 
All federally-owned and wholesale firms are excluded. 
Sources: American Water Works Association (S), p. 769; Environmental 
Protection Agency (108), p. II-4. 
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TABLE II 
NUMBER OF WATER UTILITIES AND POPULATION SERVED BY SIZE CATEGORY, 1976 
-------------------
PoEulation Category 
25- 100- 500- 1000- 2500- 5000- 10000- 100000-
99 499 999 2499 4999 9999 99999 999999 > 1 Million 
-
Number of Water Systems* 6,308 11, 714 4,932 4,850 2,496 1,646 2,442 232 11 
Percent 18% 34% 14% 14% 7% 5% 7% <1% <1% 
Population Servied 0.4 2.8 3.4 7.6 8.7 10.4 73.8 58.9 26.2 
(millions) 
Percent <1% <2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 38% 31% 14% 
*System definition is given in footnote of Table I. 








this chapter will discuss in greater detail the regulatory structure of 
the industry. Beyond the legal constraints on managerial behavior, 
there are informal operating standards put forth by the American Water 
Works Association (AWWA). The following is a policy statement of the 
AWWA regarding general operating standards. 
Delivered water should as a minimum meet United States Public 
Health Service drinking water standards. In addition, it 
s6ould be free of objectional taste and odor, color, turbidity, 
and staining elements, and as noncorrosive as practicable. It 
should be adequate in quantity for all sanitation and other 
domestic uses; safe and desirable for industrial and commercial 
use; adequate for fire protection services, and available on an 
uninterrupted basis with a minimum of fluctuations in pressure 
(5, p. 769). 
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Water utility management is comprised of formulative and administra-
tive management (96). The formulative level of management establishes 
goals and general policies of the utility. For a private water utility, 
the owner or a corporate board of directors perform this function. 
City fathers perform this function for municipally-owned water systems. 
The city fathers generally do not have the technical expertise that the 
corporate boards have. Further, city councilmen are subject to political 
influence much in the manner that corporate boards are subject to stock-
holders' influence. Public managers are often directed to conform to 
certain social and political policies which are not necessaily in the 
best interest of the utility. 
The administrative level of management is comprised of the chief 
executive officer of the utility and the management engaged in 
(1) ••. forecasting future needs; (2) making plans 
concerning the resources and methods necessary for best 
meeting forecasted needs; (3) acquiring and organizing the 
necessary resources--financial, physical, and human--to 
carry out the plans; and (4) actually operating these 
financial, physical, and human resources (96, p. 496). 
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It is the behavior of the administrative manager which is the concern of 
this dissertation. The private administrative manager must perform 
according to the wishes of the owner or stockholders. The public manager 
is usually hired by the city council, city manager, or appointed or 
elected local water boards or commissions. Only rarely is the position 
of the chief executive office an elected position (58). The public 
manager is usually directly responsible to politicians or political 
appointees. 
The closeness of public management to local political influence 
often causes problems for the public manager in operating the utility 
(58). For example, a community may use the water system to further 
community goals such as to " . further economic development, to 
relieve property taxes, or to subsidize eleemosynary institutions" 
(58, p. 217). In a 1968 survey of problems experienced by public water 
managers subject to local political control, the most common complaints 
were that the utility was required to give free water to other city 
departments and to make contributions to the municipality's general 
fund (58). In a 1974 AWWA survey of public water agencys' financial 
linkages to the local government, it was found that out of 218 responding 
public water utilities, 19 percent of the water agencies provide free 
water to the local government, 45 percent made cash contributions to 
the municipality's general fund for administrative and staff costs, 
and 38 percent made cash contributions to the general fund in lieu of 
sales, property, and franchise taxes (7). 
Production Process and Capital Intensity 
The major components of a water system are source of supply, 
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collection works and transmission mains, treatment facilities, and the 
distribution network (5). Surface sources of water consist of ponds, 
lakes, and streams. Groundwater sources come from wells, springs, and 
infiltration galleries. In a recent survey sponsored by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), it was found that 75 percent of all 
water systems use ground sources of water whereas 13 percent used surface 
sources and 12 percent purchas.ed water from wholesa·lers (108). Large 
water utilities rely more heavily on surface sources of supply. The 
EPA survey shows that while 13 percent of all systems used surface 
water, these surface sources provided water for 49 percent of the total 
population served by all utilities (108). 
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Collection and transmission facilities consist of " •.. intakes, 
pumping stations, and pipelines necessary to collect and transport . 
water to the treatment plant (5, p. 767). Treatment plants involve 
anything from minimal treatment such as disinfection to more extensive 
treatments which require using chemicals and mixing, filtration, 
settling, and flocculation systems. Once the raw water has been treated, 
it is delivered to the distribution system. This component of the 
production process includes storage and pumping stations, water mains, 
hydrants, valves, service connections, and meters. 
Water industry technology has changed very little over the past 
several decades particularly when compared to the technological advance-
ments of the communication, electric power, and natural gas utility 
industries. New water technology has been employed, but this has been 
largely to meet upgraded water quality standards. Pumping is no longer 
powered by steam and " .•. there have been improvements such as 
increased filtration rates and better system dependability through 
control development'' (5, p. 556). Larger systems are becoming 
increasingly automated, but " water systems today are basically 
the same as those 30 years ago" (5, p. 556). 
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Of all the utility industries, the water utility industry is the 
most capital intensive and has the highest investment per dollar of 
revenue (5). A common measure of capital intensity used when comparing 
various industries is the ratio of gross annual revenue to total invest-
ment (or the capital-turnover ratio). Hanke and Boland (44) report that 
the capital-turnover ratio has been estimated at 4 to 6 for wholesale 
and retail trade enterprises, 2 for manufacturing, .3 for electric 
utilities, .2 for water utilities, and around .4 to .6 for other 
utilities. Compared to other utilities and industries, the water 
industry is one of the most capital intensive industries. One reason 
for the high investment relative to revenues is the durability of the 
assets of water utilities. Many investments in the water industry 
have useful lives of 50 years or longer (108). 
Costs and Economies of Scale 
Because of the highly capital intensive nature of the water 
industry, a considerable portion of water system costs is fixed (see 
Table III). Fixed costs are defined as the sum of depreciation and 
interest expenses, taxes, and payments to the local government in lieu 
of taxes. It has been estimated that these expenditures comprise 
roughly one-third of total system costs. The other two-thirds of total 
systems costs are variable costs which include fuel and electricity for 
pumping, chemicals for purification, labor and administration expenses. 
TABLE III 
ESTIMATED VARIABLE AND FIXED COSTS BY SIZE CATEGORY, 1976 
____________ ------~---- __ Population Category 
25- 100- 500- 1000- 2500- 5000- 10000- 100000-
99 499 999 2499 4999 9999 99999 ()0'.'' '> 1 Million 
Variable Costs 
a 
.78 .68 .53 .69 . 64 .56 .57 .60 .43 
(Percent of Total) 
Fixed Costsb .22 .32 .47 .31 .36 • 44 .43 . 40 . 57 
(Percent of Total) 
aDefined as operation and maintenance expenditures. 
[.Defined as the sum of depreciation expenses, interest expenses, taxes, and in-lieu payments. 




Hanke (43) estimated that the acquisition and distribution capital costs 
accounted for 38.7 percent and 35.5 percent of total capital costs. Of 
total acquisition costs, transmission capital costs accounted for 80.4 
percent of the total with the remainder used for source of supply 
capital costs. Distribution mains accounts for some 76 percent of total 
distribution capital costs. Treatment facilities account for 14.3 percent 
of total capital costs. 
In the summary of EPA's 1976 community water system survey (108), 
the authors declare that there are " • clear economies of scale in 
total system operating expenses (0 & M, depreciation, taxes, and 
miscellaneous other expenses)" (p. II-15). They report that economies 
of scale exist also for interest expenses. For a national sample of 
water utilities used in Chapter V of this dissertation, estimates of 
returns-to-scale presented in Table VIII imply that variable costs 
decrease with increases in scale. The evidence regarding economies of 
scale in the water industry is somewhat mixed, however, when considering 
economies of scale for various components of a water utility such as 
production and distribution systems (51), transmission (61), and 
treatment (52, 87). 
Hines (51) found economies of scale in water production (specifi-
cally for surface water production) but not for the distribution of 
water. When both the production and distribution systems were combined, 
he found the presence of constant returns to scale. Linaweaver and 
Clark (61) found economies of scale present for transmission costs as 
water is transported through larger pipe sizes. Orlob and Lindorf (87) 
and Hinornoto (52) found economies of scale in the costs of water 
treatment. 
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Utility Financing and the Municipal Firm's 
Financial Linkage to Local Government 
Privately-owned water systems are self-supporting in that they try 
to generate revenues sufficient to cover operation and maintenance costs, 
taxes, interest payments, depreciation as well as the regulated -return 
on investment. Revenues should also be sufficient to provide funds 
necessary for capital additions and to be able to attract external debt 
financing. Publicly-owned utilities may be either self-supporting or 
tax-supported enterprises (5). Self-supporting enterprises 
••• receive sufficient revenue through rates, charges, 
and fire protection tax levies to meet all expenses, 
maintain and expand the system, and contribute funds to 
the utility in lieu of taxes (5, p. 773). 
These enterprises finance large capital additions by issuing revenue 
bonds. Revenue must be sufficient to pay the interest and redemption 
on these bonds. 
A tax-supported utility 
•• is budgeted and accounted for within the city's 
overall operations. Revenues from water sales are 
deposited in the general municipal fund together with 
other receipts, including tax receipts, out of which the 
expenditures for all city operations, including the water 
utility, are made. In such cases, taxes are levied to 
meet payments on bonds issued to expand the water system. 
The bonds would be general obligation bonds backed by the 
taxing powers of the municipality (5, p. 773). 
Many variations of public utility financing exist. For instance, 
a city may finance capital additions by using exclusively general obliga-
tion bonds subject to voter approval, issuing special assessment bonds 
in which assessments are levied only against benefitting properties, 
issuing revenue bonds, applying for federal aid funds from federal 
agencies such as the Farmers Home Administration (71), or using a 
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a combination of these methods (76). Most city water supply systems, 
however, are financed by revenues with some additional support from 
special assessments and general obligation bonds (76). In a 1974 survey 
by the AWWA, it was found that 82 percent of the responding 210 public 
water systems receive approximately 80 percent of their revenues from 
water sales; 16 percent receive a tax-subsidy from property taxes for 
debt-service, capital, and operation costs; and as was noted in the 
section on utility management, 38 percent of the responding utilities 
make contributions in lieu of taxes to the locality's general fund (7). 
Rate-Making Practices 
A traditional concept in water utility rate-making is that water 
rates should be cost-based (16, 59) and equitable (63). Little attention 
has been given to demand relationships (44, 68). The method which 
utilities generally use to establish rates is to first determine annual 
revenue requirements. Second, a cost-of-service study is done to 
determine the cost of serving each customer group. Finally, rates 
schedules are constructed such that revenues are generated by each 
customer group sufficient to cover their cost of service. 
According to Keller (59), revenue requirements are generally 
determined on a cash-needs basis for 5 to 10 years into the future. One 
method of projecting future cash needs is to obtain future population 
estimates and multiply these times per-capita cost estimates (44). 
Required revenues should meet all the utility's cash needs. For the 
municipally-owned utility, cash needs consist of estimated inflation-
adjusted operation and maintenance costs, debt service, capital additions 
financed from revenues, developer refunds, and in-lieu payments. The 
ordinary means by which a private utility determines its cash needs is 
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to project future operation and maintenance expenses, taxes, depreciation 
and return-on-rate base. In order to determine the additional revenues 
that must be recouped via the rate structure, projected revenue require-
ments are compared to the projected revenues associated with the current 
rate structure. 
In order to determine how to adjust the rate schedules to generate 
the additional required revenues, a cost-of-service study is done to 
determine the estimated cost of service of each customer group. MacEwen 
(63) notes that there are two methods commonlv used to allocate estimated 
costs: the commodity-demand and the base-extra methods. Two steps are 
involved. First, costs are disaggregated by function--commodity, demand, 
and customer costs in the case of the conunodity-demand method or base, 
extra capacity, and customer costs in the case of the base-extra 
technique. The next step is to allocate these costs to the various 
customer classes in accordance with their water use characteristics. 
Commodity costs are those costs that vary in direct proportion with 
output such as treatment chemicals and power for pumping. Customer 
costs include operating and maintenance costs associated with meter 
reading, billing, and the installation of meters and lines. Demand 
costs are variable and fixed charges associated with the extra plant 
capacity that is needed to meet peak-pe~iod demands. 
The rate structure most commonly used in the water industry is the 
declining block rate (42). After a minimum charge, average prices 
decline with increases in discrete quantities. The first block is the 
minimum water wate and is designed to cover the " . cost of meter 
reading and billing and the fixed charges on the customer facilities, 
as well as base water costs for minimum use customers" (59, p. 11). 
The next block generally covers the average cost of residential water 
consumption. This residential water rate also covers the costs 
associated with demands imposed on the water system by peak residential 
irrigation use. The last blocks are designed for the highest-use 
customer, e.g., industry, and are designed to recover base costs and 
demand costs associated with peak-day or peak-hour use. Base costs are 
defined in a similar manner to commodity costs defined earlier except 
that base costs include a cost for water system capital used in serving 
customers during average load conditions (59). The customer-class 
groups are ordinarily comprised of residential, commercial, industrial, 
public, wholesale, and _customer groups outside the city limits. 
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Other water rate designs which have been used or suggested for use 
are flat rates, uniform rates, step rates, demand and peak-load rates, 
inverted block rates, time-of-day rates, seasonal rates, value-of-
service rates, social rates, utility stamps, and lifeline rates (68). 
Arguments for and against these price policies revolve around simplicity, 
implementation costs, stabilizing load factors, economic efficiency, 
local income redistribution, and water conservation. 
Water Quality 
Until the last decade, it was generally assumed that adequate steps 
were being taken by water suppliers to produce a product free of 
chemical and bacteriological contamination. It was a 11 ••• shock to 
laymen and professionals alike'' (102, p. 22) to discover that there were 
serious quality problems nationwide. The extent of the problems were 
revealed in a 1969 survey of community water supplies-~The Community 
Water Supply Study - Analysis of National Survey Findings, 1969 (107). 
Sonnen reports that the survey reveals that 41 percent of the water 
systems sampled did not meet the 1962 drinking water standards, 25 
percent did not meet recommended contaminant limits, and 16 percent 
exceeded some of the mandatory limits (101). Stacha notes further that 
the water supply survey indicates that 56 percent of the utilities had 
problems with disinfection capacity, 77 percent had plant operators 
with insufficient training in water microbiology, 85 percent did not 
take bacteriological samples frequently enough, and 69 percent of the 
systems only analyzed half of the samples required by the public health 
service (102). In a recent committee report by the AWWA (9) on quality 
control practices in microbiology laboratories, it was found that 8 to 
33 percent of the 226 responding utilities were unaware that quality 
control problems existed. 
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Nationally, most small utilities use groundwater and large utilities 
use surface sources or a combination of ground and surf ace sources of 
water. For a sample of 248 Oklahoma water suppliers used in Chapter V, 
approximately one-half of all water systems used groundwater with the 
other half using surface sources. The same relationship holds for 
private and public water suppliers. Stacha (102) says that surface 
water generally at least requires turbidity removal and disinfection. 
Other problems encountered with surface supplies are poor taste, color, 
and odor; the presence of inorganic contaminants, pesticides, industrial 
and other wastes; and treatment problems associated with the seasonal 
effects on humic acids, mineral content, and turbidity. Groundwater 
problems vary from disinfection to removal of extensive quantities of 
iron, solids, hardness, manganese, hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, 
radionuclides, and inorganic matter. 
Water is disinfected by either the use of chlorine, ozone, or 
chlorine dioxide. Suspended solids contributing to turbidity problems 
can be eliminated by filtration, sedimentation, and coagulation (102). 
The EPA' s 1976 community water system survey indicates that the. typical 
treatment used by utilities employing groundwater is disinfection 
whereas surface source systems employ a wider range of treatments 
including disinfection, corrosion control, filtration, coagulation, and 
sedimentation (108). As was reported above, treatment costs account 
for 14.3 percent of total capital costs with variable treatment costs 
consisting of chemical costs, employee compensation, and energy. 
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All public and private water suppliers serving fixed resident 
populations of 25 (or 15 connections) or more are subject to the maximum 
contiminant limits established as a result of the passage of the Safe 
Water Drinking Act of 1974 (PL 93-523) (95). These limits are imposed 
on 10 inorganic constituents, turbidity, coliform organisms, six pesti-
cides, and radionuclides (102). Monitoring, sampling, and public 
notification requirements are also established in the Act with the 
responsibility for such activities being imposed on the owners of the 
utility. States are given the primary promulgation and enforcement 
responsibilities of the Act. Failure of public water systems to comply 
with the Act can potentially result in civil suits against the water 
utility with the citizens bringing the suit being awarded cost for such 
litigation (49). 
Regulation 
In addition to federal and state clean-water regulations, various 
aspects of a water utility's operation are regulated by either state 
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regulatory commissions or various types of local government regulation. 
The extent of regulation varies from none in the case of Georgia and 
Nebraska (state regulation) (62), to fairly extensive review and regula-
tion of rate levels, rate structure, debt-capital structure, accounting 
and depreciation practices, annual reports, rates of return, rates to 
outside customers, service extension, and so on. 
Investor-owned utilities are almost exclusively regulated by state 
regulatory commissions. According to Hansman, a study (no date), funded 
by the Department of Interior, of state regulatory practices by Fristoe, 
Goddard, and Keig shows that of 50 states, 46 have the power to regulate 
investor-owned utilities, 41 can regulate retail and wholesale rates, 
43 prescribe rates of return, 42 require mainline extensions to franchised 
areas, 31 regulate the financing of mainline extensions, 36 regulate 
pricing to governments, 43 require certain accounting practices and 
reporting forms, 12 require a fair-value estimation of the rate base, 
25 require original cost less depreciation to be used in valuing the 
rate base, and 26 require the straight line method of depreciation (45). 
Based upon a 1968 survey of 252 publicly-owned water utilities, 
Keig, Fristoe, and Goddard (58) found that there was a variety of forms 
of local regulation. Of the total number of utilities sampled, 68.6 
percent were regulated by city councils, 5.6 percent by state commissions, 
12.3 percent by appointed or. elected boards, and 13.5 percent by combina-
tions of city councils, boards, or commissions. State regulation of 
municipal water agencies varies from regulation of outside city service 
only to regulation of accounting and reporting practices, main-line 
extension, and both outside rates and inside retail and wholesale rates. 
Five states regulate municipal inside rates whereas 10 states regulate 
inside and/or outside public water rates (45) . 
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City council regulation is the dominant form of public regulation in 
all locally-regulated states except Tennessee. Primary control by city 
councils does not preclude some state regulation. States may require 
specific accounting procedures and regulate outside services. In general, 
city councils control the water utility's budget, water rate policies, 
and other policies not controlled by state regulation. The city council 
may also appoint a board or commission to oversee rates or capital expan-
sion. The decisions of these boards and commissions are often subject 
to the council's veto power. 
Some public water utilities are under the jurisdiction of elected 
or appointed commissions or boards which usually have the power to 
determine rates, improvements, and extension policies. In the case of 
elected and state-appointed boards, statutes limit the discretionary 
powers of the board members. Often, the chief water executive is 
appointed by the board or commission and is responsible to these groups. 
In some cases, state law empowers the city manager to employ the chief 
water manager. The last major form of local regulation is joint 
regulation by city councils and regulatory commissioners. The division 
of power between these two groups takes many forms--the appointed or 
elected commissioner may have to submit plans to the city council for 
approval or an elected manager may have to self-regulate activities in 
conjunction with local politicians. In sum, " ... the predominant 
pattern of control over publicly-owned water utilities is that in which 
the city council must approve the budget, rate structures, and other 
major policies" (58, p. 217). 
Conclusion 
Both the number of water utilities and the total population served 
have grown rapidly, particularly since the late nineteenth century. 
Little has occurred, however, over the past few decades in terms of 
technological innovation. 
The industry is composed of both private and public firms subject 
to state and various forms of local regulation. Other characteristics 
of the water industry are that (1) water firms appear to be one of the 
most capital intensive industries; (2) economies of scale seem to occur 
when overall systems costs are considered and in the case of water 
treatment, but are less clear when considering other components of the 
production process; (3) roughly one-third of all system costs are fixed 
costs with acquisition and distribution capital costs accounting for 
most of a system's capital cost; (4) many public utilities are self-
supporting, but there are a considerable number of public firms which 
are tied closely to municipal government and rely on operating and 
investment subsidies; (5) price policies apparently still adhere at 
least in word to the traditional concept of water utility pricing that 
rates should be cost-based and equitable. The dominant form of pricing 
used in the water industry is the declining-block rate policy, but 
varies from utility-to-utility depending on cost allocation techniques, 
the number of blocks, and other considerations; and (6) there is some 
evidence to suggest that water suppliers may be producing water which 
does not conform to drinking water standards. 
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The intent of the next chapter is to apply the utility maximization 
model of managerial behavior to the water utility industry. Important 
industry characteristics other than ownership are analyzed as to their 
effect on the manager's opportunity set and testable implications are 
derived with respect to managerial behavior in the water industry. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN APPLICATION OF A PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY OF 
MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR TO THE \l;'ATER 
UTILITY INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
The water utility industry is an important industry for an 
application of an economic theory of property rights for at least 
three reasons. One reason is that there are b_oth investor-owned and 
publicly owned water utilities which makes an analysis of different 
ownership rights as well as differences in other institutional character-
istics of the industry possible. Second, with the exception of rate 
studies, there has been very little economic analysis of the water 
utility industry. By contrast, there has been much more economic 
analysis of the electric power industry in the areas of rate-making, 
investment strategies, the effect of regulation, and even in the area 
of property rights and managerial behavior. A third reason for 
analyzing the behavior of privately-owned water utilities (IOUs) and 
publicly-owned water utilities (POUs) is that there may be important 
implications regarding which ownership form is preferable in terms of 
addressing pressing regional issues such as water shortages and water 
quality. 
In Chapter II, the general effects on managerial behavior of 
attenuated ownership rights were analyzed. It was concluded that any 
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attenuation of the owner's rights to be the central party to all con-
tracting, to exchange freely the o-vmership shares of the firm, and to 
keep the residual income of the firm would result in managers consuming 
both more pecuniary and nonpecuniary income sources at the expense of the 
owner's wealth. It was also concluded that these rights are more 
attenuated for public utilities than for regulated private utilities 
largely because taxpayers do not have the right to the residual income 
of the firm nor can they exchange ownership shares in the public firm 
without incurring high transaction costs. Managers of POUs can be 
expected to consume more of all pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources of 
income than managers of comparable IOUs. This conclusion was subject 
to the restriction that if the public manager's salary was statutorily 
fixed, the public manager will consume mostly nonpecuniary income as 
the constraints on the opportunity set are relaxed. 
Differences in the behavior of public and private managers are not 
affected exclusively, however, by differences in the rights of owners. 
Other factors influence the manager's opportunity set. A study of any 
industry will yield a set of characteristics unique to that industry. 
These characteristics influence the manager's ability to use resources. 
In other words, ownership rights and other institutional factors shape 
the structure of managerial property rights. 
Because the effect of ownership rights on managerial behavior has 
been discussed in Chapter II, the purpose of this chapter is to first 
identify and explain the effects that other important industrial 
characteristics have on the structure of managerial property rights. 
Next, the effect of different managerial property rights on managerial 
behavior will be analyzed. Specific consideration will be given to 
managerial actions that affect the firm's efficiency, price-output 
decisions, and product quality. 
Important Institutional Characteristics of the 
Water Utility Industry 
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In the context of the model developed in Chapter II, both ownership 
rights and other institutional characteristics affect the manager's 
ability to consume pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources of income. 
Differences in these ownership rights and industry characteristics will 
produce a shift in the manager's opportunity set or a change in the 
actual or shadow prices of one argument in the utility function relative 
to another. This, in turn, induces the manager to alter the level or 
composition of the pecuniary (P) and nonpecuniary (N) sources of utility. 
Several of the more important industry characteristics are discussed 
below in terms of their effect on the manager's opportunity set and 
utility maximization. 
Property Tax Liability and In-Lieu Payments 
Investor-owned water utilities are, for the most part, subject to 
local property taxes. Public water utilities are rarely subjected to 
local taxation, but some POUs do make payments to the local government 
in lieu of taxes or provide free service to other city departments (5). 
Taxes affect net income and as a result the residual or discretionary 
component of that net income available to management. Other things 
constant, the effect of taxes on the private manager's opportunity set 
is to constrain it inside of that opportunity set that would exist in 
the absence of taxes. Because POUs are generally not subject to 
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taxation, public water managers are expected to have access to greater 
discretionary net-of-taxes profits and thus are expected to consume more 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources of income than managers of comparable 
IOUs. 
Capital Financing 
Investor-owned water utilities must obtain capital funds in the 
same manner as any other private firm by either issuing additional stock 
and bonds, borrowing from financial institutions, or generating the funds 
internally. Small investment projects are usually funded internally 
whereas large projects _necessitate borrowing from commercial banks, 
insurance companies, and other financial institutions as well as issuing 
stocks, bonds, and debentures (76). Stocks, bonds, and debentures are 
usually issued " .•. in proportion to debt ratios prescribed by state 
public service commissions ... " (5, p. 775). An IOU must earn a 
positive rate-of-return if it is to have the ability to attract capital. 
A strong earnings record is of ten associated with a higher bond rating 
and thus lower interest rates on bond issues. Higher rates of profit 
also attract equity capital. Low profit rates or frequent losses make 
it difficult for the manager of an IOU to acquire capital. 
This is not necessarily the case, however, for publicly-owned 
water utilities. Even though most POUs are self~supporting in that they 
use revenue bonds to finance large capital additions, many POUs rely on 
subsidies from the local government (5, 76). POUs can indefinitely 
operate at a loss and still acquire capital if subsidized by the local 
government. Of the total value of bonds issued in 1964 for municipal 
water works construction, 64 percent were general obligation bonds and 
36 percent were revenue bonds (5). General obligation bonds are backed 
by the fiscal creditability of the municipality. In other words, local 
taxes are used to service the general obligation debt and thus consti-
tute a subsidy. The tax-free status of municipal bonds usually results 
in lower interest rates than would be the case for comparable private 
bonds. Furthermore, public water agencies, particularly rural water 
systems, receive federal grants and special low-interest loans for the 
construction of capital facilities (71). The capital funds acquired by 
the POU are acquired, therefore, at a lower cost per unit of capital 
than the capital funds acquired by the IOU. 
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The public manager's right to use or employ capital is also 
influenced by whether or not the public manager has the "authority to 
borrow" or is subject to public bond referenda (76). Also, major 
investment decisions are made, not at the level of administrative 
management, but at the formulative lev~l (97). For IOUs, the formulative 
decisions are made by a board of directors which often includes top 
management. The POUs' formulative investment decisions are often made 
by local politicians--city councilmen that have no technical expertise 
in water resource management. Thus, the public manager has an addi-
tional constraint placed on his capital acquisition activities in that 
local political or social considerations may weigh heavily in particular 
investment decisions. 
Other things constant, the POU is expected to employ more capital 
per unit of output than a comparable IOU, in part, because of the lower 
per unit cost of capital. In terms of the model developed in Chapter II, 
plotting capital as a nonpecuniary source of income on the horizontal 
axis and all other sources of pecuniary and other nonpecuniary sources 
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of income on the vertical axis would suggest that the lower cost of 
capital relative to the price of other N and P, the flatter the manager's 
opportunity set. Thus, if capital is a normal good, the substitution 
and income effects of the price change imply that the public manager 
will consume more capital and "other" N and P with the ratio of capital 
to the "other" N and P increasing. A salary constraint implies that the 
income and substitution effec~s will primarily favor the additional 
consumption of capital and "other" nonpecuniary sources of income 
relative to pecuniary sources of income. 
Property Taxation and Special Assessments 
as a Source of Additional Revenue 
There is some evidence that some POUs do not generate sufficient 
revenues to cover the cost of production and thus the POUs have to rely 
on subsidies from local government (7, 89). There is also evidence that 
many POUs generate surplus revenues which go to the local government 
coffers (7) and therefore constitute cross~subsidization of other 
governmental functions by utility customers (21). It is not clear which 
way the causation runs between municipal finance and water agency 
revenues (48). 
To the extent that the local government subsidizes the POU, 
managers of POUs have less of a need to operate the firm efficiently 
and therefore can further bias the costs of the firm upward by consuming 
more nonpecuniary sources of utility. POUs are rarely evaluated on the 
basis of efficiency, but on the basis of abundant and high-quality 
services at low prices. The 1974 AWWA Committee Report shows that of 
218 responding water utilities, 38 percent make payments to the 
municipality in lieu of taxes, 45 percent make cash contributions to 
the city's general fund for administration and staff expenditures, 
16 percent receive a cash subsidy from property taxes for operations, 
capital, and debt-service expenditures, 19 percent contribute free 
service to other city departments, and 41 percent do not bill the city 
for fire protection services (7). 
Some water agencies even have the right to tax property and to 
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levy special assessments such ·.as front-footage assessments (4 7). These 
additional revenue sources suggest that the POU has access to more 
discretionary profits than would be the case in the absence of subsidies, 
property tax revenues, and special assessments. Because the additional 
discretionary profits are available only to managers of some POUs and 
not to any IOUs, the public manager's opportunity set is expected to 
lie even further outside that of the private manager's opportunity set. 
Regulation 
Regulation is perhaps the most important institutional characteristic 
in terms of its effect on managerial behavior for several reasons. One, 
regulation within the water industry has a major impact on managerial 
behavior through its effect on ownership rights. Also, regulation 
affects managerial behavior due to the additional constraints that it 
places on the various aspects of operation such as price-output policies, 
capital structure, product quality, accounting and depreciation methods, 
and service extensions. Finally, noneconomic factors, in the form of 
local political and social influences, can affect managerial decisions 
via regulation (66). The effect that political influences have on 
managerial treatment of the various customer classes is still an 
unresolved issue. 
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The Nature of Water Utility Regulation. There are two distinctly 
different types of regulation in the water utility industry: state 
commission regulation of most IOUs and local regulation of POUs. Although 
there is a variety of types of public regulation, the most prevalent 
type, 69 percent, is city council regulation (58). Federal regulations 
regarding water quality constrains managerial product decisions, but the 
Safe Water Drinking Act of 1974 (PL 93-523) applies equally to both POUs 
and IOUs. Because the act is not a source of variation in managerial 
behavior, the purpose of the remainder of this section is to consider 
the possible effects that state and local regulation may have on the 
behavior of private and public water managers. 
Indirect Effects Via Ownership Rights. The most important effect of 
regulation in the water utility indu.stry is on ownership rights. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, owners of IOUs do not have the right to the full 
residual income of the firm. Also, it was stated that public owners have 
no right to the residual income of the firm nor can they transfer owner-
ship rights without bearing high transactions costs. Furthermore, the 
break between ownership and management is more acute for the POUs than 
it is for the IOUs. These differences in ownership rights led to the 
previous conclusion that managers of POUs could consume more nonpecuniary 
income at the expense of the owner's wealth than could the managers of 
IOUs. 
Direct Effects of Regulation: Political Motives. Differences in 
regulation can also have a direct effect on managerial behavior in 
addition to the indirect effects via the structure of .ownership rights. 
Differences in the incentive structure of regulators affect regulatory 
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behavior (38) which, in turn, imposes constraints on the water operator's 
ability to maximize utility. Eckert argued that the behavior of regu-
lators is strongly influenced by (1) how close reward is associated 
with regulatory responsibilities, and (2) the prospects of survival in 
office. The less closely that reward and regulatory responsibilities 
are correlated and the greater the probability that the regulator will 
have a short stay in office, the more likely that the regulator will 
prefer a regulatory structure which emphasizes industry self-regulation. 
Eckert compared an appointed regulatory commissioner to a civil 
servant heading a bureaucratic regulatory agency. For the water industry, 
the appropriate comparison is between a state regulatory commissioner 
and a politician--the city councilman. To the extent that state regula-
tory commissioners and city councilmen face a different set of costs and 
rewards, differences in their regulatory behavior will place different 
constraints on the manager's opportunity set. If it is assumed that 
lower monetary rewards are received by councilmen relative to state 
commissioners and that these rewards are less closely tied to regulatory 
effort, councilmen are expected to have less of an incentive to regulate 
effectively. Excluding political motives, the implication is that 
councilmen relative to commissioners will prefer to engage in less 
extensive review and regulation of utility operations and to pursue 
policies designed to reduce the probability of controversy and conflict. 
If the councilman's objective is re-election, then the councilman 
will suggest and support proposals for activities that the councilman 
perceives as being desirable by the politically-active constituency. 
Peltzman (90) argued that the politician will favor those constituencies 
that are associated with the highest probability of political support. 
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The probability of this support depends upon the cost to the constituency 
of organizing a political coalition and the wealth at stake by the 
individuals or firms within the constituency. The smaller the number 
of politically-active individuals or firms, the lower the cost of 
organizing a coalition among them. 
For the water industry, it is expected that the constituencies to 
which the councilmen are respousive with respect to water utility 
activities are high-income residents and particularly to business firms 
that use large quantities of municipally-supplied water. Although for 
most families, water expenditures comprise a small percentage of total 
household expenditures, high-income residents usually ov.711 larger homes 
on larger lots which often require large quantities of water for 
residential irrigation. High-income households, therefore, have an 
incentive to influence water policy because they have greater wealth 
at stake. Similarly, only those· commercial and industrial firms that 
use large quantities of municipally-supplied water would have an incen-
tive to organize coalitions fer the purpos.e of influencing municipal 
water policy. These groups comprise a s~all number of individuals and 
firms relative to the more numerous small water users. This reduces the 
transactions costs of forming political coalitions. Furthermore, the 
individual members have more wealth at stake. They can, therefore, more 
easily organize politically-effective coalitions. 
There is some evidence to support the argument that water policies 
are disproportionately shaped by the influence of high-income customers 
and water intensive industries. Curran (25) and Smith (100) both 
suggest that water resource management may not be conducted in the 
public interest because politicians are influenced by the opinions of 
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special interest groups that are not representative of the opinions of 
the general community. Beatty and Pierce's (11) study of the effect of 
political linkages on water policy formulation found that the interests 
most overrepresented were those of the better educated, white-collar 
workers, high-income groups, those who use water for business, and heavy 
water users. 
In contrast to the councilman's drive to be re-elected, it is argued 
that the appointed state commissioner cannot evaluate reappointment very 
highly because the commissioner's office is often a political appointment 
and the length of that appointment is of ten longer than the term of the 
governor who appointed _him (50). A commissioner, therefore, has an 
incentive to avoid the political environment surrounding him (83, SO). 
Hilton (SO), Noll (83), and Stigler (103) suggest that the commissioner 
will institute policies favorable to the regulated industry in return 
for less conflict and therefore less regulatory effort as well as the 
possibility of future employment within the regulated industry. Eckert 
(38) hypothesized that the commissioner will prefer self-regulation by 
the regulated industry to minimize disputes and to reduce the regulatory 
workload. De Alessi (31) suggests that commissioners will favor large 
users (industry) in an effort to reduce conflict and the regulatory 
workload. 
An elected commissioner in contrast to an appointed commissioner 
would be expected to behave in a similar manner to a councilman in that 
preferential treatment would be given to those users that provide the 
highest probability of political support. In general, it would be 
expected that the transactions costs to water utility .customers of 
organizing effective political coalitions are higher at the state than 
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at the local level. Even with a regulatory structure where both state 
and local regulators are elected, political inf luenc~s are expected to 
be more important at the local level because of the greater ease with 
which local political coalitions can be formed. In sum, the councilman 
relative to the commissioner will likely engage in less economic regula-
tion, but will advocate and support water policies beneficial to the 
politically-active users of water. 
The Effect of Regulatory Behavior on Managerial Behavior. As 
previously mentioned, a manager's maximization of utility is constrained 
by the structure of ownership rights and other important characteristics 
of the industry in question. The public manager is less constrained 
than the private manager by the structure of ownership rights, but is 
more constrained by local regulatory· and political influences. All 
managers have an incentive to increase their time-stream of benefits or 
rewards in order to increase the present value of the pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary sources of income (28). Private managers can do this by 
running the firm in accordance with the desires of the owners. This 
ensures longevity in office. A public manager's survival depends not 
only on performing according to explicit managerial contracts, but it 
also depends upon the pursuit of policies favorable to the local 
politicians. Given that managers of POUs are hired essentially as 
municipal civil servants, they can be expected to isolate themselves 
from the political process by s.imply fulfilling managerial contracts 
and carrying out the suggestions and directives of the local politicians 
who are currently in office. This is expected to be the case unless a 
political machine is dominant in which case all public agency managers 
will be expected to support and contribute to the survival of the 
dominant party (66, 67). 
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If an unregulated POU were suddenly subjected to city council review 
and hence to political pressures and if certain managerial activities not 
favored by local politicians were continued, it would be highly_likely 
that in time the public manager would be replaced. In other words, the 
opportunity cost of politically-unfavorable managerial activities would 
be expected to increase. Consumer behavior theory would predict that 
the manager would consume fewer of these activities. Likewise, the 
opportunity cost of managerial activities favored by politicians would 
fall because the manager could consume more of these activities without 
fear of termination. If the opportunity cost is lower for politically-
favored managerial activities, more of these activities will be under-
taken. Because political factors are expected to be more important at 
the local level of government and because most POUs are regulated by 
city councils, the opportunity cost of consuming politically-preferred 
nonpecuniary income is expected to be lower for the public manager than 
for the private manager. The implication is that the public manager 
relative to the private manager will consume more of these politically-
f avored managerial activities. 
Implications Regarding Managerial Behavior 
Certain implications of the property rights theory of managerial 
behavior can be deduced without regard to the nature of the manager's 
utility function. This is the case for some hypotheses regarding firm 
efficiency and is probably why much of the work in the area of property 
rights has been in this area. But beyond hypotheses relating to per 
unit costs of production and other measures of efficiency, the testable 
implications are limited unless content is given to the composition of 
the arguments included in the manager's utility function. This is the 
approach suggested by Alchian and Kessel (4) in their early pioneering 
work in property rights theory and is the approach adopted here. 
Alchian and Kessel state: 
And so in utility maximization, one must similarly add a 
postulate stating what variables affect satisfaction or 
utility. This leads to meaningful implications refutable, 
in principle, by observable events (p. 158). 
In Chapter II, it was stated that the organizational theorists 
have indicated that the manager's utility is probably a function of 
things such as power, prestige, job security, absence of conflict, and 
so on. The sources of utility that cannot be purchased directly with 
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pecuniary income are "purchased" with nonpecuniary income via managerial 
activities. The task is to identify those managerial activities that 
would most likely to associated with given sources of utility. 
It is assumed that both private and public managers have identical 
utility functions. They differ only in terms of the constraints imposed 
upon their utility-maximizing activities. The different constraints on 
the activities of public and private water managers imply that different 
quantities of the various sources of utility will be consumed. It is 
argued, therefore, that the hypothesized differences in public and 
private managerial activities constitute " ..• meaningful implications 
[of the property rights theory of managerial behavior] refutable, in 
principle, by observable events" (4, p. 158). 
Firm Efficiency 
In Chapter II, two explanations were given regarding the effect 
that alternative property right structures have on a firm's costs. To 
the extent that one structure of property rights is associated with 
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fewer constraints on managerial behavior than another structure, managers 
faced with fewer ownership constraints on decision-making will consume 
more utility-generating goods and services than comparable managers 
faced with more ownership constraints. In other words, the costs per 
unit of output will be greater for the firm managed by managers having 
greater control over discretionary resources than for firms managed by 
managers having less discretion (4, 109). A second reason for greater 
inefficiency of some firms was the possibility of shirking by labor (3). 
Shirking reduces the average product of labor and thus increases the 
component of average costs that can be attributed to labor. 
The issue of firm efficiency may be treated best by developing 
production function-cost models and then assessing the effect that 
alternative property right structures have on costs. This is essentially 
what was done by Morgan (79), Mann and Mikesell (69), and Crain and 
Zardkoohi (23) in their independent studies of the water utility industry. 
None of these studies can be considered as conclusive tests of the 
property rights theory of firm efficiency because of the presence of 
sampling errors (Morgan's study), misspecified models (the Morgan and 
Mann-Mikesell studies), and aggregation problems (the Morgan, Mann-
Mikesell, and Crain and Zardkoohi articles). 
What is needed is a cost function derived from a technical produc-
tion function. The production function and the resultant cost functions 
should ideally be disaggregated by the major functions within the water 
firm: source, treatment, distribution, and administration. Economies-
of-scale may be present in one function and not in the other. In order 
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to isolate the effect that alternative property right structures have 
on costs, it is necessary to control for the effects of scale. Greater 
insight into the relationship of costs and property rights can be gained 
through disaggregation. Unfortunately, disaggregated cost data are 
not available for the water utility industry. 
Given the above data constraints, the Crain and Zardkoohi article 
is the best study to date of the effects of alternative property right 
structures on water firm costs. They found, as did Morgan, that public 
ownership of water utilities is associated with higher costs for a 
given scale of operation than is the case with privately-owned water 
firms •. Only Mann and Mikesell found evidence to the contrary--that 
public firms relative to private firms are associdted with lower average 
costs. But, as Crain and Zsrdkoohi note, Mann and Mikesell's results 
are inconclusive because of their failure to control for input-price 
differentials. Because the evidence regarding the efficiency hypothesis 
for the water utility industry is mixed, other tests should be formulated 
using other measures of firm efficiency for which data are available. 
Specifically, the intent of this section is to consider the efficiency 
hypothesis regarding the employment of labor and capital, the average 
products of labor and capital, the efficiency with which inputs are 
combined, and the extent to which input waste occurs. 
The Demand for Labor and Capital: The Private Manager. Both 
private and public managers have an incentive to expand operations over 
which they have responsibility. De Alessi (28) argued that this is 
due to the increase in the size and duration of the pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary streams of income that res 1ilts frora such activities. Vp 
to some point, private managers can increase both pecuniary and 
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nonpecuniary rewards by this activity. According to De Alessi (28, 31), 
the manager's marginal product (actual or apparent) and thus his 
pecuniary income will increase with an increase in capital (70), staff 
(109), and the budget (82). Increases in capital, staff, and the budget 
will also increase various nonpecuniary benefits. For example, an 
increase in staff reduces the manager's workload and provides a vehicle 
for spreading responsibilities· in the event that there are errors in 
decision-making. An increase in the budget allows managers to exercise 
control over more funds that could be used for discretionary purposes. 
An increase in capital may increase the manager's prestige, power, and 
reduce the likelihood of confrontations with regulators and users that 
can result from production shortages. 
An alternative explanation of why private managers desire additional 
capital was advanced by Averch and Johnson (10). A regulated, profit-
maximizing firm can increase its profit by expanding its rate base, 
i.e., by expanding capital. Holding the minimally-acceptable return to 
owners constant, this activity increases both potential profits and the 
manager's discretionary profits. Thus, the property rights theory of 
managerial behavior explains the Averch-Johnson hypothesis as a rational 
response by utility-maximizing managers to increase the discretionary 
resources over which they have control. 
The Demand for Labor and Capital: The Public Manager. Similarly, 
the public manager receives pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources of income 
from increasing capital, staff, and the budget. De Alessi (28) argued 
that the public manager has a higher time preference than a private 
manager because of the uncertainties regarding future tenure. Therefore, 
public managers prefer current and near-term flows of income to future 
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flows. ·De Alessi argued further that public managers have an incentive 
to invest earlier, build larger and more durable capital facilities, 
and to use a lower discount rate to justify the shift of resources from 
the future to the present. These incentives are reinforced by the fact 
that public managers are rarely evaluated on the basis of efficiency, 
but on "visible" indicators of success such as output, the size of the 
capital facilities, the number of employees, and the price and quality 
of the product. 
In Chapter II and earlier ·in this chapter, it was hypothesized 
that public managers would consume more of all nonpecuniary sources of 
income than managers of comparable IOUs. It was hypothesized that this 
was particularly true for those politically-preferred managerial 
activities. Capital acquisition is expected to be a politically-favored 
activity for at least two reasons. One, it is a visible indicator of 
what the politician has achieved while in office. This is especially 
the case when it is recognized that councilmen are cast in the role of 
formulative management (97). Second, Sampson and Farris (97) and 
D.e Alessi (28) note that politicians generally give a low priority to 
the long-run because the benefits that accrue from long-run decision 
making cannot be fully captured during the politician's stay in office. 
Thus, politicians also have an incentive to redirect capital resources 
from the future to the present. This can be accomplished by lowering 
the discount rate or utility prices. If employment in the public 
sector is used as a means of rewarding campaign workers, as Crain and 
Zardkoohi (24) infer from the works of Tullock (105), Stigler (103), 
and Demsetz (36), then local politicians might have an incentive to 
support the public manager's labor-increasing activities as well. 
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Because public managers face fewer constraints on their utility-
maximizing behavior than do private managers, public managers can be 
expected to consume more of all nonpecuniary sources of income including 
the politically-preferred sources of income. It is hypothesized that 
the public manager will consume more labor and capital per unit of 
output than a manager of a comparable IOU. Thus, the average factor 
requirements of labor and capital are expected to be greater and the 
average products of labor and capital lower for the public relative to 
the private firm. 
The Variability of Input Proportions. Another measure of firm 
efficiency is the variability of input proportions used in producing a 
given homogeneous output. A competitive wealth-maximizing firm will 
produce in the long-run with an optimal plant and therefore with an 
optimal capital-labor ratio. All firms within the competitive industry 
would be forced to employ similar techniques of production in an effort 
to minimize costs. Therefore, less variance in the capital-labor ratio 
would be expected among firms which necessarily had to be concerned 
with efficiency. If public water firms are less efficient than their 
private counterparts, public water firms would be expected to exhibit 
a greater variability of input proportions than would be expected for 
private water firms. 
Clarkson (19) tested this proposition for the health care industry. 
Clarkson's central proposition 
is that the effective constraint facing decision-makers 
in proprietary hospitals differ from those in nonproprietary 
hospitals producing similar products and that observed 
differences in the combinations of inputs used in production 
are a direct consequence of differing constraints (p. 363). 
His empirical evidence supports his hypothesis that the variance of 
input proportions will be greater for nonproprietary hospitals than for 
proprietary hospitals. 
Input Waste: Water Loss. Still another measure of efficiency is 
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the extent to which water is lost within the distribution system. Water 
loss is expected to result from aging distribution facilities or 
facilities in disrepair. That is, deficient replacement and repair of 
old or leaking joints, connections, or water lines will result in greater 
water loss per customer. Because water loss is invisible to the public 
owner-taxpayer and because efticiency is not a major concern of public ./ 
owners, correcting a problem which is invisible to the voter-owners may 
provide little in the way of an additional str.eam of pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary income to the public manager. Private managers, on the other 
hand, must be concerned with efficiency at least up to the point where 
the owner's minimally-acceptable return is assured. Private managers, 
up to this point, have an incentive to minimize input waste. Public 
firms relative to private firms, therefore, are expected to incur 
greater water loss per population served. In sum, public water firms 
relative to comparable private water firms are expected to employ more 
labor and capital, to have lower average products of capital and labor, 
to employ input combinations less efficiently, and to incur a greater 
degree of water loss per population served. 
Water Rates 
Utility rates are essentially a compromise among cost of service, 
value of service, and certain non-economic considerations. In every 
bargaining situation there are both economic and political factors which 
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are important (66). It has been suggested by Mann (66) that regulators 
have historically been more concerned with rate levels than with the 
rate structure. This may be the case for state-regulated IOUs, but for 
POUs regulated primarily by city councils, the budget, rate structure, 
and other major water policies are usually subject to council approval 
(58). Mann notes that cost-of-service considerations are the most 
important determinan.t of rate levels, but political leverage is probably 
more important in determining the rate structure. One would expect 
political influence to have more of an effect on the POU's water rates 
than on the IOU's water rates. The purpose of this section is to assess 
the effect of alternative property right structures on the level and 
structure of water rates. 
Rate Level Studies. Most utility rate analyses have been electric 
power rate studies. There have been a number of studies that have 
assessed the effect of regulation on the levels of electric rates. 
Stigler and Friedland (104), in analyzing regulated and unregulated 
electric power utilities, interpret their results as indicating that 
regulation has no effect on utility rate levels. Jackson (55), using 
Stigler and Friedland's model but with firm data instead of state 
averages, found that regulation is associated with lower electric rates. 
Jackson's findings are consistent with T. G. Moore's (78) 1970 study of 
privately-owned, but state-regulated electric utilities. Moore found 
that regulated electric power firms charge between 5 to 6 percent below 
the wealth-maximizing price. However, a 1975 study by C. G. Moore (77) 
found that electricity regulation raised prices during the 1947 to 1966 
period. C. G. Moore interprets this result as an attempt by state 
regulators to cross-subsidize residential users by charging industrial 
customers a higher price. 
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T. G. Moore's results also indicate that political firms charge 
lower prices than private firms. Rather than charging a price 5 to 6 
percent below the wealth-maximizing price, as was found for IOUs, POUs 
charge approximately 10 to 22 percent below the wealth-maximizing price. 
Peltzman (90) hypothesized and· found that municipal power rates are 
lower than IOU rates. He hypothesizes that this is the result of the 
political manager's use of price policy to buy political support. He 
notes also that virtually all of the difference between public and 
private p-ower rates can be attributed statistically to the tax exempt 
status of public firms. 
For the water utility industry, there appears to be very few 
analyses of the effect of non-economic factors on water rates. Hansman 
(45), in her 1976 unpublished doctoral dissertation, hypothesized that 
political firms will charge lower prices because lower prices will make 
the regulator, politician, and water manager look good; will minimize 
confrontations with customers; and will please voters. In a 1974 
unpublished doctoral dissertation by Hennigan (48), rate regressions 
were estimated for the residential customer class by firm ownership. 
He concluded as did Hansman, that IOU water rates are more cost-specific 
than those of POUs. Peltzman (90) found the same result with respect 
to the electric power industry. This result is consistent with the 
efficiency hypothesis discussed in the previous section of this chapter. 
Hennigan also found evidence contrary to Peltzman's result that 
virtually all of the difference between POU and IOU rates can be 
attributed to the tax exempt status of POUs. Hennigan argues instead 
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that is cannot be concluded that the level of taxes is the main 
difference between POU and IOU prices. Taxes are a significant deter-
minant of the difference, but not the major determinant. Mann (66) 
investigated the effect of political influences on municipal residential 
water rates. Following Peltzman, Mann hypothesized that political 
managers would lower rates to residential users in order to purchase 
political support. The coefficient on his political variable was inverse 
as hypothesized and it was statistically significant at the one percent 
level only for the minimum water rate regression. The variable was not 
significant, however, for other residential water rate regressions (66). 
Mercer and Morgan (73) believe that Mann's results are inconclusive 
because his model is misspecified ?nd the particular political variable 
used is inadequate. Mercer and Morgan argue that the correct specifi-
cation for an average cost pricing model should include an average 
revenue variable in place of the water rate variable used by Mann and 
should include a non-operating revenue variable which Mann excludes. 
Furthe~more, they suggest that it is improper to use county-wide data 
for the political variable when city data is more appropriate. 
In sum, there has been little work done in analyzing the effect 
that non~economic factors have on water rates. Indeed, an extensive 
review of the public utility literature by Mann (66, p. 976) yielded the 
conclusion" •.. that little empirical evidence exists as to the 
exact influence of various socio~political factors on the regulatory 
process (and thus on managerial behavior)." 
Managerial Behavior and the Rate Level. Earlier it was suggested 
that power, prestige, the absence of conflict, among other things, 
entered the manager's utility function and that increasing the size of 
the firm was a means by which a portion of these sources of utility 
could be acquired. It was mentioned that increases in capital, staff, 
and the budget produced streams of pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources 
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of utility. Acquisition of these things is facilitated by increasing 
the sales of the firm. Public firms are not evaluated on the basis of 
efficiency but on visible signs of success--one such measure of success 
is output (80, 57). One way that output can be increased is by reducing 
prices for all water users as long as 'the elasticity of demand is not 
perfectly inelastic. Demand elasticity estimates for the water utility 
industry indicate that while most types of water demand exhibit price 
inelasticity, the elasticity coefficients are certainly not zero (26, 
40). 
In Chapter II, it was stated that a public manager is expected to 
have access to more discretionary profits than the manager of a private 
utility. Lowering prices as a utility-increasing managerial activity 
will exhause discretionary prof its from the revenue side just as 
additional consumption by managers of capital and staff exhausts it 
from the cost side. The incentive to lower prices is reinforced by 
the manager's expectation that lower prices are also consistent with 
the motives of local politicians. Lower prices result in greater output 
and is a justification for expansion of capital, staff, and budgets all 
of which might be considered visible indicators of the politician's 
achievements. Low prices please voters and are thus attractive to 
politicians. Furthermore, lower rates can be used for other political 
goals such as inducing water intensive firms to locate in the munici-
pality. Lower prices necessitate earlier investment in capital 
facilities than would be the case with higher water rates (53). If, 
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as was suggested previously, politicians are motivated to redirect 
resources from the future to the present, lower water rates will comple-
ment the politician's desire to invest earlier in time and to build 
larger and more durable capital facilities. 
As long as there is sufficient excess capacity to avoid shortages, 
lower prices means less customer conflict and are visible signs of what 
the local politician has achieved. Thus, lowering prices is a 
politically-preferred managerial activity. Pashigan (88), in assessing 
the effect of regulation in the transportation industry, found that 
local government regulation was more severe than state regulation in 
that lower fares were associated with local regulation. 
The private manager likewise has an incentive to expand operations 
and to lower prices, but is constrained to a price-output policy which 
at least ensures that the minimally-acceptable return to the owners 
will be met. Because public managers are not required to generate a 
profit and are confronted by local politicians that prefer low to high 
prices, the public manager relative to the private manager will charge 
lower rates for all customer classes. 
Ownership Constraints and Rate Structures. Because private and 
public managers are assumed to have the same preference functions, 
differences in their cost-reward structures account in part for 
differences in the treatment of the residential, commercial, and 
industrial customer classes. 0.wnership, regulatory structure, and 
political influence all shape these costs and rewards. 
Differences in ownership rights result in a different emphasis on 
owner's wealth maximization and therefore in different degrees of price 
discrimination. Assuming separable markets, a manager of an unregulated 
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private utility will engage in more price discrimination than managers 
of regulated private utilities or public utilities because of the greater 
emphasis placed on wealth maximization by owners of the unregulated firm 
(32, 90). Any manager, private or public, has an incentive to price 
discriminate to some degree. More complete price discrimination 
increases the firm's potential profits and thus the manager's pool of 
discretionary funds. It also results in greater output, which as 
suggested earlier results in greater streams of pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
income. Because public firms are not concerned with efficiency to the 
extent that private firms are, public firms relative to private firms 
would be expected to engage in less price discrimination. 
The price discrimination hypothesis has been tested by Peltzman (90), 
Hansman (Lf5), De Alessi (32), and Primeaux and Nelson (92). Both 
Peltzman and De Alessi found evidence of greater price discrimination in 
private electric utilities than in public electric utilities. Hansman 
found the same result for the water utility industry. With the exception 
of the Primeaux and Nelson article, none of the above studies controlled 
for cost-of-service differentials. Primeaux and Nelson tested the price 
discrimination hypothesis controlling for cost differentials and found 
that private electric firms price discriminate. For the water industry, 
Hansman found that private water firms employ more steps within each 
rate block than do POUs and that the slope of the rate-step schedule 
within a block is steeper for the IOU than the POU. There was no 
analysis of price-marginal cost ratios, however. While the evidence 
suggests that private firms price discriminate more completely than 
public firms, there has yet to be a test of this hypothesis for the 
water utility industry which analyzes price-marginal cost ratios. 
Political Influence and the Rate Structure. A major unresolved 
issue for which there is little evidence is the effe~t of political and 
regulatory influences on the rate structure. In addition to the owner-
ship effect mentioned above, the design of the rate structure is also 
influenced by the effect that regulation and political factors have on 
the manager's opportunity set. Earlier in this chapter, the hypothesis 
was advanced that both state commissioners and local politicians favor 
large users relative to small users. It was also maintained that 
political influences are expected to have a greater effect on the 
managerial activities of locally-regulated POUs relative to state-
regulated IOUs. The im,plication for water rate design is that the 
public water firm will design a rate structure that is relatively more 
beneficial to high usage customers within the city and more beneficial 
to residents relative to nonresidents than is the case for the state-
regulated IOU. In order to isolate the ownership effect on the rate 
structure, some attempt should be made to control for the regulatory-
p9litical effects. 
Jackson (55) was one of the first to investigate the role of 
political power on private electric power rates. He argued that due to 
the greater political power of high-usage customers, these users would 
be able to extract lower rates from the utility. He found that indus-
trial power rates were lower than residential power rates. Stigler and 
Friedland (104) hypothesized that electric rate regulation would favor 
the residential user, but they found evidence to the contrary. 
Peltzman (90) argued that the political incentives for re-election 
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would result in electric rates that were lower for the- residential class 
relative to other user classes and would be lower for voters relative to 
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nonvoters. His results seem to suppo the latter hypothesis, but 
Peltzman concluded that his evidence did not support the former 
hypothesis. Primeaux and Nelson (92) concluded that industrial electric 
customers receive preferential treatment relative to residential users, 
but they could not conclude that industrial user political pressure via 
the regulatory structure was the cause. Mikesell (75) also found 
evidence that high-usage users are given preferential electric rates. 
He found that high-usage residential customers are favored over low-
usage residential users. The weight of the evidence for the electric 
power industry at least seems to support the hypothesis that high-usage 
customers are preferred to low~usage customers. 
It appears that there has been no attempt, other than Hann (66), to 
assess the effect of political factors on the structure of water rates. 
Mann's political variable did not perform as expected except in his 
minimum rate regression. If water rates are used to buy votes, then 
following both Peltzman and Mann's reasoning, a political strength 
variable would be expected to have a negative effect on all residential 
water rates. Mann found that this was only the case for the minimum 
water rate. One reason for the poor results, other than Mercer and 
Morgan's criticisms mentioned earlier, might be that the political 
influences to which public regulators are responsive are those that 
originate not from the more numerous low-usage residential customers, 
but from high-income residential users and water intensive firms. 
Product Quality 
There has been virtually nothing done in the area· of property rights 
and product quality. Newhouse (80) and De Alessi (31) were two of the 
first to assert that managerial utility and product quality were 
positively related. De Alessi says that both private and public 
managers have a desire to increase product quality because this is an 
output-increasing strategy. Newhouse, in his economic model of a non-
profit hospital, postulates that rionprofit institutions will emphasize 
quality. He also says that a manager's pecuniary income is positively 
related to the prestige of the institution. The institution's prestige 
is a function of the quality and quantity of the product. With respect 
to the water industry, Hennigan (48), however, felt that water quality 
differences between POUs and IOUs would be minimal because federal 
clean-water regulations apply equally to both types of firms. He did 
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not test this proposition. Water quality regulations may set the minimal 
quality standards, but the minimal standards do not imply that public 
and private water firms will produce a product of exactly the same 
quality. 
There are at least two reasons to expect a manager with discre-
tionary resources to consume a higher quality product. If a manager's 
objective function includes such things as status, a desire to serve 
the public, professional excellence, absence of conflicts with regulators 
and customers to name just a few of those things considered important 
by the organizational theorists, then producing a higher quality product 
is one of several managerial activities consistent with these objectives. 
That is, management will produce a higher quality product as a means 
of acquiring additional sources of utility. 
A second reason was pointed out by De Alessi (31)·. A higher quality 
product can increase the manager's pecuniary rewards if the increase in 
quality increases the demand for the product and thus output. Greater 
output facilitates the acquisition of more capital and labor and would 
be expected to increase the manager's marginal product and therefore 
his income. Households are sensitive to the taste, smell, and color 
of water as well as to the water pressure at the tap. MacEwen (63) 
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lists water quality as an important factor affecting water demand. He 
cites some evidence that suggests that there appears to be a relationship 
between water. quality and the industrial demand for water. 
In the context of the model of managerial behavior discussed in 
Chapter II, it was noted that anything that increases potential profits 
will shift the manager's opportunity set outward. If an increase in 
product quality increases the demand for the product and if the resultant 
additional revenues exceed the additional costs of providing the higher 
quality output, potential profits would be expected to increase. The 
increase in the discretionary funds available to the manager implies 
that the manager would be expected to consume both more pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary income. Up to a point, it is expected that qualitative 
product improvements would increase potential profits. Thus, up to a 
point, private managers will have an incentive to increase product 
quality. 
For the water industry, POUs can acquire water treatment facilities 
at a lower per unit cost ·than can IOUs. This is because municipalities 
often use municipal bonds to, finance capital facilities. POUs are also 
eligible for federal grants and low-interest loans for the construction 
of water treatment facilities. Because the additional cost of new 
treatment facilities is less for a POU than it is for a comparable IOU, 
the manager of a POU would be able to expand water treatment and thus 
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product quality to a degree greater than could a manager of a comparable 
IOU. 
POUs will also provide higher product quality than comparable IOUs 
because of the differences in the position of the opportunity sets 
facing the public and private managers. If the manager's utility 
function is in any way an increasing function of quality, as was asserted 
by be Alessi and Newhouse, the property rights theory of managerial 
behavior predicts that the POU will produce a higher quality product 
than the IOU. This is because the manager of the POU relative to the 
manager of the IOU has access to more discretionary resources to purchase 
more of all nonpecuniar_y sources of utility, including product quality. 
In sum, the POU relative to a comparable IOU is expected to produce a 
higher quality product as reflected in a water quality index to be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
Differences in ownership, the regulatory structure, political 
factors, and other industrial characteristics shape the opportunity sets 
that constrain the choices of public and private water managers. Based 
upon the unique set of managerial property rights associated with the 
water utility industry, it was hypothesized that public managers relative 
to private water managers would employ more labor and capital per unit of 
output. Public firms relative to private firms, therefore, would be 
expected to have lower average products of labor and capital. Public 
firms are also hypothesized to incur greater water loss per customer 
and to employ a less efficient combination of inputs relative to 
comparable private water firms. 
92 
With respect to rate-making, the public firm relative to the private 
water firm will charge lower prices for all water users, will price 
discriminate less, but will give preferential treatment to large-usage 
customers relative to low-usage customers and to residents relative to 
those that live outside the city limits. Finally, it was hypothesized 
that the POU will produce a higher quality product than a similarly-
situated IOU. In addition to presenting the results of tests of the 
above hypotheses, the purpose of the next three chapter is to describe 
the data, samples, and statistical methodologies used in testing each 
of the above hypotheses. 
CHAPTER V 
FIRM EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCT QUALITY 
Introduction 
In Chapter IV, it was hypothesized that a POU relative to an IOU 
would (1) employ more labor and capital for a given level of output, 
(2) employ a combination of inputs that would diverge more from the cost-
minimizing combination, (3) have lower average products of labor and 
capital and a higher incidence of input waste, and (4) produce a higher 
quality product. The first hypothesis is tested by estimating reduced-
form input demand functions employing a binary variable for ownership. 
A further implication of hypothesis (1) is that POUs will incur higher 
costs at a given level of output than IOUs. A reduced-form cost 
function consistent with the underlying input demand functions is used 
to test this additional implication. A test of hypothesis (2) entails 
estimating a "cost-minimizing" capital-to-labor ratio for each water 
utility and then comparing it to the firm's actual capital-to-labor 
ratio. Hypothesis (3) is tested by using the appropriate parametric or 
nonparametric tests to determine if there are differences in these 
measures of firm efficiency by ownership. Finally, in the last section 
of this chapter, regression analysis is used to assess the effect of 




The Demand for Labor and Capital 
The empirical models used to test for the effect of firm ownership 
on the demand for labor and capital are of the log-linear constant 
elasticitiy type (54). The input demand functions are derived from a 
minimization of cost subject to a production function. This is equiva-
lent to a Lagrangean maximization of output subject to a cost constraint. 
Let 
z Q(L,K) + A.(C - wL - rK) 




w price of labor, and 
r = price of capital. 
Substituting a Cobb-Douglas production function 
where A = constant, 
a output elasticity of labor, and 
8 output elasticity of capital. 
(5. 1) 
(5.2) 
for the general production function in (5.1) and maximizing Z subject to 









Combining the first-order conditions produce the familiar marginal 
condition for a cost-minimizing combination of inputs. 
(3Q/3L)/(3Q/3L) w/r , (5.4) 
which can be rewritten as 
rK/6 wL/a . (5.5) 
Solving (5.5) for the capital-to-labor ratio yields the cost-minimizing 
capital-to-labor ratio, 
K/L S/a w/r . (5.6) 
Solving (5.6) for K, substituting this expression for Kin (5.2), 
and making a logarithmic transformation on (5.2) results in the 
derivation of a log-linear constant elasticity capital demand function 
ln K 
where a 
a - a/(a + B) ln (r/w) +a! S ln Q 
a 
ln[A(a/S) ]/a+ S 
Similarly, a labor demand function can be derived as 




The test of hypothesis (1) involves estimating equations (5.7) and (5.8) 
separately with a binary variable for ownership. The equations to be 








= 1, 2, ... , n where n equals the i1urnber of private and public 
water utilities included in the sample, 
binary variable for ownership type (1 if municipally owned, 
0 if privately owned), and 
U = a residual term for the ith water utility. 
i 
The advantage of estimating equations (5.9) and (5.10) is that 
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output is treated as an exogenous variable. As Crain and Zardkoohi note, 
water utilities do not have control over the provision of their output 
in that they are required to produce sufficient quantities of water to 
. . 
meet all water demands (23). Further, the relative input price variable 
can be treated as an exogenous variable because the interest rate, r, 
is determined by compet.itive capital markets and wage rates, w, are 
fixed by public employees' contracts in the case of POUs or union 
contracts in the case of IOUs (54). 
Sample, .Data, and Methodology. The sampling population consists of 
a survey by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) of water utility 
operating data for 1970 (8). The survey provides data on 768 water 
utilities representing 48 states and serving a population of 85,581,070 
(7). No utilities serving communities of less than 10,000 population 
are reported in the AiiWA survey. A 1976 survey .of community water 
systems by the Environmental Protection Agency estimates that of an 
estimated·34,631 water systems, only 8 percent of the systems serve 
populations in excess of 10,000 (108). Thus, the A\iWA survey comprises 
roughly 28 percent of the total number of water systems in the over-
10,000 population size range. 
The sample chosen for testing hypothesis (1) as well as hypotheses 
(2) and (3) include all water firms in the AW\{A survey for which 
adequate data are available. Some of the firms included in the AWWA 
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gurvey are purchase-only firms. Purchase-only firms have primarily 
distribution facilities. Because of the absence of p·roduction facilities 
and the labor needed for its operation, these firms were omitted from the 
analysis. The largest investor-owned utility in the sample serves a 
population of 1,251,000. In an effort to control for scale effects, all 
public water agencies are excluded that serve populations in excess of 
the largest investor-owned water firm. The largest POU serves a popula-
tion of 1,.230,000. The sample used in the following analysis consists 
of °125 water utilities of which 87 are POUs and 38 are IOUs. 
The data on capital, labor, price of capital, ownership, and output 
were taken from the AWWA 1970 survey. The wage rate variable is 
constructed from data on wage rates provided in the AWWA 1 s committee 
report, Water Utility Salaries and Wages, 1968 (6). 
Let 
K. = net book value of the ith utility in thousands of dollars. 
1 
Li = LFi + ~LPi where LFi and LPi equal full and part-time labor, 
respectively, for the ith utility. 
r. price of capital of the ith utility defined as the bond yield, 
1 
dividend yield, or loan rate applicable to capital investments 
put in place in 1970. Some utilities report more than one of 
these rates. In most of these cases, the rates did not differ 
markedly. It was decided to keep the sample size as large as 
possible by retaining those utilities that reported multiple 
financing methods. For these utilities, a simple average of 
these rates is used. The data do not allow for the computation 
of a weighted-average rate. 
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w. weighted-average annual wage for the ith utility by region and 
1 
ownership. The weights are based on the importance of each of 
17 different occupational classifications relative to total 
water utility employment. The weights are multiplied by each 
occupation's average annual wage and income and summed across 
all 17 occupations. The weights and specific occupation wage 
levels vary by ownerBhip and the nine regions defined in the 
1968 wage survey. 
Regions 
1. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Vermont 
2. New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania 
3. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
4. Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
South Dakota 
5. Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia 
6. Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee 
7. Askansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas 
8. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, 
Wyoming 
9. Alaska, California,· Hawaii, Oregon, Washington 
Qi = millions of gallons of water produced and purchased annually 
by the ith utility. 
D. binary variable for the ith water utility ownership (1 if 
1 
municipally owned; 0 if privately owned). 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table IV below. 
TABLE IV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED IN ESTIMATING EQUATIONS 
5.9 AND 5.10 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Variable N Mean Deviation Value Value 
Capital (K) 
Pooled 125 21,926.70 35,892.10 132.00 210,374.00 
POU 87 22,887.90 29,811.90 260.00 210, 374. 00 
Iou· 38 19,725.90 25,023.50 132.00 88,147.00 
Labor (L) 
Pooled 125 116.88 200.79 5.50 1,540.00 
POU 87 114.78 219.27 6.00 1,540.00 
IOU 38 121. 70 152.75 5.50 526.00 
Price of Capital (r) 
Pooled 125 6.08 1. 92 1. 70 10.00 
POU 87 5.17 1.28 1. 70 8.00 
IOU 38 8.19 1.42 4.95 10.00 
Price of Labor (w) 
Pooled 125 6,386.88 649.06 4, 981. 00 7,763.00 
POU 87 6,215.23 620.73 5,136.00 7,763.00 
IOU 38 6, 779.87 537.03 4,981.00 7 ,431. 00 
Output (Q) 
Pooled 125 10,021.80 15,395.30 304.00 70,976.00 
POU 87 8 ,811. 94 15,119.90 304.00 70,976.00 
IOU 38 12 '791.80 15,862.90 326.00 54,507.00 
Total Population 
Served N Mean Total 
Pooled 125 164,918.00 20,614,699.00 
POU 87 134,733.00 11,678,298.00 
IOU 38 235;168.00 8,936,401.00 
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Both of the input demand functions are estimated using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). A check for multicollinearity was done by 
inspecting the diagonal elements of the (X.'X)-l matrix, the determinant 
of the (X'X) matrix, and the simple correlation coefficient matrix. For 
both intput d~mand functions, there did not appear to be any serious 
problems with multicollinearity. Tests for heteroskedasticity were 
conducted for all regressions using a test attributed to Glejser (65). 
For all of the regression equations estimated in this section on firm 
efficiency, the null hypothesis of homoskedastistic disturbance terms 
could not be rejected. Therefore, the regression estimates presented 
below are OLS estimates. 
Regression Results. The results of the capital and labor demand 
regressions are shown in Table V. The coefficients on all variables 
including the binary variables for ownership in both the capital and 
labor demand regressions have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant with the exception of the coefficient of ln(r/w). in the 
]_ 
capital demand equation. The coefficient on ln(r/w). is positive, but 
]_ 
statistically not significant. Thus, the regression results support the 
alternative hypothesis that after controlling for levels of output and 
relative factor prices, municipal water agencies relative to private 
water firms employ more capital and labor. 
A comparison of the regression estimates for (5.9) and (5.10) 
suggest that cost-minimizing considerations are more important in the 
demand for labor than in the demand for capital. 1 The theoretical 
1Differences in the regression results may also be the result of 
measurement error. The variable used as a proxy for capital is net book 
value which depends, in part, on the accounting treatment of the valuation 
of the capital base. 
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TABLE V 
OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF EQUATION 5.9 AND 5.10 
2-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
Ca:eital Demand Equation 
D. .5900 .1803 3.272 .0014 
1 
ln(r/w). .1236 .2659 .465 .6429 
1 
ln Q. .9334 • 0529 17.645 .0001 
1 
(Constant) 1. 7461 1. 9648 .890 .3759 
R2 = .740 F = 114.31 N = 125 
-2 .733 MSE = .5955 dF = 121 R = 
Labor Demand Eguation 
D. .3009 .1126 2.672 .0086 
l. 
ln(w/r)i -.3393 .1661 -2.043 .0432 
ln Q. .8539 .0331 25.830 .0001 
l. 
(Constant) -1.0285 1.2270 -.840 .4040 
2 
R = .862 F = 252.82 N = 125 
-2 
R = .858 MSE = .2323 dF = 121 
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economic variables, relative factor prices and output, seem to explain 
much of the water utility's demand for labor, but only output is an 
important economic determinant of the demand for capital. The overall 
R2, R-2, F statistic and adjusted is much larger and the mean square 
error, MSE, much smaller for the labor demand regression than it is for 
the capital demand regression. In both regressions, ownership is an 
important noneconomic explanatory variable. It might be inferred that 
in addition to ownership, noneconomic considerations such as the 
community's desire for residential, commercial, and industrial develop-
ment may be more important in explaining the water firm's demand for 
capital than its demand for labor. 
Operation, Maintenance, and Administrative Costs 
A much-tested implication of the theory of property rights is that 
publicly-owned firms have higher per unit costs than privately-owned 
firms. The weight of the empirical evidence to date and the results of 
the capital and labor demand regressions above support this hypothesis. 
As noted earlier, there have been few attempts to test this hypothesis 
for the water utility industry. The Crain and Zardkoohi study (23) was 
the best of the cost studies because of their use of a reduced-form cost 
function which accounted for factor price differentials. Intriligator 
(54) notes that Nerlove employed this same type of cost function in 
analyzing the electric power industry. Because the sampling technique 
and wage data employed by Crain and Zardkoohi differ from that used in 
the previous section, a reduced-form constant elasticity cost function is 
estimated using the sample used previously for the capital and labor 
demand regressions. 
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Crain and Zardkoohi made use of the s2.me 1970 ;)perating data for 
water utilities used in this study, but used wage data from a 1974 survey 
of water utility salaries and wages by the AWWA even though 1968 wage and 
salary data were available. Because Crain and Zardkoohi did not provide 
regional rankings by ownership for their wage variable (which is a 
weighted-average wage rate constructed for their study), no comparison 
can be made to the 1968 weighted average wage variable used in this study. 
Crain and Zardkoohi used the same price of capital variable as is 
used in this study, but they ch~se to eliminate all firms which reported 
more than one source of capital financing. The effect of doing so was 
to eliminate from their sample most of the larger private water systems 
(from 500,000 to 1,251,000 population served). The 1970 operating data 
reveal that IOUs tend to use mulitple methods of finance more frequently 
than do POUs. Because Crain and Zardkoohi eliminated all public firms 
serving populations larger than the largest IOU, they effectively 
excluded most large water systems in excess of a half-million population. 
Empirical Model. Adding the cost condition 
C = wL + rK (5.11) 
to the first-order conditions and production function in (5.3) and (5.2), 
respectively, a reduced-form constant elasticity cost function can be 
derived as (54) 
C(w,r,Q) 
a B 1/ (a+S) 
= A' (w r Q) 
or 





The cost equation to be estimated can be derived first by making a log-
linear transformation on (5.13) and then adding a disturbance term. The 
result is given below in (5.14). 
ln C. 
l 
a S 1 
A' + a + S ln wi + a + S ln ri + a + B ln Qi + Ui 
It is necessary to impose a restriction on the above equation that 
sum of the coefficients on ln w. and ln r. must equal l (23) . This 
1 l 
be achieved by dividing ln c. and ln w. by ln r .. The result is as 
l 1 l 
follows: 
ln c. ln A' + a (ln ln r .) + 
1 





Adding the binary ownership variable, D., gives the regression equation 
l 
to be estimated in (5.16). 
ln C. - ln r. 
l l 
a 1 
A' +a+ B (ln wi - ln ri) +a+ B ln Qi+ 
(5 .16) 
D. + U. 
1 l 
All of the variables used to estimate the above equation remain the 
same as those used in estimating the capital and labor demand functions 
with the exception of the new variable C .. C. is defined as the sum of 
l l 
operating, maintenance, and administration costs and is obtained from 
the 1970 AWWA survey of water utility operating data. Taxes are 
excluded from costs because .of the bias that would be introduced due to 
the fact that municipal firms are rarely subject to taxation. Debt 
service and depreciation expenses are also excluded because of sporadic 
reporting of these variables and because omitting observations for which 
these expenditures are absent results in a sample that is no longer 
consistent with the sample used in estimating the capital and labor 
demand functions. 
Regression Results. The coefficients of the economic explanatory 
variables are positive as hypothesized in (5.16) and are significantly 
different from zero at the .01 level. 2 The ownership binary variable, 
D., is positive as expected and significantly greater than zero at a 
1 
.06 level (see Table VI below). These results confirm the results 
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presented by Crain and Zardkoohi (23) and add additional support to the 
general hypothesis that municipal water agencies are less efficient than 
private water firms. Although regression estimates of (5.16) and Crain 
and Zardkoohi's regression estimates are not directly comparable because 
of differences in data and sampling, it can be noted that regression 
(5.16) provides a better fit to the data and the relative input price 
variable using the 1968 wage data has a higher t ratio than is the case 
for Crain and Zardkoohi's estimates. 
Input Combinations 
As discussed in Chapter IV, if POUs are less efficient than IOUs, 
POUs are expected to be associated with greater variability of input 
proportions than IOUs. This was the central proposition of Clarkson's 
study of proprietary and nonproprietary hospitals. Clarkson tested the 
hypothesis by testing the null hypothesis that the variances of input 
combinations are equal for proprietary and nonproprietary hospitals 
against the alternative hypothesis that the variances of nonproprietary 
hospitals are greater than those of proprietary hospitals (19). The 
2Note that the coefficient on ln Q, r,, ! B' is comparable in size and 
significance to the same coefficients foruthe capital and labor demand 
functions. et l 6. equals .8412 for equation (5.16) and .9334 and· .8539 
for equations {5.9) and (5.10), respectively. 
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TABLE VI 
OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF EQUATION 5.16 
2-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
D. .1334 .0838 1.59 .1139 
l 




.7528 .1235 6.09 .0001 
(Constant) -7.4979 .9128 -8.21 .0001 
R2 .907 F = 394.95 N = 125 
-2 .907 MSE = .1285 dF = 121 R = 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
N Mean Deviation Value Value 
c. 
l 
Pooled 125 1540.06 2152.94 78.00 8877. 00 
POU 87 1305.49 1905.26 83.00 8656.00 
IOU 38 2077 .08 2582.87 78.00 8877 .oo 
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same test applied to the water industry (see Table VII) using the sample 
described above supports Clarkson's hypothesis that the variability of 
input proportions among public firms exceeds that of private firms. 
TABLE VII 
EMPLOYMENT OF CAPITAL Ai~D LABOR, F TEST FOR EQUALITY OF 
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Note that the mean levels of (K/L) are greater for POUs than IOUs. 
A Mann-Whitney U test (22) of the null hypothesis that the capital-to-
labor ratios are equal for POUs and IOUs can be rejected in favor of an 
alternative hypothesis that POUs are more capital intensive relative to 
IOUs at a .01 level of significance. This result is in contrast to 
Crain and Zardkoohi's 1980 argument that " ... the public sector will 
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operate with relatively less capital and more labor than privately o\~1ed 
firms in performing roughly identical activities" (24, p. 1075). Some 
doubt, therefore, is cast upon the theoretical model which underscores 
their hypothesis. 
Although the results in Table VII are suggestive, the assumption 
that underlies Clarkson's hypothesis is that both private and public 
water firms face a competitive· environment which out of necessity requires 
the use of a single cost-minimizing combination of inputs. Water 
utilities operate in sheltered markets and they face different input 
prices rather than single market-determined wage rates and capital 
prices. Thus, the cost-minimizing capital-to-labor ratio would be 
expected to differ for each water firm. A more rigorous test of the 
efficiency hypothesis with respect to input combinations involves the 
estimation of a cost-minimizing capital-to-labor ratio for each firm and 
a comparison of this ratio to the firm's actual capital-to-labor ratio. 
Greater divergences of a firm's actual from its cost-minimizing capital-
to labor ratios imply less efficiency in the employment of input 
combinations. 
In the first section of this chapter, a cost-minimizing capital-to-










be defined as CK., 
l 
the cost minimizing capital-to-labor ratio, 





(K/L) . \ 
l 
(5. 18) 





actual capital-to-labor ratio for the ith utility, and 
the absolute value of the difference between the ith 
utility's actual and cost-minimizing capital-to-labor 
ratio. 
All other variables and constants are defined as before. 
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The null hypothesis to be tested is that the POUs' actual capital-
to-labor ratio will diverge by the same amount in absolute value from 
its cost-minimizing capital-to-labor ratio as is the case for IOUs. 
The alternative hypothesis is that A. is greater for POUs relative to 
l. 
IOUs. The hypothesis is stated below in (5.19). 
(5. 19) 
In order to test for differences in A., estimates of a and B have 
l. 
to be obtained. Unique estimates of a and B can be obtained from the 
cost regression estimated previously. The coefficient on ln Q 1 
i' a + B' 
can be divided into the coefficient on (ln wi - ln ri)' a~ B' to give 
the output elasticity of labor, a. Because a + B must equal the returns-
1 
to-scale, B can be derived as the reciprocal of a + B less a. The cost 
regression was estimated for the entire sample, a sample of IOU firms, 
and a sample of POUs without the binary ownership variable. A test for 
differences in estimated coefficients between regressions (60), the 
Chow test, was used to determine if there were statistically significant 
differences in the slope coefficients and thus estimates of a and B by 
ownership. The results of the test indicate that there are no significant 
differences in estimates of a and B by ownership. Therefore, the 
parameter estimates of a and B (see Table VIII) will be taken as the 
estimates for both private and public firms and will be derived from the 
estimates of equation (5.16) reported in Table VI. 
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TABLE VIII 
ESTIMATES OF ~, B, AND RETURNS-TO-SCALE 
Coefficient Coefficient on 
A 
on ln Q. (ln w. - ln r.) Returns-to-Scale a B 
]_ ]_ ]_ 
.8412 .7528 1.189 .895 .294 
(.0246)* (.1235)* 
* Standard errors are in parentheses and are significantly different 
from zero at a .01 level. 
If A. is a normally distributed random variable, a t-test for 
]_ 
differences in sample means would be an appropriate parametric test of 
(5.19) (46). If A. is not normally distributed, the t-test will give 
]_ 
invalid results. Using a test for normality, the Kolmogorov:-Smirnov 
one-sample test (22), it was found that the null hypothesis that A. is 
]_ 
a normally distributed random variable can.be rejected. As a result a 
nonparametric test, the Mann-Whitney U test (22), is used to test the 
hypothesis in (5.19). This test determines whether or not the two 
independent ownership samples have been drawn from the same population. 
As was reported previously, POUs are significantly more capital 
intensive than IOUs. This can be explained in part by the higher ratio 
of the price of labor to the price of capital experienced by POUs 
relative to IOUs (see Table IX). The cost-minimizing capital-to-labor 
ratio, CK, is correspondingly higher for POUs as well. The results of 
the Mann-Whitney test for differences in A. by ownership are presented 
]_ 
below in Table IX. 
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TABLE IX 
INPUT VARIABILITY HYPOTHESIS, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST RESULTS 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Variable N Mean Deviation Value Value 
(w/r) 1 
Pooled 125 1166.10 472.19 646.12 4566.47 
POU 87 1301.89 496.16 763.20 4566.47 
IOU 38 855.19 180.12 646.12 1378.66 
CK, 
l. 
Pooled 125 362.79 146.90 201.01 1420.68 
POU 87 405.03 154.36 237.44 1420.68 
IOU 38 266.06 56.01 201.01 428. 92 
(K/L). 
l. 
Pooled 125 216.24 i59.54 4.63 1254.29 
POU 87 235.54 173.25 13.64 1254.29 
IOU 38 172.03 112.49 4.63 491.23 
A. 
l. 
Pooled 125 201.19 161.21 4.07 1242.35 
POU 87 229.49 179.89 4.07 1242.35 
IOU 38 136.38 75.37 6.83 265.48 
Mean Mann-Whitney U Level of 
N Score (A.) 
l. 
Z Statistic* Significance 
POU 87 69.93 z = -3.23 .001 
IOU 38 47.16 
*Standard Normal Statistic. 
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The results above indicate that the null hypothesis in (5.19) can 
be rejected at a .01 level of significance in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that POUs relative to IOUs combine inputs less efficiently. 
Thus, noneconomic factors such as ownership are important determinants 
of not only the quantities of labor and capital employed, but also the 
proportions in which they are employed. 
Other Measures of Firm Efficiency 
In Chapter IV, it was hypothesized that POUs would have lower 
average products of labor and capital and would be associated with a 
higher incidence of inp.ut waste than would be the case for IOUs. The 
average products of labor and capital for the ith utility are defined 
Q. Qi 
APL. APK. 
l respectively. difficult as - and = K.' Input waste is more L. 
l l l l 
to define given the nature of the data. Water loss in the transmission 
and distribution system per population served would be a good measure 
of input waste, but the data provide information only for the difference 
between total water produced and purchased and total water sold. This 
difference includes not only water lost in the transmission and distri-
bution system, but also water used in the treatment plant and water 
supplied without charge to certain municipal agencies. However, the 
data can be used to construct a proxy variable for input waste defined 




= (Q. - RPW.)/POP. 
l l l 
(5.20) 
nonrevenue-producing water per population· served by the ith 
utility in millions of gallons, 
RPW. 
1 
= revenue-producing water produced by the ith utility in 




population served by the ith utility in thousands of people, 
and 
Qi is defined as before. 
If POUs relative to IOUs are less efficient, it is expected that 
POUs will have lower average products of labor and capital and greater 
input waste per population served relative to IOUs. The null and 









K ' and 
(5.21) 
Hl: 
POU < APIOU APP OU < APIOU APL L Hl: K K 
HO: NP~ou = NPWIOU 
Hl: NPWPOU > NPWIOU 
The same sample is used in testing the hypotheses in (5.21) as has 
been used throughout this chapter. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for normality again indicate that a nonparametric test should be 
used. The results of Mann-\~1itney U test of the hypotheses in (5.21) and 
related descriptive statistics are reported in Table X. 
The results in the table below allow for the rejection of the null 
hypotheses that there is no difference in the average products of labor 
and capital by ownership type in favor of the alternative hypotheses 
that IOUs have higher average products of labor and capital than POUs. 
These results are consistent with the results of the capital and labor 
demand regressions presented earlier. The Mann-Whitney Z statistic is 
significant for a one-tail test at the .027 level for the average product 
of labor hypothesis and at the .001 level for the average product of 
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capital hypothesis. The null hypothesis that there is no difference in 
nonrevenue-producing water per population served by ownership cannot be 
rejected, however. It may be that NPW is measuring something other than 
input waste. For instance, some of the nonrevenue-producing water may 
be used to increase in-system storage. This hardly constitutes _input 
waste. There are no data on the quantity of nonrevenue-producing water 
that goes to increasing stocks of finished water. In sum, POUs relative 
to IOUs employ more labor and capital, are more capital intensive, use 
less efficient combinations of inputs, incur higher variable costs, and 















MANN-W1!ITNEY U TEST RESULTS Ai.'1D RELATED DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS OF HYPOTHESES IN (5.21) 
Z Statistic 
Standard Minimum Maximum (One-Tail 
N Mean Deviation Value Value Significance) 
125 94.18 58.67 20 .. 80 459.57 z = 1.93 
87 87.06 48.42 20.80 315.67 (.027) 
38 110. 48 75.47 42.31 459.57 
125 .82 1.80 .08 17 .11 
87 .61 1.10 .08 7.59 z = 4.19 
38 1. 27 2.79 .24 17.11 (.000) 
125 .0090 .0119 0.0000 .0954 
87 .0080 .0060 0.0000 .0246 z = -.23 
38 .0121 . 0196 0.0000 .0964 (.411) 
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Product Quality 
The final hypothesis advanced in Chapter IV was that POUs would 
produce a higher quality product than IOUs. This hypothesis was origi-
nated elsewhere (80, 31), but has yet to be tested. One difficulty in 
testing such a hypothesis is measuring product quality. What makes the 
water industry attractive as a test case is the extensive chemical 
contaminant data available from some state health commissions for 
finished water--water within the municipal distribution system. It is 
possible to construct an index of water quality using this data. 
Because there is no publ·ished source of contaminant data for the 
nation as a whole, it was decided to test the product quality hypothesis 
using data for just Oklahoma. The chemical contaminant data to be 
discussed in greater detail below are from Public Water Supplies for 
the State of Oklahoma: 1979 Annual Report (85). Data on investor-owned 
and municipally-owned water systems were obtained from the master 
computer information file--the Model State Information System, Public 
Water System Inventory Subsystem: Ccmprenensive Report--Selection 
Extract File (86). All utilities for which chemical contaminant and 
other data were available were selected. In order to control for scale 
effects, municipal water systems were limited to approximately the same 
size range in terms of population served as investor-owned water systems. 
All state- or federally-owned systems and purchase-only systems were 
omitted. Finally, for a water system to be selected, it had to serve 
full-time residents. Systems exclusively serving nonresident or 
transient populations such as resorts were omitted because different 
monitoring and water sampling requirements apply to these water 
suppliers relative to systems serving fixed residential populations (1). 
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Theoretical and Empirical Model 
In order to determine if ownership affects water quality, it is 
necessary to control for other factors that may affect water quality. 
Jeffrey and Singley (56) suggest that water quality is a function of 
surveillance, source of raw water supply, treatment, and water operator 
competence. It is expected that environmental and regional factors are 
important influences as well. For example, Sonnen (101) reports that 
the National Academy of Science's 1972 committee on water quality 
criteria recommended that contaninant criteria vary with temperature. 
Further, precipitation would be expected to affect water quality in terms 
of its affect on total dissolved solids and the quantity of herbicides 
and pesticides that wash into surface sources of raw water. Regions may 
also differ with respect to soil characteristics, the intensity of 
agriculture, and community attitude with respect to the maintenance 
and preservation of raw water supplies. 
Water utility data are not available with respect to the grade level 
of the water system operator nor are they available with respect to the 
type and extent of treatment. Population served will be used as a proxy 
for the extent of water treatment. Larger systems are expected to 
engage in more treatment because these systems generally have better 
laboratory procedures for identifying quality problems and the resources 
necessary to install treatment facilities. Adams (1) notes: 
The large utility that employs chemists will have little 
trouble sampling, but the small system will need some 
trained individual to collect samples. Some tests, such as 
turbidity and chlorine residuals, must be done by operating 
personnel. These personnel must be trained sufficiently 
to do these tests and have the required equipment (p. 231). 
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In a 1980 AWWA committee report on quality control practices in water 
bacteriology laboratories, there is some evidence to suggest that larger 
water systems do a better job sampling water and thus determining its 
quality characteristics (9). Thus, population served is expected to be 
positively related to water quality. 
Surveillance data is not available with the exception of whether or 
not monthly monitoring takes place for the water system. Virtually every 
water system reported the occurrence of monthly monitoring. Thus, with 
no variation in this variable, there is little if any explanatory value. 
A binary variable for ground versus surface raw water supplies is 
available as a raw water variable. Both Morgan (79) and Hennigan (48) 
suggested that surface sources may require more treatment and therefore 
result in greater system costs. If surface sources of raw water are of 
lower quality relative to ground water sources, the incidence of surface 
sources is expected to be inversely related to water quality. This 
variable, however, was not used because of its high degree of association 
with the regional binary variables to be discussed below. For example, 
of 68 water suppliers selected from the eastern region, only one system 
made use of ground water. Regional binary variables, as a result, are 
expected to pick up much of the effect that a raw-water source variable 
would have on water quality. 
Binary variables are also used to indicate the type of ownership 
and the region within the state of Oklahoma that the utility is located. 
Several regional breakdowns were tried. The regional breakdowns that 
seemed to be the most heterogeneous and resulted in the smallest simple 
correlation coefficients among the other regressors was an east, west, 
central breakdown. The Eastern Region is comprised of Oklahoma's State 
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Water Quality Laboratory's Southeast and Northeast Regions. The Central 
Region is comparied of the North Central and South Central regions, and 
the Western Region is comprised of the Southwest and Northwest regions. 
Because the contaminant data were collected for different months in 
different regions, monthly average rainfall and temperature were obtained 
for the county in which the utility is.located and for the month is which 
the contaminant data were collected. These environmental variables were 
obtained from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration data (84). 
In order to minimize problems with multicollinearity, only temperature 
was used as an environmental variable. It was found that temperature 
and precipitation were strongly positively related. Further, preliminary 
regressions indicated that termperature was more important in explaining 
water quality than precipitation. 
There is not a water quality index available for Oklahoma water 
suppliers. A search for water quality indices did not produce one which 
made use of the data which were available for Oklahoma. It was decided 
to create an index of water quality using the maximum chemical contami-
nant limits reported in the EPA's Primary and Secondary Drinking Water 
Standards (85) as a means of assigning weights to the various 
·contaminants. The derivation .of the quality index is described in the 
next paragraph. 
The water quality index (WQ) measures the deviation of a water 
supplier's actual contaminant levels for eight health- and aesthetic-
related chemicals from the maximum contaminant levels allowed in EPA's 
Primary and Secondary Drinking Water Standards weighted by a relative 
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= the water quality measure for finished water at some point 
in the distribution system for the ith water firm, 
= actual chemical contaminant :Levels for the jth chemical of 
the ith water firm, 
= EPA's maximum contaminant level for the jth chemical 
contaminant, and 
Wj = relative weight of importance for the jth chemical 
contaminant. 
W. can be constructed by inference from EPA's Water Quality 
J 
Standards. It can be inferred from the EPA's Primary and Secondary 
Drinking Water Standards that the higher the maximum contaminant level 
allowed for a given chemical contaminant, the less important is that 
chemical relative to the other chemical contaminants in terms of harmful 
impacts on water quality. 
Let 
MCL. 
A. 8 J 
L MCL. 
j=l J 
where MCL. is·EPA's maximum contaminant level for the jth chemical 
J 
contaminant. The larger the value of A, the less important is the jth 
chemical contaminant relative to the other seven contaminants in terms 
of a detrimental impact on water quality. 
Let 
(l/A.) 
wj = a 
L (1/A.) 
j=l J 
where W. is the relative weight of importance of the jth chemical 
J 
contaminant relative to the other contaminants in terms of a harmful 
impact on water quality. A chemical is a more harmful contaminant if 
it is associated with a higher value of W. 
chemical contaminants equals one. 
W. summed over all eight 
J 
WQ. will equal zero if the ith utility is exactly meeting the 
1 
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drinking water standards with respect to the eight chemical contaminants. 
Positive (negative) values of WQ. indicate that the ith water system is 
1 
producing water of higher (lower) quality than that which would result if 
the water system was just meeting the maximum contaminant levels. There 
is a slight qualification to the interpretation of WQ. offered above. 
1 
Discussion of this will be postponed until later, however. The null 
hypothesis of interest is that water quality is unaffected by the type 
of water system ownership. The alternative hypothesis is that POUs 
relative to IOUs produce higher quality water as measured by WQ. 
Regression analysis is used to test the above hypothesis. The regression 







a water quality measure for the ith water system, 
= 1 if the. ith utility is municipally owned and 0 if it is 
privately owned, 
= population served by the ith water system, 
= mean monthly temperature in degrees for the county in which 
the ith water system is located and for the month in which 
the contaminant data was collected, 
R . 
ni 
1 if the ith water system is located in the nth region as 
defined by the Environmental Health Services of the State 
Water Quality Laboratory and 0 otherwise; where 
n = 1--Eastern Region and 2--Western Region, and 
U. =residual term for the ith water supplier. 
1 
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Checks for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity are the same as 
those used in the previous sections. While the selection of regressors 
minimized problems with multicollinearity, heteroskeda.sticity appeared 
to be a problem--particularly with respect to the regional binary 
variables. Problems with heteroskedasticity are dealt with by estimating 
(5.25) using weighted least squares (1;'1LS). WLS coefficients are unbiased, 
consistent, and efficient whereas the coefficient estimates of a 
heteroskedastistic OLS ~odel are only unbiased and consistent. Confidence 
intervals produced from OLS estimates are no longer correct for given 
levels of significance (60). Thus, tests of significance should be made 
using WLS estimates. Both OLS and .WLS estimates are reported in Table 
XII. 
Data and Results 
Using the sampling method discussed at the beginning of this section, 
255 water systems were selected for the sample to be used in estimating 
regression (5.23). Upon investigation of the data, seven firms were 
omitted because of very unusual values for the water quality variable 
relative to the other 248 water suppliers. These outliers were dropped 
to reduce any bias that would be created by special characteristics or 
events unique to these utilities that could have affected their water 
quality. It is also possible that these outliers resulted from incorrect 
contaminant data reported by the Oklahoma Water Quality Laboratory. The 
sample of 248 water firms represents approximately 23 percent of all 
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water suppliers in Oklahoma serving a total population of 341,206. The 
sample consists of firms serving populations ranging from 36 to 11,000. 
Seventy-seven percent of the water systems are municipally owTted whereas 
23 percent are privately owned. Data used in estimating equation (5.23) 
are presented in .Table XI. 
·Note that the use of regional binary variables impounds the Central 
Region into the constant term of equation (5.23). For the entire sample, 
29.1 percent of all firms are located in this region. For the POU and 
IOU samples, the percentages are 17.7 and 11.4 percent, respectively. 
OLS and WLS estimates of equation (5.23) are presented in Table XII. 
The results from Table XII indicate that after controlling for 
other influences on water quality, public ownership is positively 
associated with water quality. The ownership coefficient is significantly 
greater than zero at a .10 level for the OLS estimates and a .033 level 
of significance in the WLS regression. For both the OLS and WLS 
regressions, coefficients on the regional binary variables are positive 
and significant and the coefficient on the. temperature variable is 
negative and significant. 
Six of the eight chemical contaminants that are used in constructing 
the water quality index are toxic in that they are associated with health 
hazards. The other two contaminants are from the secondary drinking 
water standards and affect the aesthetic qualities of finished water 
but have little health related effects. Contaminants listed in the 
secondary drinking water standards affect the smell, taste, and color 
of the water (85). If public managers and politicians desire higher 
quality water and the absence of conflict or confrontation with water 
customers, it might be hypothesized that public ownership is more 
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TABLE XI 
WATER QUALITY REGRESSION: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Variable N Mean Deviation Value Value 
WQ 
Pooled 248 6.841 1.490 -1. 947 8.734 
POU 192 6. 940 1.409 -1. 94 7 8.734 
IOU 56 6.502 1. 711 - .397 8.206 
POP 
Pooled 248 1375 2059.248 36 11000 
POU 192 1647 2112,321 36 10500 
IOU 56 445 1551. 864 50 11000 
D 
Pooled 248 
POU 192 • 774 
IOU 56 .226 
TEMP 
Pooled 248 53.546 17. 721 26.100 82.900 
POU 192 54.579 17.014 26 .100 82.900 
IOU 56 50.004 19.709 28.100 81.900 
Rl 
Pooled 248 .274 
POU 192 .194 
IOU 56 • 081 
R2 
Pooled 2L18 .435 
POU 192 .403 
IOU 56 .032 
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TABLE XII 
OLS AND WLS ESTIMATES OF THE WATER QUALITY REGRESSION, (5.23) 
2-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Variable -coefficient Error T-Value Level 
OLS 
D .309 .242 1. 283 .2009 
POP .106 E-04 .455 E-04 .232 .8166 
TEMP -.018 .oos -3.241 .0014 
Rl .825 .239 3.447 .0007 
R2 .750 .242 3.104 .0021 
(Constant) 6.970 .361 19.30 .0000 
R2 = .132 F = 7. 377 N = 248 
-2 
R = .114 MSE = 1. 967 dF = 242 
WLS 
. D .373 .203 1.841 .0669 
POP .622 E-05 .383 E-04 .163 .8710 
TEMP -.013 .oos -2.533 .0119 
Rl .832 .237 3.503 .0005 
R2 • 779 .259 3.016 .0028 
(Constant) 6.672 . 377 17.702 .0000 
R2 • 98 F = 1423.84 N = 248 
-2 
R .972 MSE = 1.069 dF = 242 
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strongly positively associated with a water quality index that comprises 
only "visible" contaminants than the index used previously which comprised 
both toxic and aesthetic contaminants. Color, taste, odor, and the 
staining of fixtures can be traced directly to the finished water supply, 
but it is more difficult to associate diseases such as kidney infection, 
sclerosis, nephritis, and nephrosis with water quality (56). 
Another water quality measure (WQM) was constructed for each water 
supplier using the method outlined earlier but using two of the chemical 
contaminants that are listed in the secondary drinking water standards. 
Equation (5.23) was estimated using WQM. in place of WQ. as the dependent 
l l 
variable. Because of the presence of heteroskedasticity, both OLS and 
WLS estimates are reported in Table XIII. 
Note that the t-values are higher and levels of significance lower 
for the ownership coefficient in the regression employing wQM rather 
than WQ. Again, ownership is found to be positively related to a water 
quality measure and significantly greater than zero at the .058 level 
for the OLS regression and the .009 level for the WLS regression. While 
the coefficients of the other ~egressors in general had the same signs 
for the WQM regressions as for the WQ regressions, only the temperature 
variable was significantly different from zero. 
One difficulty with the water quality measures constructed above 
is that one water supplier could have higher water quality as measured 
by WQ and WQM relative to another water supplier, but have violations 
of the drinking water standards whereas the latter utility may not. 
The water quality measure used here weights contaminants according to 
how harmful they are. A water supplier may be violating maximum 
contaminant limits on less harmful chemical contaminants, but if the 
TABLE XIII 
OLS AND WLS ESTIMATES OF THE WATER QUALITY REGRESSION 
USING (WQM) AS THE DEPEN~ENT.VARIABLE 
Standard 
Variable Coefficient .Error T-Value 
OLS 
D 12.166 7.695 1.581 
POP .362 E-03 • 00145 .25 
TEMP -.634 .172 -3.685 
Rl 10.067 7.628 1.320 
R2 2. 711 7.699 .352 
(Constant) 62.39 11.505 5.423 
R2 = .073 F = 3.81 N = 248 
-2 R = .054 MSE = 1996. 97 dF = 242. 
WLS 
D 14.488 6.113 2.370 
POP -3.42 E-03 .0012 -.285 
TEMP -.298 .169 -J .• 768 
Rl 10.709 7.148 1.498 
R2 5.519 8.859 .623 
(Constant) 42.205 11.979 3.523 
R2 = .584 F = 56.706 . N = 248 
-2 


















TABLE XIII (Continued) 
2-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
Standard 
WQM N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Pooled 248 42.316 45.943 -259.94 82.176 
POU 192 44 .4 95 43.561 -259.94 81.89 
IOU 56 34.846 53.066 -227.23 82.176 
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supplier has very small concentrations of the more harmful contaminants, 
the water quality indices could possibly indicate a high degree of water 
quality. In order to ensure that there is little if any bias created 
by this aspect of the water quality indices, another measure of water 
quality was used that is independent of the weighting scheme used in 
constructing the other two indices. 
For each water supplier sampled, the chemical contaminant data 
contained the number of violations of the drinking water standards 
incurred for the date in which the contaminant data were collected. For 
every instance where actual contaminant levels exceeded maximum contami-
nant limits, a violation was recorded. The number of violations (V) 
was regressed on the same independent variables as used previously. 
Because the number of violations and water quality are expected to be 
inversely related, all of the coefficients of the regressors are expected 
to have signs opposite of those reported in Tables XII and XIII. In 
particular, if public ownership relative to private ownership results in 
higher water quality, the ownership binary variable is expected to be 
inversely related to the number of violations. Because heteroskedasticity 
was found to be present, both OLS and WLS estimates are presented in 
Table XIV. 
Ownership has an inverse and statistically significant relationship 
with the number of violations. These results are consistent with those 
reported for the WQ and WQM regressions. Besides owr_ership, only 
population served (POP) and the Eastern Region variable (Rl) have signs 
opposite of those in the WQ and WQM regressions. Based upon the results 
of the regressions employing the three measures of water quality, it 









R2 = • 086 








R2 = .344 
-2 
R = .328 
TABLE XIV 
OLS AND WLS ESTIMATES OF THE WATER QUALITY REGRESSION 




Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
-.288 .132 -2.181 • 0301 
-.329 E-04 .249 E-04 -1. 322 .1874 
-.005 .003 -1.585 .1143 
-.100 .131 - .766 .4446 
.249 .132 1.888 .0602 
.909 .198 4. 605 .0000 
F = 4,546 N = 248 
MSE = .589 dF = 242 . 
-.261 .149 -1. 754 ,0806 
-.332 E-04 .198 E-04 -1. 676 • 0951 
-.003 .003 - ,937 .3497 
-.266 .113 -2.354 ,0194 
.192 .118 1.633 .1038 
.857 .241 3,563 ,0004 
F = 21.14 N = 248 
MSE = 1.548 dF = 242 
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TABLE XIV (Continued) 
2-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
Standard 
v N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Pooled 248 .472 .794 0 5 
IOU 56 .661 1. 049 0 4 
POU 192 .417 .697 0 5 




The evidence reported in this chapter is consistent with the 
alternative hypotheses that POUs relative to IOUs are less efficient, 
but produce a higher quality p'l'.'oduct. In particular, POUs relative to 
IOUs were found to employ more capital and labor, to be more capital 
intensive, to employ input combinations less efficiently, to have lower 
average products of labor and capital, to incur higher variable costs, 
and to produce higher quality finished water. The next chapter will 
test hypotheses related to rate-making practices. 
CHAPTER VI 
WATER UTILITY PRiCING: RATE LEVELS 
AND STRUCTT.JRES 
Introduction 
Property rights theory predicts that managers of publicly-owned 
enterprises have an incentive to charge lower prices for a given 
quantity and quality of a good or service than managers of privately-
owned enterprises. Further, both private and public managers have an 
incentive to price discriminate, but private firms are likely to price 
discriminate to a greater extent than public firms. Finally, it was 
hypothesized in Chapter IV that regulatory-political influence is an 
important noneconomic determinant of utility pricing and will be more 
important in explaining public utility pricing than in explaining 
private utility pricing. With regard to regulatory-political influences 
on rate-making, it was hypothesized that (1) high-usage customers would 
be "preferred" to low-usa·ge customers: high-usage residential 
customers are preferred tolow-usage residential customers; industrial 
customers are preferred to residential customers, and (2) customers 
inside the city boundaries are preferred to those outside. 
The intent of this chapter is to test hypotheses relating to the 
rate level and rate structure and to describe the data, sample, and 
methodology employed in the rate analysis. Chapter VII will focus on 
the effect of local regulatory-political influences on managerial 
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behavior. First, an average-cost pricing model is derived and estimates 
of the model are obtained using regression analysis for the residential, 
commercial, and industrial user groups. The last half of Chapter VI is 
concerned with the derivation of long-run marginal costs and the use of 
average price-marginal cost ratios for testing hypotheses related to 
price discrimination. 
Rate Levels 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that there is no difference 
between public and private water utility pricing with respect to rate 
levels. The alternative hypothesis stated in Chapter IV is that, other 
things constant, POUs will charge lower water rates for all customer 
classes relative to IOUs. First, an average-cost pricing model is 
developed. The next section discusses the sample, data, and methodology 
used in testing the above hypothesis. The last section presents the 
regression results and conclusions. 
The Empirical Model: An Average-Cost 
Pricing Model 
The empirical model is a variant of that suggested by Mercer and 
Morgan (73). Mercer and Morgan's model is an average-cost pricing 
model. They assume that the total revenue (TR) of a public utility is 
a function of utility sales (R) and non-operating revenue (T) such as 
subsidies from the city's general fund. Total utility costs (TC) are 
assumed to be a function of operating expenses (OMA), output (Q) and 
output squared (Q 2), outstanding debt (DT), " ... and· other variables 
(X) which reflect the agency's specialized cost characteristics" (73, 
p. 1302). Further, they assume that the utility is required to 
generate revenues sufficient to cover costs. The latter assumption 
provides the relationship 
TR TC 
and by substitution 
R + T a + bOMA + cQ + dQ 2 + eDT + fX 
Solving for Rand dividing by Q gives 
R/Q a' + b(OMA/Q)+ dQ + e(DT/Q) + fX - T/Q 





Thus, the average revenue of a public utility is a function of an average 
cost variable, output, debt per unit of output, specialized cost 
variables, and subsidies per unit of output. 
It appears that the only attempt to investigate private versus 
public water utility rate-making for the residential, comTuercial, and 
industrial user groups was by Hennigan (48). Hennigan, however, 
investigated the extent of cost-based pricing by ownership, a hypothesis 
first advanced by Peltzman (90), rather than the effect of ownership on 
rate levels. Hennigan's empirical model was similar to the one above 
in that he hypothesized that water rates were a general function of 
water system average costs, output, as well as some specialized cost 
variables. But his model was dissimilar from the one above in that 
specific water rates for select survey quantities were used as the 
regressands in his rate regressions rather than the theoretical average 
price variable derived in (6.3). In criticizing Mann's 1973 study (66) 
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of political influence on residential water rates, Mercer and Morgan (73) 
argue that 
the replacement of average user revenue as the dependent 
variable in [Mann's equation] with one rate for a specific 
quantity • . . implies that the value of one rate is 
independent of the remainder of the rate schedule. Clearly, 
under the assumption that total costs must be covered, the 
determination of one specific rate is also a function of 
the quantities of water purchased at that rate as well as the 
level of other rates and the quantities purchased at those 
rates (p. 1304). 
While the model in (6.3) refers specifically to POUs, a variant 
of the model will be used for both POUs and IOUs. As was discussed 
-
in Chapter III, a traditional concept in water utility pricing has been 
that water rates should be cost related. Keller (59) notes that cost-
based pricing is still a valid premise for both POUs and IOUs. One of 
the main differences in estimating revenue requirements for POUs relative 
to that of IOUs is that IOUs' rate requests involve a return on the rate 
base whereas this element is missing from POU revenue requirements (59). 
Subsidies per unit of output (T/Q), is omitted from (6.3) because 
data are not available for this variable and a proxy such as municipal 
property taxes cannot be used because as was discussed in Chapter IV, 
it is not clear which way the causation runs between water rates and 
municipal property taxes. The empirical model to be used in testing 
the rate level hypothesis is as follows: 
(R/Q) ji = a' + b(o~) i + cMGDi + e(DQT) i + fXi + gDi + ui (6.4) 
where (R/Q) .. = 
Jl 
average user revenue of the jth customer group and ith 
water utility in dollar~ per thousand gallons annually; 
j = residential, commercial, and industrial. 
average operating, maintenance, and administration costs 
for the ith water utility in dollars per thousand 
gallons annually. 
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million gallons of water produced or purchased per year 







= million gallons of water produced or purchased per day 
for the ith water utility, 
debt service costs per unit of output per year for the ith 
water utility in dollars per thousand gallons annually, 
= a vector of three specialized cost variables for the ith 
utility: 
(T~X)i 
(~R) i = 
total tax liability per unit of output per year 
for the ith water utility in dollars per 
thousand gallons, 
surface source production as a percent of total 
output per year for the ith water system, 
revenue producing water as a percent of total 
output pe~ year for the ith water system, 
binary variable for ownership for the ith water system 
(1 if publicly-owned and 0 if privately-owned), and 
U. = residual term for ·the ith water system. 
i 
The relationship betweeri. average user revenue (R/Q) and average 
OMA DT · 
variable costs (Q), average debt service costs (Q), and total taxes 
. f ( TTX) ; , d b . . A . per unit o output Q is expecte to e positive. verage operating 
(OMA) 11 d b . (DT) . . costs Q as we as average e t service costs Q are important in 
computing revenue requirements for both the POU and IOU. The greater 
these costs, the higher will be the revenue requirements and thus the 
rate request. The greater.the tax liability (T~X) the higher will be 
overall system costs and thus the revenue requirements. The scale 
variable, millions of gallons per day (MGD), is expected to be inversely 
related to average costs and consequently average prices. The relation-
ship between ownership (D) and average revenue (R/Q) is expected to be 
inverse, i.e., POUs will be associated with lower average prices relative 
to IOUs. Surface sources of water are expected to be more costly than 
groundwater sources because the costs of treatment and the cost of the 
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surface impoundment itself are expected to be greater than similar costs 
for groundwater sources. Thus, the greater the ratio of surface source 
production to total production (SQR), the m~re costs that will be incurred 
by the water utility and therefore the higher the rates that must be 
charged to cover these costs. Finally, revenue producing water as a 
f 1 d . (RPW) . f . 1 . ff . ' . percent o tota pro uction Q is a measure o· uti ity e· iciency in 
that the lower this ratio, the.more free water and/or distribution system 
leakage experienced by the utility. Free service and system leakage 
entail costs that must be covered by revenue producing sales. Thus, as 
RPW Cq-) decreases, revenue requirements and user rates are expected to 
increase. 
Sample, Data, and Hethodology 
The sampling population consists of all private and public water 
systems (serving a population in.excess of 10,000) for which adequate 
data are available. The data source used here is the same as that used 
in the first half of the previous chapter on firm efficiency--~perating 
Data for Water Utilities 1970 and 1965 (8). The sample construction is 
the same as that used previously in that "purchase only" systems are 
omitted and an effort is made to keep the population size range 
approximately the same for both IOUs and POUs. In addition, five water 
utilities were omitted from the sample because of highly implausible 
values for certai.n variables. No explanation can be offered for these 
outliers other than the possibility of recording error in the 1970 
survey. The sample consists of 126 water firms serving a total popula-
tion of 16,049,770. Ninety-five of the water agencies are POUs serving 
a total population of 9,913,001 and 31 of the water firms are IOUs 
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serving a total population of 6,136,769. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table XV. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used in estimating equation (6.4). 
A t~test is used to test the directional hypotheses of the individual 
regression coefficients. A second basis for rejection of the null 
hypothesis that ownership has no effect on average prices will consist 
of a Chow test for differences between regression coefficients of two 
subsample regressions (60). The null hypothesis in the Chow test is 
that each coefficient in a POU regression is equal to its counterpart 
in an IOU regression. The alternative hypothesis is that for at least 
one of the sets of coefficients, the coefficients are not equal to one 
another. Checks for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity are 
performed as discussed in the previous chapter on firm efficiency. 
There was no indication of significant collinearity between the 
regressors with the exception of ownership (D) and total taxes per unit 
f (TQTX). o output, The simple correlation coefficient between total 
taxes per unit of output and ownership was -.776. It was decided to 
retain the tax variable, however, because it has been suggested 
previously (90) that an important difference between POU and IOU rates 
is the difference in their respective tax liabilities. In order to 
isolate as best as possible the effect of ownership on water rates, it 
is necessary to control for taxes. The rate regressions were run with 
and without the tax variable. In both cases, the ownership variable 
was significant and negative as hypothesized. Whereas in the average 
price regressions run with and without the ownership variable, the tax 
variable was generally only significantly different from zero when the 
ownership variable was missing. These results suggest that ownership is an 
TABLE XV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF REGRESSION VARIABLES 
USED IN AVERAGE PRICE REGRESSIONS 
Standard Minimum 
Variable N Mean Deviation Value 
(R/Q) Residental 
Pooled 126 • 632 .• 275 .139 
POU 95 ~550 .220 .139 
IOU 31 .883 .278 .376 
(R/Q) Commercial 
Pooled 126 • 4 31 .179 . ll5 
POU 95 .385 .161 .ll5 
IOU 31 .574 .159 • 2!f 9 
(R/Q) Industrial 
Pooled 126 .256 .113 • 039 
POU 95 .236 • ll3 .039 
IOU 31 .315 • 089' .164 
(OMA) 
Q 
Pooled 126 .188 .091 • 049 
POU 95 .178 .092 .049 
IOU 31 .219 • 083 .116 
MGD 
Pooled 126 22.657 38.815 .852 
POU 95 19.794 34.316 .852 
I.OU 31 31.430 49 .821 1.633 
(PT) 
Q 
Pooled 126 .069 .061 .ooo 
POU 95 .074 .068 .ooo 
IOU 31 .053 .031 .003 
(SR) 
Q 
Pooled 126 .578 .460 .ooo 
POU 95 .573 .464 .ooo 


























Table XV (Continued) 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Variable N Mean Deviation Value Value 
(RPW) 
Q 
Pooled 126 .855 .105 .433 1.246 
POU 95 .861 .102 .611 1.246 
IOU 31 .836 .111 .• 433 1.000 
(TTX) 
Q 
Pooled 126 • 040 • 059 .ooo .258 
POU 95 .014 .027 .000 .133 
IOU 31 .119 • 059 • 008 .258 
Total Population 
Served N Mean Total 
Pooled 126 127,379 16 '049' 770 
POU 95 104,347 9,913,001 
IOU 31 197 '960 6,136,769 
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important explanatory variable and a test of significance on the ownership 
coefficient is not expected to be appreciably biased by the inclusion of 
the tax variable. 
Tests for heteroskedasticity revealed that only for the residential 
average price regression could the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
be rejected. Both OLS and weighted least squares (WLS) estimates will 
be presented for the residential regression. 
Before reporting the results of the average price regressions, 
several caveats should be noted. First, because of the various inter-
dependencies that exist in a regulated environment, there is always the 
potential for simultaneous equation bias when a single equation such as 
(6.4) is estimated. Average prices are a function of costs and costs 
are a function of output. But output is a function of average prices. 
A solution .to the problem involves the construction of a sophisticated 
simultaneous equation system. The data requirements for such a system 
go beyond what is available in the AWWA 1970 survey. Mann (66) suggests 
that these interdependencies can. be minimized and a single-equation 
approach used by a judicious selection of regressors. Simple correlation 
coefficients do not suggest strong correlations between average costs 
(O~) and (MGD) and between average prices (R/Q) and (MGD). Thus, if 
there is a feedback effect of prices on MGD and as a result on costs, 
this effect is expected to be minimal. 
A second point is that estimating model (6.4) for IOUs may involve 
a possible misspecification problem. IOU rate making is not identical 
to POU rate making in that for IOUs 11 ••• return-on-rate base plus 
depreciation expense is the usual means of determining revenue require-
ments is excess of operation and maintenance expense and applicable 
taxes" (59, p. 10). 
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For POUs, return-on-rate base is not applicable and depreciation is 
not that important in determining revenue requirements--particularly for 
growing public water utilities (59). Depreciation expense was not 
included in (6.4) because of the sporadic reporting of this variable in 
the 1970 survey. A dividend variable was tried as a proxy variable for 
the return-on-rate base in an eximation of (6.4) for just the IOU 
subsample and was found to be not significant. 
Finally, in order to isolate the effect of ownership on rate levels, 
one must control for the effect of regulation. As will be noted in 
Chapter VII, the simple correlation between ownership and a state versus 
local regulation binary variable for the sample used in testing the 
efficiency hypothesis is quite high, .88. Most POUs are locally regulated. 
To ensure that the ownership variable (D) is not measuring the effect of 
regulation, a subsample was formed consisting of all POUs and IOUs for 
which state regulatory agencies regulate rates inside municipal boundaries. 
If the ownership variable is indeed measuring the effect of ownership, 
it is expected to be significant in an estimation of (6.4) for the 
subsample mentioned above. This approach would generally be preferred to 
incorporating in (6.4) a state versus local regulatory binary variacle 
because of the significant collinearity that would be introduced between 
the ownership and regulatory variable. 
Regression Results 
First, both the OLS and WLS estimates for the residential average 
price regression will be presented. Second, OLS estimates for the 
commercial and industrial regressions will be reported. Third, subsample 
regressions will be reported as well as the results of the Chow test. 
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TABLE XVI 
OLS AND WLS RESIDENTIAL AVERAGE PRICE REGRESSIONS 
1-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Regression Variable Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
OLS OMA .583 .205 .?..850 .0026 
Q 
MGD -.0013 .0004 -3.120 .0011 
DT 
1.643 .292 5.625 .oooo -
Q 
TTX 
.969 .423 2.292 .0118 
Q 
SR .119 .034 3.450 .0004 
Q 
RPW -.528 • lli. 7 -3.589 .0002 
Q 
D -.241 .0.58 -4.125 .oooo 
(Constant) .964 .148 6.619 .oooo 
R2 = .645 F = 30.69 N = 126 
-2 R = .624 MSE = • 028 dF = 118 
WLS OMA .550 .189 2.910 .0021 
Q 
MGD -.0011 .0004 -2.529 .0063 
DT 1.562 .253 6.164 .oooo 
Q 
TTX 
.237 .514 .461 • 3226 
Q 
SR 
.092 .031 2.932 .0020 
Q 
RPW -.481 .138 -3.485 .0003 
Q 
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TABLE XVI (Continued) 
Standard Significance 
Regression Variable Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
D -.316 • 098 -3.214 .0008 
(Constant) 1.032 .161 6.422 .oooo 
R2 == .938 F = 221. 97 N = 126 
-2 
R .933 MSE = 13.44 dF == 118 
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TABLE XVII 
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE PRICE REGRESSIONS 
1-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Regression Variable Coefficient I:rror T-Value Level 
Commercial OMA . 813 • J.56 5. 202 .oooo 
Q 
MGD -.0002 .0003 -. 704 .2413 
DT 
.495 .223 2. 218 .0142 
Q 
TTX • 292 .323 . 904 .1339 
Q 
SR • 030 .026 Ll51 .1260 
Q 
RPW 
-. 311 .112 -2. 771 ,0032 
Q 
D -.129 • 045 -2.895 .0022 
(Constant) .584 .111 5,244 .oooo 
R2 = .513 F = 17.77 -N = 126 
~2 
R = • 481-1- MSE = • 017 dF = 118 
Industrial 
OMA 
• 531. .112 4.734 .0000 
Q 
MGD -.00004 ,00023 -.169 .4331 
DT .266 .160 1.659 .0498 
Q 
TTX 
-.161 .232 -.695 .2441 
Q 
SR -.005 ,019 -.270 .3938 
Q 
RPW 
- • J.18 .018 -l.459 • 0736 
Q 
D -.077 ,032 -2.401 • 0089 
(Constant) .306 .079 3,832 .0001 
R2 = .367 F = 9.76 N = 126 
-2 
R .329 HSE = .009 dF = 118 
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A fourth set of OLS estimates will be reported for the state-regulated 
subsample mentioned above. 
The signs of all the regression coefflcients are as hypothesized in 
all the regressions with the exception of the industrial average price 
regression (see Tables XVI and XVII). Both total taxes per unit of 
TTX output (Q), and surface source production as a percent of total produc-
tion, (~R), have negative signs in the industrial regression. These 
coefficients, however, were not significantly different from zero. In 
general, ownership, (D), average costs:, (O~), average debt-service 
DT costs, C--q-), and revenue producing water as a percentage of total water 
RPW produced, (Q), were significant in all regressions at a .01 one-tail 
level of significance. The exception is again in the industrial 
regression ~here (DQT) and (R~W) are significant at the .05 and .10 levels, 
respectively. Million gallons per day, (MGD), total taxes per unit 
TTX 
output, (Q), and surface source production as a percentage of total 
production, (~R), were only significant in the residential regression. 
The evidence presented above is consistent with the alternative 
hypothesis that public ownership exerts a negative effect on user group 
average prices. Note also that based upon a comparison of overall F 
2 values, adjusted R s, and the size and significance of individual 
regression coefficients, cost-based pricing appears more important in 
explaining residential rates than in explaining the average prices of 
higher-use customer groups such as commercial or industrial user groups. 
The implication is that non-cost influences appear to be more important 
in explaining the average prices of high-usage customer groups than low-
usage customer groups. It was hypothesized earlier th~n an important 
non-cost influence on utility pricing is regulatory-political influence. 
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The effect of regulatory-political influence on rate making will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
A second basis for rejection of the null hypothesis that ownership 
has no effect on utility rate levels is to estimate (6.4) without the 
onwership variable for the entire sample as weli as for both the 
ownership subsamples and to perform a Chow test. The OLS estimates for 
the pooled, POU, and IOU samples are presented below (Table XVIII). 
Considering first the residential regression, all of the parameters 
in the pooled, POU, and IOU residential regressions have the expected 
signs. All coefficients are significant except for the tax variable in 
the POU model. The calculated F statistic for the Chow test is large 
enough to reject the null hypothesis that the POU and IOU residential 
regression are structually the same at a .01 level of significance. In 
h . l . (OMAQ ) ' (DQT) , (-SQR) , t e commercia regression, RPW and (--q-) have the expected 
signs in all three regressions with only (SR) 
Q 
being statistically not 
significant. (MGD) has the hypothesized negative sign for both the POU 
and IOU regressions, but the coefficient on (MGD) is not significant. 
The tax variable, (T~X), is significant at the .01 level and positive as 
hypothesized in both the pooled and IOU equations, but is negative in the 
POU regression. Again, the calculated F statistic allows the rejection 
of the null hypothesis that no differences exist between the POU and IOU 
commercial average price regressions at a .01 level of significance. 
The industrial regressions are similar to the binary variable 
. OMA DT 
industrial regression presented in Table XVII in that only Cq-), (Q), 
d (RPW) h h . an Q ave t e correct signs. (OMA) i· s the 1 . ' 1 . . f . t Q on y variao e signi ican 
in both the POU and IOU industrial regressions. 
RPW . C-q-) is the only other 
significant variable in the IOU model. i~1ereas, in the POU regression, 
(DQT) and (T~X) are both significant at the .10 and .05 levels, 
TABLE XVIII 
POOLED, POU, AND IOU AVERAGE PRICE REGRESSIONS AND CHOW TEST F STATISTICS 
Regression Independent Variables 
Residential Regression 
_') OMA DT TTX SR RPW N F R ... (Constant) MGD - - -
Q Q Q Q. Q 
Pooled 126 29.06 .574 .762 .725 -.0009 1.546 2.296 .123 -.603 
a (. 215) b (. 0004) a (. 310) a(.293' a(.037) a(.155) 
POU 95 17.15 • 508 • 718 .553 b -. 001 1.544 • 043 • 089 -.478 
a(.216) (.0005) a(2.87) (.619) a(.036) a ( .158) 
IOU 31 6.01 .500 • 915 bl. 088 -.002 b 2.764 1.896 .224 -.872 
(.516) b (. 0008) (1. 38) a(.661) b(.097) a(.344) 





(Constant) OMA DT TTX SR RPW F R 
Q 
MGD 
Q Q Q Q 
Pooled 126 18.20 .452 .475 .889 .00002 .443 1.003 .033 -.352 
a(.159) (.0003) b(.229) (.216) (. 027) a(.115) 
POU 95 8.74 .331 .393 .798 -.0003 b • 399 -. 688 .031 -.210 
a(.184) (.0004) (.245) c(.522) (. 031) c ( .134) 
IOU 31 10. 23 • 649 .686 1.095 -.00003 1.809 1.233 .034 -.736 
a(.247) (. 0004) a(. 660) a(.316) (. 046) a(.164) 
~ 




TABLE XVIII (Continued) 




(Constant) OMA DT TTX SR RPW R MGD - - -
Q Q Q Q Q 
Pooled 126 10.02 • 302 • 242 .576 .0001 .235 b .262 -.004 -.142 
a(.113) (. 0002) c(.163) (.154) (.019) b (. 082) 
POU 95 7,23 .285 .207 ,542 -.0002 .239 -.761 .012 -. 089 
a ( .134) (.0003) c(.178) b ( .384) (.022) (. 098) 
IOU 31 2.62 .244 .355 .513 .00014 .416 .241 -. 049 -.214 
a (. 204) (.00032) (.546) (.261) (.038) c ( .136) 
Calculated F7 112 = 1.748 
' 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; Table values of F7 112 are F.05 = 2.090 and F.01 = 2.805; 





respectively. However, in the POU regression, TTX C--q-) has a negative sign 
which is inconsistent with a priori expectations. In the case of the 
industrial average price regressions, the null hypothesis that the POU 
and IOU regressions are structurally the same cannot be rejected. 
In terms of explanatory power, the adjusted R2 for the residential 
and industrial regressions are similar for the POU and IOU subsamples. 
For the commercial regression, the adjusted R2 for the IOU sample is 
• 649--almost twice as large as the POU adjusted Rz . Considering utility 
pricing in general, it is difficult to conclude (as do both Hansman [45] 
and Hennigan [48]) from the estimates presented here that IOU pricing is 
more cost-specific than POU pricing except possibly in the commercial 
regressions. With respect to low- versus high-use customer groups, the 
POU regressions reflect the same relationship noted previously that 
cost-based pricing is apparently less important and by implication non-
cost variables more important in explaining rate-making for high-usage 
relative to low-usage customers. However, note that such a relationship 
is less apparent for the IOU regressions. In the IOU regressions, cost-
based pricing appears to be more important in explaining commercial 
average prices than in explaining the average prices for the residential 
group. 
The results of the Chow test for the residential and commerical 
regressions suggest that ownership has a significant effect on some of 
the parameters of the average price regressions. This does not seem to 
be the case for the industrial regressions, although the estimates 
reported for the industrial equation with the binary ownership variable 
(see Table XVII) does indicate that a significant intercept shift can be 
attributed to ownership. Some caution should be used in making strong 
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conclusions from the Chow test presented in Table XVIII. The degrees of 
freedom in the IOU equations are less than the recommended minimum of 30. 
Thus, it is possible that not all of the assumptions of classical linear 
regression model hold and the estimators for the IOU regressions may 
therefore not be the best linear unbiased estimators. 
In an effort to isolate ownership from regulatory influences, a 
subsample was constructed that consisted of all POUs and IOUs from the 
pooled sample for which municipal inside rates are regulated by state 
regulatory commissions. All 31 IOUs and 24 of the 95 POUs are state 
regulated. The states in 1968 that regulated municipal inside rates 
were Indiana, Maine, Montana, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (58). With 
the exception of Montana, all of these states are represented in this 
sample. If the ownership variable (D) is measuring the effect of owner-
ship rather than regulation, ownership is expected to be significant and 
have the hypothesized inverse sign in these regressions. The results are 
presented in Table XIX. 
These results show that ownership has a significant and inverse 
relationship to average prices even after controlling for regulatory 
influences. The t-ratios on the ownership coefficient are only marginally 
affected by controlling for regulatory influences. It is also of interest 
to note that the explanatory power of the cost-based pricing model is 
greater for the state regulated subsample than for the entire sample of 
state and locally regulated water utilities. 
In sum, the evidence presented in this section on utility pricing is 
consistent with the alternative hypothesis that relative to IOUs, POUs 
charge lower average prices for all customer groups. This result 
obtains even after controlling for the tax differential between POUs and 
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TABLE XIX 
AVERAGE PRICE REGRESSIONS FOR STATE REGULATED WATER UTILITIES 
1-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Regression Variable Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
Residential OMA • 939 .361 2.598 .0062 
Q 
MGD -.002 .0006 -2.514 .0077 
DT 
2.607 .929 2.806 .0036 -
Q 
TTX 1.239 .459 2. 696 • 0048 -
Q 
SR .124 .053 2.353 .0114 
Q 
RPW -.715 .239 -2.987 .0022 
Q 
D -.225 .067 -3.350 .0008 
(Constant) • 966 .219 4.395 .0000 
R2 = • 7L13 F = 19.41 N = 55 
-2 
R .705 MSE = .027 dF = Lf 7 
Commercial OMA 1.175 .241 4.873 .0000 
Q 
MGD -.0001 .0004 -.251 .4014 
DT 
• 959 .620 1.546 .0642 -
Q 
TTX .707 .307 2.305 .0128 
Q 
SR .079 .035 2.243 .0148 --
Q 
RPW -.545 .159 -3.410 .0006 
Q 
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TABLE XIX (Continued) 
1-Tail 
Standard Significance 
Regression Variable Coefficient Error T-Value Level 
D -.093 .045 -2.069 .0220 
(Constant) .592 .147 4.036 .0001 
R2 • 720 F = 17.27 N '= 55 
-2 
.678 MSE .012 dF = 47 R = 
Industrial OMA 
.691 .146 4.728 .oooo 
Q 
MGD ."0002 .0003 .662 .2554 
DT 
.230 .376 .613 • 2714 -
Q 
TTX 
• 205 .186 1.103 .1378 --
Q 
SR .007. .021 .346 .3653 
Q 
RPW -.202 .097 -2.090 .0210 
Q 
D -.068 • 027 -2.495 .0081 
(Constant) .286 .089 3.216 .0012 
R2 = .649 F = 12.46 N = 55 
-2 
.598 MSE .004 dF = 47 R = 
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IOUs and state versus local regulation of inside water rates. Further, 
the results imply that non-cost factors tend to be more important in 
explaining the average prices of high-usage groups relative to low-usage 
groups and in explaining utility pricing in an environment of local 
regulation relative to state regulation. 
Water Utility Pricing: Rate Structure 
As was discussed in Chapter IV, both economic and property rights 
theory predict that investor-owned utilities price discriminate. In 
addition, property rights theory has been used to develop the hypothesis 
that municipally-owned utilities have an incentive to price discriminate, 
but less completely than their privately-owned counterparts (90). For 
both POUs and IOUs, this price discrimination is expected to favor higb-
use relative to low-use customer groups. That is, industrial customers 
are expected to have lower price~marginal cost ratios relative to 
residential customers. Commercial customers are expected to have higher 
price-marginal cost ratios than industrial customers, but lower ratios 
than residential customers. The intent of this section is to determine 
(1) if both POUs and IOUs price discriminate in the water utility 
industry; (2) which customer group is "preferred" in the sense of having 
the lowest price-marginal cost ratio; and (3) the extent to which price 
discrimination differs by ownership. 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the price-marginal cost 
ratios of the residential, commercial, and industrial user groups are 
equal. Rejection of the null hypothesis supports the alternative 
hypothesis that both POUs and IOUs engage in price discrimination. 
Pair-wise tests (46) were performed to determine which groups benefit 
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from price discrimination. Also, Xann-Whitney U tests were used to test 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the extent to which 
price discrimination is applied by POUs and IOUs. 
Theoretical Model: Estimation of 
Price-Marginal Cost Ratios 
For each customer group, price-marginal cost ratios are estimated. 
The price variables used here are the average prices used in the previous 
section. The absence of sufficient rate data preclude the use of 
marginal prices. Long-run marginal costs are estimated using a technique 
similar to that used recently in an article by Primeaux and Nelson (92). 
In that article, they describe a procedure whereby long-run marginal 
costs are estimated for private electric power companies. Their proce-
<lure, which they attribute in theory to Boiteaux and Stasi (15), is to 
estimate short-run marginal variable costs first and then to add the 
marginal costs of meeting peak demand. This procedure can be traced to 
an even earlier article by Boiteaux (14). 







short-run marginal costs of the ith utility in 
dollars per thousand gallons, 
(6.5) 
0 = aoMA Q = 
8QOMA 
the elasticity of variable costs with respect to 
output, and 
OMA and Q are defined as before. 
In the chapter of firm efficiency, o was estimated in equation 
(5.16) to equal .84. Data are not sufficient, however, to allow 
estimation of o for the sample used in this section. Of the 126 firms 
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comprising the sample used in the previous section on rate making, fewer 
than 25 percent of these firms had data on the input price ratio variable 
used in estimating the cost function in Chapter V. Because there would 
be too few degrees of freedom to reestimate the cost function, estimates 
of o would be unreliable. But, because the sample used here an~ the one 
used previously in the chapter on firm efficiency have approximately the 
same number of observations, consist of the same size range firms in 
terms of population served, and contain roughly the same number of IOUs 
relative to POUs, the estimate for o mentioned above will be taken as a 
parameter estimate for the purpose of estimating short-run marginal 
costs. The parameter estimate for o will apply to both POUs and IOUs. 
The results of a Chow test reported in the chapter on firm efficiency 
indicated that the null hypothesis that the slope coefficients of the 
POU and IOU cost functions are equal could not be rejected. Thus, there 
is no statistical basis for using separate estimates of o by ownership. 
Primeaux and Nelson (92) allocate SRHC to the customer classes 
using a method employed earlier by Moore (78). They estimate the number 
of kilowatt-hours that must be produced or purchased in order to supply 
one additional kilowatt-hour to each customer group and then multiply 
this coefficient times the firm's SRMC. The same approach in theory 
could be applied to the water utility industry--that is, determining 
the number of gallons of water that must be produced or purchased to 
supply a given customer group with one additional gallon of water. 
Following a model employed by Primeaux and Nelson, an attempt was made 






where UW. = 
]. 
unaccounted-for-water (or water lost in the transmission 
and distribution system, free water, and water used in the 
treatment plant) for the ith utility in millions of gallons, 
Q~ = 
]. 
millions of gallons of water supplied to the nth customer 
group by the ith utility; n =residential (R), commercial (C), 
industrial (I), 
= miles of transmission and distribution line for the ith 
utility, and 
U. =residual term for the ith utility. 
]. . 
Coefficient (a1) can be interpreted as the additional water necessary to 
supply an additional million gallons to residential users. Primeaux and 
Nelson allocate SRMC by multiplying a coefficient such as (a1) by SRMCi. 
According to this procedure, the short-run marginal costs attributed to 
the residential user group would be given by: 
SRMC~esidential 
]. 
a1 • SRMCi 
This approach was abandoned here because of the high degree of 
multicollinearity between the regressors and as a result the lack of 
(6. 7) 
confidence in both the parameter estimates and tests of significance. 
In the present analysis, the assumption will be made that the short-run 
marginal costs of supplying an additional 1,000 gallons of residential, 
commercial, or industrial water is the same as it is for the system as a 
whole. 
It can be noted that any method of allocating short-run marginal 
costs must involve liberal assumptions given the data constraints. One 
would expect that the short-run marginal costs of supplying an additional 
1,000 gallons of residential water would be higher relative to the same 
costs of supplying industrial water. Billing, customer service, meter 
maintenance, and variable distribution costs would all be expected to 
be greater for the residential relative to the industrial user group. 
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The available variable cost data is not disaggregated nor is it allo-
cated to the various customer groups. 
The next step in estimating long-run marginal costs is to estimate 
the marginal plant charges (MPC)--the additional cost of constructing 
enough plant capacity to produce an additional million gallons of water 
during the peak demand period. Primeaux and Nelson, following De Salvia 
(37), determine the (MPC) by analyzing the fixed costs of existing plant. 
They define fixed costs as a sum of depreciation, amortization, rent, 
taxes, net income, and interest payments. The latter two items are costs 
necessary to obtain new plant capacity whereas the first four cost items 
represent costs of using existing plant. If it is assumed that the firm 
constructs additional capacity in response to changes in peak demand and 
employs the new capital facilities in the same proportion to other inputs 
as previously used, then following Primeaux and Nelson, the MPC can be 
estimated as 












marginal plant charge in thousands of dollars, 
change in fixed costs (thousand of dollars) per million 
gallon change in peak day demand, 
the sum of depreciation, total taxes, in-lieu payments, 
debt service, and dividends for the ith utility in 
thousands of dollars, and 
change in peak day demand per million gallon per day change 
in total water demanded. 
Rents were not available to include in the fixed cost definition. 
Debt service expenditures are included in place of amortization and 
interest payments. Dividends are included as a proxy of net income only 
for the IOU subsample regression. In-lieu payments are defacto taxes 
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and included only in the POU subsample regression discussed below. 
Total output is defined as before, but peak-day demand output, Q , is 
p 
defined as the maximum-day output of water delivered to the distribution 
system in 1970. 
dQ 






b + blQ . + u. 
pl l 
where FCi, Qpi' and Qi are defined as above, and 




Taking the first derivatives of FC with respect to Q and Q with respect 
p p 
to Q give 
and 
dFC 
bl = dQ 
p 
( 6 .10) 
Because fixed costs are defined somewhat differently for the POU and IOU 
subsamples, b1 and c 1 were estimated for POUs and IOUs separately. Thus, 
the marginal plant charge for the POU sample is defined as 
bPOU • POU 
MPCPOU = 1 cl (6.11) 
and is defined for the IOU sample as 
bIOU IOU 
l • cl 
(6.12) 
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The MPC is the addition to fixed costs in thousands of dollars to 
construct enough capacity to produce an additional million gallons of 
water during peak-day demand. 
Once the MPC has been estimated, the next step is to allocate these 
costs to the various user groups. Economic theory suggests that these 
costs should be allocated to the user groups in proportion to their 
contribution to peak demand. However, because of the absence of this 
kind of data, the MPC will be allocated to the three user groups using 
the method employed by Primeaux and Nelson (92). The MPC is multiplied 
times the maximum-day demand, Q , to get the estimated total increase in 
p 
fixed costs that would result in adding the capacity necessary to meet 
the entire peak-day demand. This would then be allocated to the user 
groups on the basis of the amount of water demanded by the jth user group 




where PCT .. 
J J_ 
= amount of water demanded by the jth user group as a 
percentage of total water produced or purchased by the 
ith utility, 
= amount of water demanded by the jth user gro~p of the 
ith utility in millions of gallons, 
= total water produced or purchased by the ith utility, and 
residential, commercial, and industrial. 
Therefore, the marginal plant charge for the jth user group of the ith 
utility and mth ownership type would be defined as 
MPC . . = (1-IPC • Q . • PCT .. ) 




marginal plant charge in thousands of dollars for the mth 
ownership type; m =public ownership (P), private 
ownership (I), and 
Qpi and PCTi are defined as above. 
161 
In order to convert MPC . . to the same unit of measurement (dollars 
mJ 1. 
per thousand gallons) as is used for short-run marginal costs and 
average prices, it must be divided through by Q .. The result is given 
1. 
in (6.15) below. 
MPCQ .. 
ffiJ 1. 
(MPC • Qpi' • PCT .. )/O. 
m J 1 '1. 
(6.15) 
In sum, MPCQ .. is defined as the total marginal plant charge in dollars 
mJ 1. 
per thousand gallc:ins at_tributed to the j th user class of the ith utility 
and mth ownership type which is incurred in constructing capacity 
necessary to meet the entire peak-day demand. 
There are at least two difficulties with this method of estimating 
and allocating marginal plant charges. For one, there is evidence that 
residential water customers relative to industrial water users 
contribute more to peak than to yearly demand. In a 1977 article on 
water rates by MacEwen (63), it is noted that 
• • • the ratio of maximum day demand to average day demand 
ranges from 1..9 to 4.8 for residential developments 
depending on the individual lot size and value of properties 
• . . By contrast large industries using public water supply 
have a much lower maximum day to average day ratio, (less 
than 1.5), and for those operating on a 24-hour per day 
basis the load factor is even more uniform (p. 521). 
As a result, equation (6.15) tends to underestimate the marginal plant 
charge for residential customers and overestimates it for industrial 
customers. Second, plant capacity is generally never added just to 
meet current peak-day demand, but is added in sufficient quantities 
to meet forecasted future needs as well. The methods used here at 
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least attempt to introduce cost-of-service into an analysis of price 
discrimination. There appear to have been no previous attempt to bring 
these cost considerations into an analysis of price discrimination for 
the water utility industry. 
The final step in constructing price-marginal cost ratios is to sum 
short-run marginal costs and total marginal plant charges to get long-run 
marginal costs. Long-run marginal costs for the jth user class of the 
ith utility and the mth ownership type is defined as 
LRMC . . = SR11C . + MPCQ .• 
m]l l mJl 
(6.16) 
Dividing this into AP .. , the average price paid by the jth user class of 
- Jl 








where PMC .. 
m]l 
= price-to-marginal cost ratio applicable to the jth 
customer class of the ith utility and mth ownership type. 
Ideally, both marginal costs and user prices should come from the 
last consumption block for each user class. Rates schedules with 
consumption blocks for each user group are unavailable in the 1970 AWWA 
operating data. In other words, marginal prices are not available for 
use in the numerator of the price-to-marginal cost ratios. The water 
rates which are reported in the AWWA survey are rates for specific 
total quantities, not marginal quantities. Because marginal prices 
are unavailable, average user prices are used. 
Sample, Data, and Methodology 
The sample used to test the price discrimination hypothesis is the 
same as that used previously in the rate level analysis. In order to 
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test the hypothesis that public and private water firms price discrimi-
nate, a one-factor analysis of variance model (46) is used to test the 
null hypothesis that the price-marginal cost ratios are equal for the 
residential, commercial, and industrial user groups. The alternative 
hypothesis is that at least one of the price-marginal cost ratios are 
not equal. The analysis of variance test statistic is the F statistic. 
If the calculated F value exceeds the table F value at a stated level 
of significance, the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that price discrimination exists. In order to 
determine which customer groups benefit from price discrimination, the 
S-method (46) or what is also known as multiple comparisons is used to 
. . 
investigate differences between pairs of user groups. The F test can 
tell us that at least one price-marginal cost ratio is not equal to the 
others but it does not tell us which one. The S-method is able to 
determine which of the particular differences are statistically 
significant. 
In order to determine which ownership form price discriminates more, 
one would ideally have to have access to complete rate structures, the 
quantities of water purchased by customer groups at various points 
within that structure, as well as disaggregated cost and revenue data. 
Because this type of data is unavailable, greater price discrimination 
will be defined as a greater difference between the price-marginal cost 
ratios of the various user groups. Evidence of price discrimination 
exists if the price-marginal cost ratios are not equal between user 
groups. By inference, price discrimination is greater the less equal 
are these ratios. The null hypothesis to be tested is.that the ratio of 
the POUs' price-marginal cost ratio for residential users to the 
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price-marginal cost ratio of industrial users is equal to the same ratio 
for IOUs. The alternative hypothesis is that this ratio is greater for 
IOUs than for POUs. Because of the greater pressure for wealth maximi-
zation in private utilities relative to public utilities, private 
utilities are expected to price discriminate more completely than public 
utilities. Similar tests will also be presented for residential-
commercial and commercial-industrial comparisons by ownership. 
A Kolomogrov-Smirnoff test for normality is used to determine if 
the ratios described above are normally distributed for both ownership 
samples. The results of this test indicate that the null hypothesis of 
normality can be rejected. Thus, a nonparametric equivalent to the 
t-test, the Mann-Whitney U test, is used to test the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between the extent to which POUs and IOUs 
price discriminate. 
Empirical Results 
Estimates of regression equation (6.9a and b) and the estimated 
marginal plant charges are presented in Tables XX and XXI. Next, 
descriptive statistics of variables used in the construction of the 
price-marginal cost ratios are presented in Table XXII. This is 
followed by the test of the hypotheses described above. 
Chow tests of equations (6.9a and b) by ownership type allowed the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the fixed costs and peak demand 
regressions were structurally the same for both ownersnip types. The 
Chow test F statistic was 32 and 6.6, respectively. 
The results of the analysis of variance F tests indicate that 
price discrimination occurs among IOUs as well as PODs. The null 
TABLE XX 
ESTIMATION OF PARAMETERS USED IN ESTIMATING MARGINAL 
PLANT CHARGES (EQUATIOHS 6.9a and b) 
Ownership Regr28sions 6.9a and b Statistical Characteristics 
POUs 
FC. 87.213 + 24.546 Q . R2 = .851 N = 
1 (l.038)*pl· i2 .849 dF = = 
F 558.85 MSE = 
Qpi = 2.469 + 1. 756 Q R2 = .909 N = 
(.056)* 'R2 .908 dF = 
F 983.495 MSE = 
IOUs 
FC. 553.204 + 45.357 Q . R2 = • 7 34 N 
l (5. 069)*pl i2 = .725 dF = 
F = 80.04 MSE 
Qpi 1.466 + 1.417 Q. 
R2 .875 N 
(.099)i~ 1 i2 .872 dF 
F = 205.94 MSE = 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; (*) indicates 
significantly different from zero at a .01 level of 
significance. 
TABLE XXI 
ESTIMATION OF MARGINAL PLANT 
CHARGES BY OWNERSHIP TYPE 
Ownership Marginal Plant Charge 
POUs 
MPCPOU = 1.756 • 24.546 = 43.103 
IOUs 














































DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED 
IN THE PRICE DISCRIHINATION HYPOTHESIS 
Standard Hinimum 
N Mean Deviation Value 
95 .150 ·.on .041 
31 :184 .069 .098 
95 .065 • 038 .ooo 
31 .098 .060 .012 
95 .028 ,017 .001 
31 .042 • 026 .001 
95 .043 • 030· .ooo 
31 • 047 .033 .002 
95 .215 • 091 .045 
.··.31 ,282 .093 .148 
. 95 .1n .077 .042 
31 .227 ~078 .115 
95 .193 .on • 041 
31 .232 • 071 .114 
95 ,550 .220 .139 
31 ,883 .278 .376 
95 .385 ,161 .ll5 
31 .574 .159 .249 
95 .236 .113 .039 

























TABLE XXII (Continued) 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Variable N Mean Deviation Value Value 
PMCR 
POU 95 2.876 1.650 1.108 . 12.185 
IOU 31 3.518 · i.ss4 1.238 9.150 
PM Cc 
POU 95 2.371 1.272 .597 10.812 
IOU 31 2 •. 700 1.044 1.532 6.517 
PM Cr 
POU 95 L397 1.228 .290 11.382 
IOU 31 1.460 .605 • 716 3.978 
Note: (R) resident.ial~ (C) commercial, (I) industrial. 
hypothesis that the price-marginal cost ratios are equal for all user 
classes can be rejected at the .01 level of significance for both 
ownership subsamples. The calculated F statistics and results of the 
multiple comparisons are presented below in Table XXIII. 
TABLE XXIII 
F STATISTICS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS USED IN THE PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION HYPOTHESIS AND PAIR-WISE COMPARISONS 
F Values and S-Method 
Hypothesis Confidence Intervals 
HO: PMCR PMCC PMCI 
Table Value 
POU N 95 F2,282 27.55 F2,282 4.61 
IOU N 31 F2,90 20.41 F2,90 = 4.89 
HO: PMCR = PMCC; PMCR = PMCI; PMCC = PMC I 
Confidence Intervals a = . 01 a= .05 
Treatment Effect 
Differences 
POUs R - C: (-.111, 1.121) (.009, 1.001) 
c - I: ( .358, 1.59 ) (.478, 1.47 ) 
R - I: ( .863, 2. 095) (.983, 1.975) 
IOUs R - C: (-.197, 1.833) (. 01, 2.048) 
c - I: ( .225, 2. 255) (.432, 2.048) 
R - I: (1.043, 3.073) ( 1. 25' 2. 866) 
Note: R = residential; C = commercial; I = industrial; and 






The confidence intervals presented above are estimated via the 
S-method which allows for all J(J-1)/2 pairwise comparisons from a set 
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of J populations. In this case, J equals the three user classes. The 
advantage of the S-method is that it simultaneously compares differences 
among the means of the J populations. It is a " •.. statistically 
improper practice to run the test for the difference between two means 
on all possible pai.rs of populations" ( 46, p. 486) because of the 
difficulty of interpreting the results. If a given confidence interval 
presented in Table XXIII does not contain zero, it is significant at the 
stated level of significance. Note that at the .05 level of significance, 
.for both ownershi~ types, none of the confidence intervals contains zero. 
Thus, the three confidenc~ intervals for both the POU and IOU samples 
hold simultaneously at a .95 level of confidence. The differences 
between the price-marginal costs ratios of all possible pair-wise 
comparisons are significant and thus the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference in price-marginal cost ratios for all possible pair-wise 
combinations can be rejected at a .05 level of significance. At the 
.01 level of significance, only the residential-commercial comparison 
is not significant. This result obtains for both ownership forms. 
The evidence presented in Table XXIII is consistent with the 
argument that both POUs and IOUs price discriminate. This price 
discrimination is imposed on all three user classes with high"'""usage 
customers benefitting relative to low-usage customers (see Table XXII). 
These results will have to be considered as tentative, however, given 
the absence of both marginal prices and sufficient data to accurately 
estimate and distribute long-run marginal costs. 
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Mann-Whitney U tests were performed to determine if the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in the extent to which POUs and 
IOUs price discriminate could be rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that IOUs price discriminate more than POUs. The null and 
alternative hypotheses can be stated as: 
a) HO: (PMC /PMC . ) POU = (PMC /PMC )IOU R I R I 
Hl: (PMC /PMC ) POU < R ·I 
(PMC /PMC )IOU 
R I 
HO: (PMC /PMC )POU = (PMCC/PMCI)IOU C I 
(6 .18) 
Hl: (PMC /PMC )POU < (PMC /PMC )IOU C I C I 
b) 
HO: (PMC /PMC )POU = (PMC /PMC )IOU R C R C 
c) 
Hl: (PMC /PMC )POU < .R C 
(PMC /PMC )IOU 
R C 
The results of the Mann-Whitney tests do not allow the rejection of 
any of the null hypotheses stated in (6.18). The one-tail probabilities 
for (6.18a, b, and c) are .38, .49, and .33, respectively. There appears 
to be no statistically significant difference between the extent to 
which POUs and IOUs price discriminate. This result is in contrast with 
Hansman's conclusion that private water utilities price discriminate 
more completely than public water utilities (45). Hansman's analysis 
consists of a matched-pairs test of 18 pairs of private and public water 
firms representing firms serving populations between 25,000 and 600,000. 
Hansman's test for the extent of price discrimination by ownership is 
similar to the one presented above with the exception that there is no 
consideration of cost-of-service differentials. Hansman computed two 
water price ratios: (water rates at 6,000 gallons/water rates at 
50,000 gallons) and (water rates at 50,000 gallons/water rates at 
300,000 gallons). Using at-test for differences in means, Hansman 
found that the null hypotheses that the price ratios are the same for 
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both POUs and IOUs could be rejected at a .02 level of significance in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis that IOUs have higher price ratios 
than POUs. Although her results are consistent with the predictions of 
property rights theory, her tests are inconclusive in the absence of 
cost-of-service considerations. 
In order to investigate the importance of the bias created by 
omitting cost considerations, price ratios were computed absent of long-
run marginal costs. The :Mann-Whitney U test was used to test the null 
hypothesis that the ratios, (APR/APC), (APC/AP1), and (APR/A.PI) do not 
differ by ownership. The null hypothesis with respect to the first ratio 
could not be rejected. However, the null hypotheses with respect to the 
latter two ratios can be rejected at the .10 level of significance in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis that these ratios are greater for 
IOUs relative to POUs. When price-marginal cost ratios are used in place 
of prices, the significant differences by ownership vanish. It can be 
inferred from these tests that Hansman's results may be biased by 
ignoring cost-of-service considerations. 
In sum, it appears that both POUs and IOUs price discriminate, but 
it cannot be concluded that IOUs price discriminate to a greater extent 
than POUs. The price discrimination for both POUs and IOUs is 
relatively more beneficial to the user groups with greater per-capita 
consumption than those with lower levels of per-capita water consumption. 
Conclusion 
Certain theoretical implications can be drawn from a property rights 
analysis of water utility rate making. POUs relative to IOUs are 
expected to charge lower water prices for all customer classes, to price 
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discriminate less, and to design the rate structure such that large users 
of water receive preferential treatment. It was found that POUs do 
charge lower prices for all customer classes than IOUs. This was the 
case even after controlling for both regulation and taxes. The cost-
based average pricing model performed best for the residential regressions. 
The implication drawn earlier is that non-cost factors are more important 
in explaining conunercial and industrial water prices and particularly 
for utilities operating in an environment of local regulation. While it 
was found that POUs price discriminate, the evidence presented here does 
not support the alternative hypothesis that POUs price discriminate 
less than IOUs. ~he next chapter is concerned with trying to isolate 
the effect of ownership in order to determine if regulatory-political 
factors are important determinants of water manager behavior. 
CHAPTER VII 
REGULATORY-POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON 
MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR 
Introduction 
In the broadest sense, a property rights theory of managerial 
behavior must consider all important factors that shape the manager's 
set of costs and rewards. There is considerable evidence to support 
the hypothesis that ownership rights are an important determinant of the 
opportunity set faced by managers. However, it has been hypothesized 
here and elsewhere (66, 90), that regulatory and political influences 
are important as well, particularly for the utility industries. 
Strictly speaking, one must control for regulatory and political 
influences when trying to isolate the effect of ownership on economic 
behavior. Similarly, one must control for ownership in order to isolate 
regulatory and political effects. 
In the. chapter on water pricing with respect to rate levels, public 
ownership was found to exert a significant downward effect on rate levels 
even a~ter controlling for regulatory effects. This chapter will 
attempt to determine if regulatory-political influences are important 
determinants of managerial behavior after controlling for ownership. 
First, the effect of local regulatory-political influences will be 
investigated with respect to the demand for water utility capital, 
labor, and variable costs. Second, the effect of local regulation 
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with respect to the incentive to engage in economic regulation will be 
considered. Third, local regulatory-political influence will be 
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analyzed with respect to its effect on user rates both inside and outside 
the municipal city limits. 
Local Regulatory-Political Influence: 
Capital, Labor, and Variable Costs 
In order to isolate the effect of differences in ownership on labor 
and capital demand, it was mentioned in Chapter IV that ownership should 
be separated from local political influences to determine if ownership is 
an important noneconomic factor in the acquisition of labor and capital. 
It was hypothesized in Chapter IV that politicians have tastes for 
municipal capital and labor. If it is assumed that all politicians 
have similar tastes and preferences with respect to water utility capital 
and labor, then differences in the quantities of municipal labor and 
capital consumed by politicians would be due to differences in the 
constraints on the politicians' qbilities to maximize utility. 
One reason for the lack of research in the area of political influ-
ence and local government operation, particularly utility operation, 
might be due to the lack of good measures of political influence. There 
just do not seem to be any good measures of a local politician's ability 
to influence local water utility operations given the availability of 
both political and regulatory data. A binary variable for state versus 
local regulation cannot be used as a local political influence variable 
in either regression (5.9) or (5.10) because of the high degree of 
association between ownership and local regulation. Most POUs are 
locally regulated whereas IOUs are regulated by state regulatory 
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commissions. The simple correlation coefficient between the binary 
variable for ownership and a binary variable for state versus local 
regulation is .88 for the sample used in the chapter on firm efficiency. 
Thus, multicollinearity would make it difficult to separate the cwnership 
and local regulatory-political influence effects from one another. 
Per-capita income has been suggested as a measure of the community's 
ability to finance municipal capital (66). The problem with using this 
variable as a measure of the constraint on the politician's ability to 
consume capital and labor is that changes in per-capita incomes would be 
expected to alter per-capita water demands. Because municipal utilities 
are required to m~et demand, increases in supply in response to increases 
in demand may require increases in both capital and labor. In short, a 
local regulatory-political influence effect cannot be separated from a 
water demand effect in single equation capital and labor demand functions 
which include per-capita income as a regressor. It might be possible to 
construct a simultaneous-equation model to control for these inter-
dependencies, but available census and water operating data preclude 
the construction of such a model. 
Still another measure of political influence is the variable used 
by Mann (66) in his study of municipal residential water rates--the 
percentage of the voting age population that voted in the 1968 presi-
dential election. Actually, this variable is a measure of user 
influence rather than political influence. Mann hypothesized that the 
higher this percentage, the more politically active the community, and 
the more responsive would be politicians to the residential household's 
desire for lower water rates. This variable is inappropriate here 
because there is no reason to expect that households have tastes for 
176 
municipal capital and labor at least to the extent that they are willing 
to engage in lobbying efforts to get them. 
The variable used here as a measure of the politician's ability to 
affect local water utility operations, albeit a crude measure, is a 
binary variable for state versus local rate regulation of municipal water 
utilities. It is expected that in those states that have the power to 
regulate POUs, the local politician's ability to influence municipal 
utility decisions is diminished. However, the degree to which these 
states regulate POUs varies from minimal regulation of just outside rates 
to fairly complete regulation. The type of regulation for which state 
data is available that would seem to have the greatest impact on the 
local politician's ability to alter the size of the utility's capital 
stock and labor force would be internal rate regulation. Internal rate 
regulation affects rate levels and to a lesser extent price discrimination 
(66) which, in turn, affects the.output of the firm and its demand for 




1 if the state in which the POU operates regulates municipal 
inside rates and 0 if city councils or other forms of local 
regulation regulate municipal water rates (45); 
i = l, 2, ... , n water firms. 
If states regulate municipal water systems, local politicians are 
expected to have less of an ability to affect water utility operations. 
Thus, (Pi) is expected to vary inversely with the politican's ability 
to increase municipal capital and labor and therefore the local water 
firm's demand for labor and capital. 
In order to test this hypothesis, the sample used in the chapter on 
firm efficiency was divided into two samples by ownership. The capital 
177 
and labor demand functions were estimated for the POU sample using 








=A - a+B ln(w/r)i + a+B ln Qi+ cPi + Ui 
where b, c < 0. 
(7 .1) 
(7. 2) 





R2 . 730 -2 




-2 .846 R 
TABLE XXIV 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE CAPITAL AND LABOR DEMAND 
FUNCTIONS USING VARIABLE (P) 
Standard T Significance 
Variable Coefficient Error Value Level 
ln(r/w). .273 .286 .95 .3429 
1 
ln Qi .894 .064 13.86 .0001 
P. -.085 .244 -.35 . 7282 
1 
(Constant) 3.734 2.250 1. 65 .1008 
F = 74.99 N = 87 
MSE = .546 dF = 83 
ln(w/r) . -.388 .189 -2.06 .0428 
1 
ln Qi .849 .043 19.97 .0001 
P. .077 .161 .48 .6318 
1 
(Constant) -.350 1.484 -.24 .8140 
F 158.38 N = 87 
MSE = .237 dF = 83 
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The hypothesized inverse relationship betwee ln K. and P. occurs, 
l l 
but the coefficients on P. in both the capital and labor demand regres-
1 
sions are not statistically significant. The results suggest that either 
political influence on the demand for water utility labor and capital is 
unimportant or that P. is not measuring that political influence. It 
l 
may be that local political influence manifests itself more in the design 
of the rate structure than in the employment by water agencies of labor 
and capital. The last section in this chapter will assess the importance 
of local political influence on both inside and outside water rates. 
In Chapter IV, it was also suggested that politicians have a taste 
for expanding municipal services including water services. If politi-
cians have a taste for expanding municipal water services and if P. is 
l 
measuring the politician's inability to do this, P. is expected to be 
l 
inversely related to water system costs. That is, local politicians 
in states that regulate municipal water rates will have less of an 
ability to influence rate and extension policies that affect both the 
water firm's size and costs. The cost function derived in Chapter V is 
estimated for the public sample only. The equation to be estimated is 
given in (7.3) below. 
ln C. - ln r. 
l l 
a 1 
a+ a+S(ln wi - ln ri) + a+S ln Qi+ 
dP. + U. 
l l 
where d < 0 
and the regression estimates are shown in Table XXV. 
The sign on P. is inverse as hypothesized and is significantly 
l 
(7.3) 
less than zero at a .11 level. Thus, the evidence from Tables. XXIV and 
XXV are only suggestive. The results do not strongly support the 
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hypothesis that local regulatory-political influence is an important 
noneconomic determinant of water utility capital, labor, and variable 
costs. These results combined with the previous results from the chapter 
on firm efficiency do suggest, however, that ownership is an important 
noneconomic determinant of water utility capital, labor, and cost. 
TABLE KXV 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE COST EQUATION EMPLOYING (P) 
Standard T Significance 
Variable Coefficient Error Value Level 
(ln w. - ln r .) .769 .138 
l l 
5.60 .001 
ln Qi .821 .031 26.50 .0001 
P. -.142 .117 -1.21 .2294* 
l 
(Constant) -7.297 1.081 -6.75 .0001 
R2 = .896 F = 238 .15 N = 87 -2 
.892 MSE .126 dF = 83 R = = 
*Significantly less than zero at a .11 level. 
Local Regulation and the Incentive to 
Engage in Economic Regulation 
In Chapter IV, it was hypothesized that local regulators, 
principally city councilmen, relative to state regulatory commissioners 
have less of an incentive to engage in economic regulation which is 
defined here as the extensive review and regulation necessary to impose 
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cost-based pricing. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that non-cost 
influences such as local political influences would be expected to be 
more important for locally-regulated than state-regulated utilities. 
To gain greater insight into utility rate-making, the average price 
regressions estimated previously were reestimated for the sample of 
locally-regulated water firms used in Chapter VI and compared to the 
state-regulated estimates presented in that chapter. The results of 
these regressions are consistent with the argument that economic regula-
tion or (cost-based pricing) is less rigorously imposed at the local than 
at the state level of regulation. Comparing adjusted R2s for the state 
versus local regu~_ation subsamples, utility pricing for the state-
regulated sample appears to be much more cost-based ·than it is for the 
locally-regulated sample (Table XXVI). 
TABLE XXVI 
ADJUSTED R2 FOR RESIDENTIAL, CO}frfERCIAL, AND 
INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE PRICE REGRESSIONS 
State Regulation Local Regulation 
Regression N = 55 N = 71 
Residential .705 .486 
Commercial .678 .311 
Industrial .598 .234 
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This conclusion together with the earlier statement from the chapter on 
utility pricing and rate levels that it was difficult to conclude that 
IOU pricing is more cost-related than POU pricing implies that both 
Hansman's (45) and Hennigan's (48) findings that private ownership 
relative to public ownership is associated with more cost-based pricing 
may be the result of regulatory effects,not controlled for rather than 
the effect of ownership per se. 
Local Regulatory-Political Influence 
and Water Rates 
Outside Residential Water Rates 
For the water industry, it has been hypothesized by Crain and 
Zardkoohi (according to De Alessi [33]) and Mann (66) that politically-
active markets would receive lower water rates than politically-inactive 
markets. Peltzman (90) tested a similar hypothesis for the electric 
power industry. The 1970 AWWA survey provides data on both inside and 
outside residential water rates for the 500 cubic foot (or 3,750 gallon) 
consumption level. Those users outside city boundaries are defined as 
politically inactive whereas inside users constitute the politically 
active market. In discussing Crain and Zardkoohi' s article, De Alessi (33) 
notes that Crain and Zardkoohi apparently controlled for no variables 
other than ownership. There was no attempt to assess the regulatory-
political effect on inside vers~s outside rates. Crain and Zardkoohi 
found as hypothesized that inside rates are lower than outside rates. 
In order to determine if local regulatory-political influences tend 
to bias rates upward for politically inactive markets and downward for 
politically-active markets, it is necessary to control for ownership and 
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cost-of-service differentials. Because the AWWA operating data do not 
disaggregate sales to residential users according to whether they reside 
in- or outside municipal boundaries, no attempt will be made to control 
for cost-of-service differentials. However, it is possible using the 
sample used in the chapter on utility pricing to control for ownership. 
All POUs in that sample for which residential outside rates were reported 
constitute the sample used to test the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between outside to inside water rate ratios for state- and 
locally-regulated public water utilities. If inside customers are 
preferred to outside customers by local politicians, and if local 
political influence is more important at local levels of regulation than 
at state levels of regulation, the ratio of outside to inside water rates 
for a given level of consumption is expected to be higher for locally-
1 
regulated relative to state-regulated POUs. 
The inside and outside water rates used to test the above hypothesis 
are inside and outside residential water rates for the 3,750 gallon 
consumption level. Missing data.resulted in the loss of five of the 
state-regulated POUs and seven of the locally-regulated POUs. The 
resulting sample consists of 64 locally-regulated and 19 state-regulated 
POUs. The Mann-Whitney U test is used as the. statistical test of the 
null hypothesis. The results are presented in Table XX.VII. 
1For state regulation, poth inside and outside users constitute the 
politically-active market. Thus, state regulators would be expected to 
be indifferent between these two user grcups with respect to rate levels. 
Differences in the treatment of these user groups are expected, however, 
to occur for locally-regulated water utilities. To the extent that 
outside to inside water rate ratios <lifter by the type of regulation, it 
can be inferred that regulatory-political effects do constitute important 
non-cost effects on water utility rate making. 
TABLE XXVII 
MAl~N-WHITNEY U TEST; RATIO OF OUTSIDE TO INSIDE 







Ratio of Outside to 
Inside Water Rates 
(3, 7 50 gallons) 
Mean Rank 
z·statistic 
One-tail Level of Significance 




The null hypothesis that outside to inside residenLial water rates 
are not affected by regulation type can be rejected at a .119 one-tail 
level of significance in favor of the alternative hypothesis that local 
regulatory-political influences relative to state-regulatiqn results in 
higher outside-to-inside municipal water rates. This result suggests 
that the type of regulation faced by utilities may be an important factor 
in the treatment of outside customers relative to inside customers. 
Inside Water Rates 
In Chapter IV it was hypothesized that both city councilmen and 
state regulatory commissioners have incentives to favor industrial 
relative to residential customers. It was also asserted that the 
preference for industrial customers would be greater for locally-
regulated that state-regulated water utilities. It was hypothesized 
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in Chapter IV that user group influence via regulatory forces would result 
in preferential water rates. In order to test this hypothesis, two 
rankings were used to measure the "importance" of the industrial user 
group relative to the residential user class. If preferential water 
rates result from user group influence being brought to bear on politi-
cians and regulators, then as measures of the "importance" of the 
industrial user group increases, price-marginal costs ratios for that 
group are expected to decrease. 
The two rankings used to measure the industrial user group's degree 
of importance or influence are: 
1. Each firm is ranked according to the percentage of total water 
sold to industrial customers, and 
2. Firms for which data are available are ranked according to the 
percentage of total value added contributed by the five 
2-digit SIC industries that make the heaviest use of municipally-
supplied water. The value added data is from the 1972 Census 
of Manufacturers (106) and pertains to the cities in which the 
water utility is located. The SIC industries are: 
33 - Primary Metals 
29 - Petroleum and Coal 
28 - Chemicals and Allied Products 
26 Paper and Allied Products 
20 - Food and Kindred Products 
Once the firms are ranked for each ownership type, the top half of 
the sample is compared to the bottom half in terms of the industrial 
price-marginal cost ratio. If the rankings are in ascending order, the 
top relative to the bottom half of both rankings is expected to be 
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associated with lower industrial price-marginal cost ratios. The null 
hypothesis to be tested is that there is no difference between the 
industrial price-marginal cost ratics of the top and bottom halves of 
both rankings. In order to control for both ownership and regulatory 
influences, the rankings were separately done for IOUs, state-regulated 
POUs, and locally-regulated POUs. 
Based upon the arguments in Chapter IV, the null hypothesis is 
expected to be rejected for all three classifications mentioned above. 
That is, state and local regulators are expected to respond to industrial 
user group influence. If this influence impinges more directly on local 
regulators than state regulators, the null hypothesis is expected to be 
rejected at a higher level of significance for locally-regulated water 
agencies than would be the case for the state-regulated IOUs and POUs. 
Again, tests for normality indicate that the nonparamEtric Mann-
Whitney U test is the appropriate test of the null hypothesis stated 
above. The null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that as the importance of the industrial user class increases, 
the industrial price-marginal cost ratio falls (see Table X...~VIII). This 
is the case for all three classifications below. Note that the Z 
statistic is more than twice as large for the locally-regulated POU 
sample than it is for both the state-regulated IOU and POU samples. 
These results support the hypothesis that user group influence via the 
regulatory structure is more important for locally-regulated relative 
to state-regulated water utilities. 
Using ranking 2, for only nine of the 31 IOUs and 26 of the POUs 
were there adequate value added data. Of the 26 POUs, five were state-
regulated. It was decided to drop the five state-regulated POUs and 
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test the null hypothesis using only two classifications: state-regulated 
IOUs and locally-regulated POUs. The same testing procedure that was 
followed above is followed with respect to ranking 2. When the top and 
bottom halves of the rankings were compared using the Mann-Whitney U 
test, the mean rank score for the top half of the POU sample was smaller 
than for the bottom half indicating that industrial price-marginal cost 
ratios are lower as the industrial user group influence increases. Just 
the opposite relationship occured for the IOU classification. However, 
in neither case were the results statistically significant (see Table 
XXIX). 
TABLE XXVIII 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST; INDUSTRIAL PRICE-MARGINAL 
COST RATIOS BY RANKING 1 
z 
Utility Type N Statistic 
IOU 
(State Regulated) 31 -2.37 
POU 
(State Regulated) 24 -2. 77 
POU 







MANN-WHITNEY U TEST; INDUSTRIAL PRICE-MARGINAL 
COST RATIOS BY RANKING 2 
Mean Rank Hean Rank z 
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Level of 
Utility Type N Top Half Bottom Half Statistic Significance 
N = 5 N = 4 
IOU 9 6.20 3.50 -1.4697 .1416 
(State Regulation) 
N = 11 N = 10 
POU 21 10. 73 11.30 - • 2113 .8327 
(Local Regulation) 
The results are therefore mixed with respect to political influence 
and user group preference. Ranking 1 provides support for the regulatory-
political influence hypothesis advanced in Chapter IV. Ranking 2, 
however, casts some doubt upon whether ranking 1 is actually measuring 
user group influence via the regulatory structure. In order to ensure 
that ranking 1 was not capturing scale effects, the variable used in 
ranking 1 was correlated with the water utility scale variable, millions 
of gallons per day, used in the average price regressions. The simple 
correlation coefficient was -.134 hardly indicating that Tanking 1 was 
capturing scale effects. In fact, the simple correlation suggests that 
utility size and the importance of the industrial user class are 
negatively related. 
Conclusion 
The iesults of this chapter suggest that political-regulatory 
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influence may be an important factor shaping the opportunity sets faced 
by managers. Local regulators relative to state regulators tend to 
bias utility costs upward, tend to engage in less economic regulation, 
tend to prefer inside users relative to outside customers, and at least 
for ranking 1 tend to respond more to the user group influence of 
industrial customer's. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY Ai~D CONCLUSIONS 
Summary and Conclusions 
As was stated in the introductory chapter, one objective of this 
dissertation was to derive a geometric model of a decision maker's 
maximization of utility that -is general enough to incorporate the relax-
ation of all of the major ownership property rights. The model developed 
in Chapter II not only is able to allow for th~ relaxation of ownership 
rights, but can also be used to assess the effect that other important 
industry characteristics have on managerial behavior. 
It was shown in Chapter II that a manager of a privately owned and 
unregulated corporation faced a different set of constraints on utility 
maximizing behavior than the manager-owner of the "classical" firm. 
The corporate manager maximizes utility in pecuniary-nonpecuniary 
income space whereas the "classical" owner-manager maximizes pecuniary 
income or profit. The reason for this distinction is that for the case 
of incorporation, a corporate manager's pecuniary income is no longer 
equal to profit as it was for the case of the classical manager. 
The constraint on the classical owner-manager's behavior was a 
function of the market environment and technological characteristics of 
the firm. The constraint on the corporate manager's behavior includes 
in addition to the market and technologj_c2l constraints, the minimal 
- return required by the owner' s of the firm. The minimal profit 
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requirement depends in part upon the costs to owners of monitoring 
management. The greater these costs, the more discretion that managers 
will have to use the firm's resources to pursue utility-generating 
activities. It was also noted in Chapter II that because the manager's 
consumption of nonpecuniary income was expected to be less visible to 
owners than their consumption of pecuniary income, managers would 
consume relatively more nonpecuniary than pecuniary income as constraints 
are relaxed. In sum, the separation of ownership from management is 
expected to produce both an income and substitution effect on the 
manager's opportunity set. The corporate manager will consume more 
nonpecuniary and pecuniary income with his consumption of nonpecuniary . . 
income increasing relative to pecuniary income as constraints are relaxed. 
The model was also used to compare the managerial behavior of 
private, private and regulated, and public firms. For instance, the 
model predicts that the manager of a regulated private firm will consume 
more pecuniary and nonpecuniary income than the manager of a comparable 
unregulated private firm, but less pecuniary and nonpecuniary income 
than the manager of a comparable public firm. Chapter IV extends the 
model by investigating differences in the constraints imposed on public 
and private water utility managers by some industry characteristics 
other than ownership. Chapter IV also gives some content to the manager's 
utility function. This makes possible a wider range of behavioral 
implications than is possible for the general model developed in 
Chapter II. 
The brief overview of the water utility industry presented in 
Chapter III pictures the water industry as an industry. that has grown 
largely in line with general population growth. It is not a very 
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technologically progressive industry, nor can it be stated conclusively 
that there are economies of scale particularly when considering individual 
system components. The industry is dominated with public water firms 
with some 8 percent of the total number of public and private water firms 
serving 80 percent of the total population served. The water industry 
is one of the most capital intensive industries with fixed costs 
accounting for roughly one-third of total costs. Further, it appears 
that public water firms face a variety of forms of local regulation, but 
city council regulation is the dominant type. Private water firms are' · 
almost exclusively subject to state regulation. 
Public utili~ies in general tend to be self-supporting but many are 
tied financially to the local government. Some rely on subsidies for 
operationandothers generate surpluses that are often used by the cities 
as a type of unlegislated tax revenue. Most utilities, private and 
public, employ a declining-block rate pricing policy although public 
and private water utilities differ with respect to the estimation of 
revenue requirements. Finally, it was noted that at least for 1969, 
water utilities apparently were producing water which did not conform 
to the 1962 drinking water standards. 
In Chapter IV, the effect of industry characteristics other than 
ownership on managerial behavior was analyzed. Specifically, the 
important water industry characteristics that are expected to affect 
the manager's opportunity set are property taxes and in-lieu payments; 
capital financing; external sources of revenue such as property tax 
levies, government subsidies, and special assessments; and regulation. 
Property taxes and in-lieu payment to local governments constrain the 
manager's consumption of pecuniary and nonpecuniary income by absorbing 
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a portion of the manager's discretionary profits. Property tax levies, 
local government subsidies, and special assessments have just the 
opposite effect. Because an investor-owned utility's tax burden exceeds 
the contribution that some public firms make to local government in the 
form of in-lieu payments and because public firms are of ten subsidized 
by local government, managers of public firms have fewer constraints 
placed on their want-satisficing activities relative to private 
managers. This reinforces a conclusion from Chapter II that a public 
manager relative to a private manager will have more discretionary 
resources with which to consume pecuniary and nonpecuniary income. 
Capital financing for public relative to private water utilities 
results in lower per unit capital costs which allows more discretionary 
resources to be diverted by managers to utility-generating activities. 
Lower capital costs are also expected to encourage a more capital 
intensive operation. Regulation was hypothesized to affect managerial 
property rights by altering ownership rights and by directly placing 
operating constraints on management. Political motives via the 
regulatory structure were hypothesized to be an important determinant 
of the behavior of public managers,. particularly for locally-regulated 
water firms .. 
Implications of the utility maximization model regarding managerial 
behavior with respect to firm efficiency, rate-making, and product 
quality were derived in Chapter IV. A number of these hypotheses can 
be inferred directly from the efficiency implications of the general 
model discussed in Chapter II. The hypotheses discussed in Chapter IV 
that are implications of the general model are that public water firms 
relative to private water firms will incur higher costs, combine inputs 
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less efficiently, have lower average products of labor and capital, and 
will incur more input waste. 
The price discrimination hypothesis can also be derived from the 
implications of the general model in Chapter II. The model in Chapter II 
implies that managers have an incentive to increase the discretionary 
resources over which they have command. One way for public managers to 
accomplish this is to price discriminate. In Chapter IV it was noted 
that a private water manager would be expected to price discriminate 
at least up to the point at which the owner's minimal return is assured. 
It was also noted that because of the private utility owner's emphasis 
on wealth maximization, private relative to public water managers would 
likely price discriminate more completely. 
For the other hypotheses discussed in Chapter IV, however, it was 
necessary to add content to the manager's utility function. It was 
necessary to make assumptions about the sources of managerial utility 
and what kinds of activities give rise to managerial satisfaction. By 
assuming that specific managerial activities were related to specific 
sources of utility, additional implications of the model were derived. 
This was accomplished by first assuming that the utility functions of 
private and public managers were identical and then altering managerial 
property rights in order to make directional statements about the 
managers' consumption of various sources of managerial utility. In 
particular, it was hypothesized that public water managers relative 
to private water managers would employ more labor and capital, charge 
lower user prices for all customer classes, give preferential treatment 
to high-usage relative to low-usage customers and to residents relative 
to nonresidents, and would produce a higher quality product. 
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The evidence reported in Chapter V is consistent with the alternative 
hypotheses that public relative to private water firms are less efficient, 
but produce a higher quality product. It was found that public ownership 
exerts a positive effect on both the demand for labor and capital. The 
reduced-form input demand function performed best for the labor demand 
regression. Economic considerations appear to play more of a role in the 
water firm's demand for labor than its demand for capital. An implica-
tion is that noneconomic factors such as ownership may be more important 
in explaining the water system's demand for capital than its demand for 
labor. It was also found that public water firms employ input combina-
tions less efficiently, incur higher variable costs, have lower average . . 
products of labor and capital, and produce a higher quality product. 
The only hypothesis from Chapter IV that produced results incon-
sistent with the predictions of the property rights model was the input 
waste hypothesis. The results of that test were not significant, 
however. 
The results from Chapter V leave the water policy maker in an 
uneasy position. If a region has both water quality and water shortfall 
problems, it is not clear whether public or private ownership is to be 
preferred. Public ownership is apparently associated with higher water 
quality, but the more efficient private water supplier would be expected 
to be able to produce more water for a given commitment of resources. 
In those regions that experience periodic water shortages but have a 
reasonably high level of raw water quality, private ownership may be 
preferred to public ownership as a possible alternative to water 
conservation practices. 
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In Chapter VI, results of tests of the rate level hypothesis revealed 
that public relative to private water firms charge lower water rates for 
all user groups. This result obtains even after controlling for 
differences in tax liabilities and regulation. Further, the cost-based 
pricing model performed better for the residential customer group than 
it did for either the commercial or industrial user groups. The pricing 
model performed even better for a subsample of just state-regulated 
water utilities. Cost factors, therefore, seem to be more important 
determinants of residential relative to commercial and industrial rates 
and for state-regulated utility rates in general. The implication 
drawn in Chapter VI was that noncost factors such as local political 
influence may be more important in explaining commercial and industrial 
water rates, particularly for locally-regulated utilities than in 
explaining the water rates of residential users. It was not concluded 
in Chapter VI, however, that private water firms' rate-making practices 
are more cost-based than public water firms' rate making. 
The evidence from the last half of Chapter VI is consistent with 
the alternative hypothesis that public water firms price discriminate. 
It was found that industrial customers benefit from the lowest price-
marginal cost ratios and that price discrimination is practiced between 
all possible pairs of user groups. The null hypothesis that there is 
no difference in the extent to which public and private water firms 
price discriminate could not be rejected. 
The results from Chapter VI also provide implications regarding 
water conservation policies. Lower water prices for all user groups 
mean that the quantity of water demanded will be greater and there will 
be the need for earlier investment in capacity than if water rates were 
higher. Thus, the finding that public relative to private ownership 
results in lower water prices suggests that the conversion of public 
water assets to private ownership or some sort of combined franchise 
system of operation would likely result in more economic pricing with 
prices performing the rationing function rather than legislative fiat. 
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In Chapter VII attempts were made to isolate local regulatory-
political influences from ownership in order to determine if regulatory-
political constraints on the manager's opportunity set were important 
influences on managerial behavior. Using a regulatory binary variable 
as a proxy of local regulatory-political influence, the evidence 
presented in Chapter VII appears to be consistent with much of the 
discussion of the expected regulatory-political effects on managerial 
behavior presented in Chapter IV. Specifically, it appears that local 
regulators (city councilmen) relative to state regulators tend to bias 
utility costs upward, engage in less economic regulation, and give 
preferential treatment to the politically-active users relative to 
the politically-inactive users. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The model discussed in Chapter II and expanded and applied in 
Chapter IV generated a number of implications regarding the behavior 
of private and public water utility managers. The empirical results 
presented in Chapters V, VI, and VII attest to the power and potential 
of property rights analysis. There is need, however, for further 
theoretical and empirical efforts in property rights theory. 
Economists are still uneasy about allowing themselves the liberty 
of discussing what constitutes the components of the decision maker's 
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utility function. More research is needed by economists and other social 
scientists on the factors that decision makers consider as important 
sources of satisfaction. The dividends of such research will come in the 
form of an expanded set of behavioral implications. 
A wider range of application of the property rights theory is 
needed. The utility maximization model can be used to derive behavioral 
implications for any type of decision maker as long as the decision 
maker's property rights can be distinguished. Conceivably, political 
models, models of comparative economic systems, models of childhood 
behavior and so on could be built in the property rights context. 
Further, economists need to work closer with other disciplines such as 
psychology, sociology, political science, and management when formulating 
property rights models. 
Work remains to be done in providing more conclusive tests of the 
efficiency, price, and quality hypotheses. The availability of 
disaggregated cost data would allow the estimation of cost functions 
for each water system component •. It would also make it easier to 
accurately estimate long-run marginal costs WQich are needed for the 
price discrimination hypothesis. There is also a need for more 
accurately assigning marginal costs to the various useY groups. Access 
to complete rate schedules together with detailed cost and production 
data are needed if simultan2ous-equation models are to be used to 
minimize simultaneity problems that exist in the regulated environment. 
If national chemical contaminant, water operator grade level, 
surveillance, and other important data become available on a firm level, 
there is need for a test of the water quality hypothesis for the nation 
as a whole to ensure that the results presented in Chapter V are ~ot 
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unique to Oklahoma. Other aspects of product quality should be investi-
gated as well such as customer service and water pressue at the tap. 
Finally, there appear to have been virtually no attempts to 
determine the importance of ownership relative to other factors that 
affect the manager's opportunity set. Hore work needs to be done to 
determine what industry characteristics are consistently more important 
determinants of managerial behavior. There is still much need to 
investigate. the importance of local regulatory-political forces on the 
public manager's behavior and to distinguish that effect from the 
ownership effect on managerial behavior. 
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